[photo credit: @UAE_YOT2019]
When then president Donald Trump proclaimed the Abraham Accords
on September 15 of last year, he said that several other Arab nations
would normalise relations with Israel. And in the case of two, Morocco
and Sudan, with the transactional tactics that he used, Trump was able
to bend the arms of those countries. With Sudan, it was to drop the
sanctions. In the case of Morocco, it was to acknowledge their
sovereignty over the Western Sahara. But he also claimed that Saudi
Arabia would sign up, it hasn't happened, at least not yet. Do you see
it happening anytime soon?
There definitely is a trend toward normalisation that we see in the
Arab world and there's no doubt that Saudi Arabia is a part of this
trend, even though Riyadh has not yet joined the Abraham Accords. Maybe
Riyadh will later, maybe not. Time will tell. But nonetheless, Saudi
Arabia is in support of this trend toward normalisation. But in my
opinion it is unlikely that at any point, at least with King Salman,
still on the throne, that Saudi Arabia would announce, in a public
manner, that it has joined the Abraham Accords.
What I think is more likely is that we are going to see Saudi Arabia,
taking some mini steps toward normalisation. And it's important to
realise that from the Saudi leadership's perspective, making any moves
which would signal an official abandonment of the Palestinian cause
comes with real risks. Saudi Arabia, unlike the UAE, or Bahrain is a
large country, large in terms of geography, population. And there could
be anger among maybe Saudi clerics or just even average citizens in
Saudi Arabia, if the Saudis were to enter into the Abraham Accords. This
is not what the Saudi leadership wants right now. So that has to do, of
course, with the domestic landscape in Saudi Arabia.
At the same time when we're talking about the issue on the regional
or the global level, you need to keep in mind that since the 1980s the
King of Saudi Arabia has formally been the Custodian of the Two Holy
Mosques. Saudi Arabia has a leadership role in the Islamic world. And
there are other countries such as Iran and Turkey, which represent
challenges to Saudi Arabia's position as the self-anointed or the
supposed leader of the Islamic world. And I think the Saudi leadership
understands that Riyadh entering into the Abrahamic Accords could give
more ammunition to Iran or Turkey when trying to challenge Saudi
Arabia's position vis a vis the Islamic world. Now, there are certain
ways in which the Saudis could benefit from joining the Abraham Accords,
the ways in which the four countries that normalised relations with
Israel last year have benefited from defence cooperation with Israel,
trade investment, energy ties, high tech is obviously a big part of the
picture. I think Mohammed bin Salman would like to see his country have
those gains and those benefits that could come with a normalised
relationship with Israel. But again, as I said, those other factors, all
those risks, I think are going to result in Riyadh being quite cautious
on this issue.
And meantime, the Israelis and the Emiratis are getting on like a
house on fire. And it seems to me, Giorgio, they're very much on the
same page. Still the Emiratis do argue that it was they who halted the
West Bank annexation and therefore protected the Palestinians. I'm
wondering what you make of that argument?
This idea that the UAE, entering the Abraham Accords and pushing it
throughout the region, was going to be of any benefit to the
Palestinians was absurd. Obviously, the UAE has not stated that they're
abandoning the Palestinians. They're framing it that the Abraham Accords
helps the Palestinians. But that's absolutely absurd. This notion that
Arab countries normalising diplomatic ties with Israel would result in
the Israelis treating the Palestinians any better is ridiculous. We saw
what happened with the conflict in May 2021. We've seen settlements
continue to expand all the time. It's clear that the Palestinians have
been a loser from the Abraham Accords. What Israel has taken away from
the Abraham Accords is that they can become increasingly integrated into
the Middle East's diplomatic fold without making a single concession to
the Palestinians. I would argue that this has only encouraged the worst
of the worst of Israeli behaviour.
What about other Gulf states? We've talked about Saudi Arabia and
your sense - and I agree with you that it's unlikely that, in the near
future, the Saudis would recognise Israel - but what about Oman, Qatar,
Kuwait? What is the level of their current engagement with Israelis? And
do you see them moving forward with recognition?
I don't think that any of these three GCC states that you mentioned, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman would join the Abraham Accords.
