Olaf Scholz will not follow Washington's China playbook
New German chancellor wants Beijing ties based on European policy
Judy Dempsey is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor-in-chief of the international relations blog Strategic Europe.
During her long stint as German Chancellor, Angela Merkel shaped German and European policy toward China. During her first term in office that began in 2005, she placed human rights and values high on her agenda. That focus did not last long.
For 16 years, as leader of Europe's biggest economy and a country that is one of China's most important trading partners, Merkel pursued three main policies in dealing with China.
She put Germany's economic interests before values. She pushed for a more independent European policy with Beijing instead of supporting the United States' more combative strategy toward Beijing. And she avoided adopting policies that would isolate or antagonize China.
Her successor Olaf Scholz, a Social Democrat, is expected to take a different approach.
His coalition not only includes the pro-business Free Democrats but also the Greens, whose leading member, Annalena Baerbock, now runs the foreign ministry. She has put values at the top of her agenda.
The big question is whether Baerbock can reconcile her defense of values with Germany's substantial economic and trade interests with China. It will be a difficult balancing act. Yet, the political climate has changed in Germany and Europe in ways that could make it easier for Berlin to recalibrate its conciliatory strategy toward Beijing.
For the new German government, China is now seen as "a systemic rival," as the country was unambiguously described in the German government's coalition agreement. Implicitly it means that Beijing's political and authoritarian system, its economic power and its growing military strength together pose strategic and ideological challenges to the West.
And with the emphasis of values in the coalition treaty and its implicit reference to China's deteriorating human rights record, its saber-rattling over Taiwan, and its crackdown on democracy and civil society in Hong Kong, it means that Berlin cannot continue to do business as usual with Beijing. Scholz's coalition has little choice but to embark on a new policy toward China.
If Baerbock has her way, that policy could consist of three elements. First, Berlin will pursue a dialogue with Beijing that is more open, frank and more European. The bilateral policies that Merkel pursued will be replaced by Berlin working much more closely with the European Union in forging a stronger, united stance. This is important, as it could prevent China from playing off EU member states against each other.
Second, when it comes to doing business with China, Berlin intends to adopt a much tougher policy again with its European partners.
Merkel, to her credit, repeatedly defended the need for transparent procurement and tender procedures. And she never gave up on the need to protect intellectual rights or make investment rules more attractive and fairer to foreign companies. German companies and business lobbies are today much more vocal and critical in demanding a level playing field.
And third, Berlin wants the EU to work more closely with the United States in forging a common economic and political strategy toward Beijing.
Germany, but also other big European member states, are reluctant to support Washington's confrontational approach toward China. It was an approach that Merkel did not buy into. Nor does Scholz.
What his government wants is a relationship with China that is based on a European policy, and not an exclusively German one, and one that has a strong trans-Atlantic component.
The latter is important. It is about Europe and the United States projecting a united front when it comes to dealing with human rights, cybersecurity, intellectual property issues and elements of transparency, such as sharing information about pandemics.
This is why the EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Council provides a much-needed and timely platform for the Europeans and Americans to discuss, and if possible iron out, their differences over China.
Interests inevitably get in the way for Germany as it tries to establish a common strategy on the European level, or for that matter, the EU working much more closely with the United States.
But the political climate in Europe toward China has changed from continuing, often uncritically, with the status quo to one that recognizes China's global role and its position as a competitive rival. A recent poll by the German-based Koerber Foundation concluded that less than 10% of the German public regard China's growing international influence as positive.
Skeptics can argue that Baerbock's commitment to human rights and values, coupled with a dialogue anchored on those views, will be overridden by the Chancellery.
After all, it is the Chancellery that has immense influence over foreign policy, especially the dossiers related to China, the United States, Russia and the EU. Merkel kept a firm hand on those dossiers, to the detriment of the foreign ministry. But 2021 is a very different era from the Germany and China of 2005.