I would argue that the last GCC state which would enter the Abraham
accords is Kuwait. Kuwait's foreign policy is firmly pro-Palestinian;
anti-Israeli, anti-Zionist sentiments are very strong in Kuwait. There
is no appetite among any figures in the Kuwaiti government or Kuwaiti
society for normalisation. Kuwait has been extremely vocal in opposing
the Abraham Accords. And one reason why this is the case has to do with
the fact that Kuwait is a semi-democracy. There is a legislative body
there, the National Assembly which does represent the people of the
country, and therefore this democratic aspect of the Kuwaiti political
system helps us understand why leaders need to be vocally
pro-Palestinian. It's because they are more accountable to citizens in
the country's political system. So, as I said, I think Kuwait could
possibly even be, maybe with the exception of Algeria, the Arab League
member I have the most difficult time imagining entering the Abraham
Accords. Now to be sure, Kuwait would formalise diplomatic relations
with Israel within the context of the Arab Peace Initiative. But we all
know that Israel is not going to go back to the 1967 borders so I think
we can be quite comfortable in ruling out the possibility of Kuwait
following Abu Dhabi's lead on this front.
When it comes to Qatar the situation is not necessarily all that
different. The Palestinian issue is one that matters to the leadership
in Doha. It's also an issue that matters to average Qatari citizens. Of
course, we should keep in mind that Qatar has engaged Israel a lot over
the years. The Qataris are pragmatic, they understand that Israel is a
reality in the region and they don't see any reason to pretend
otherwise. But a formalisation of Qatar’s relationship with Israel, I
don't think will happen and this, again, has to do with public opinion,
as well as elite opinion in Doha. Also Qatar has a foreign policy that
relies on soft power to a large extent. Qatar’s narrative is that it is a
GCC country that stands for human rights, human dignity and the
Palestinian cause is important to this narrative. In international
forums Qatari officials always raise the issue of Palestine and for
Qatar just to abandon the Palestinian cause in favour of a normalised
relationship with Israel, is just a little difficult for me to imagine. I
would also add one more point when we're talking about Qatar and
Israel: the Israelis might actually have their own vested interests in
keeping Qatar outside of the Abraham Accords. Why is that? Well, it
boils down to Qatar and their relationship with Hamas. While there have
definitely been a number of Israeli commentators, politicians, and in
the US, there are many pro-Israel politicians and commentators who blast
Doha for having a relationship with Hamas, it's not lost on the Israeli
leadership that Qatar has been able to, at times, keep a lid on things
in Gaza by providing assistance to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.
And Qatar has been able to be somewhat of a diplomatic bridge between
Hamas on one side and Israel and the US government on the other. If the
Qataris were to enter the Abraham Accords, I think that would throw off
Qatar’s relationship with Hamas, which as I said, both the US and Israel
have incentives to see stay alive.
And Oman?
Lastly, when talking about Oman, we should keep in mind that the
Omanis, like the Qataris have had a pragmatic relationship with Israel
for decades. We remember in October 2018, then Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu came to Oman. He was also not the first Israeli prime minister
to visit the Sultanate. So there's definitely engagement between the
Omanis and Israelis. But Oman believes that the Palestinian issue is
important and believes that the issue needs to be resolved before Muscat
can join other Arab capitals in terms of formalising diplomatic
relations with Israel. The Omanis I know believe that their country
should always be a potential platform for Israelis and others in the
region to come to, to discuss peace. If the Israelis want to be serious,
one day, about making peace with the Palestinians I am positive, they
will always be welcome in Muscat, to come there and to have talks, which
are aimed at resolving issues in the region. So Oman is definitely not
hostile to Israel. But Oman, in my opinion, will not be abandoning the
Arab Peace Initiative. And just as the case in Kuwait and Qatar we have
in Oman, ruling figures in the government who care about the Palestinian
cause. And there's widespread support for the Palestinian cause among
the average Omanis on the streets, so it would be very unpopular
domestically to abandon the Arab Peace Initiative. And a final point.
Oman has always been the GCC country that has the warmest relationship
with Iran. The Omanis and Iranians definitely disagree about certain
things and have different perspectives. But the Omanis have always been
sensitive to Iran’s security and the interests of Iran are ones that
Oman’s government has cared about. Oman has over the years avoided
taking actions that would result in Iran feeling increasingly insecure.
And Tehran absolutely views the Abraham Accords as a threat to Iran
security, as well as Iran's geopolitical position in the region. So in
the interest of creating serious problems for Muscat’s relationship with
Tehran, Oman is further incentivised to stay out of the Abraham
Accords. But again, I will also say, the case for Kuwait and Qatar is
also the same for Oman. It's a country that fully supports the Arab
Peace Initiative. And if the Israelis would ever go back to the 1967
borders, I'm sure they would welcome an opportunity to normalise
relations with Israel. But that is so far away from where we are today.