Michael Beckley and Hal Brands have a curious view of modern Chinese history:
Beijing is a remarkably ambitious revanchist power, one determined to make China whole again by “reuniting” Taiwan with the mainland, turning the East and South China Seas into Chinese lakes, and grabbing regional primacy as a stepping-stone to global power.
It is also increasingly encircled, and faces growing resistance on many fronts—just the sort of scenario that has led it to lash out in the past.
The historical record since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 is clear: When confronted by a mounting threat to its geopolitical interests, Beijing does not wait to be attacked; it shoots first to gain the advantage of surprise.
It is telling that Beckley and Brands can point to so few examples of this supposed pattern, because China has so rarely sent its military into other countries. In the 72 years since it was created, the People’s Republic of China has gone to war with other states all of three times, plus some relatively minor skirmishing with the Soviets in 1969. China has not fought a war since its ill-prepared invasion of Vietnam failed 42 years ago. That does not mean that the Chinese government can’t or won’t attack its neighbors, and the China of 2021 is much stronger militarily than the China of 1979, but the overall record doesn’t support Beckley and Brands’ interpretation very well.
Presumably China has faced threats to its interests many times over the decades, so it is strange that they have so rarely resorted to “shooting first.” Beckley and Brands want to portray China as a trigger-happy aggressor-in-waiting, but the record is much more mixed and suggests considerable wariness about resorting to the use of force. They say, “this pattern of first strikes and surprise attacks has seemingly been on hold” for the last forty years, so that strongly suggests that the “pattern” they have identified either doesn’t exist or is no longer relevant to Chinese conduct today.
Conveniently, Beckley and Brands tell us that it is this period of more than forty years that is the “aberration.” When a state behaves one way for a majority of its modern existence, it is quite odd to declare that this is the departure from the real “pattern” that it normally follows. China’s apparent reluctance to use force outside its borders is a big problem for China hawks that need them to be on the warpath. Their solution to this problem is to wave it away and say that it doesn’t matter now. For a “remarkably ambitious revanchist power,” China has not engaged in much actual revanchism. There is understandable concern that this could change in the future, but if you are arguing that we should expect China to behave as it did in the past it is surely relevant that China hasn’t made a habit of launching wars to seize territory.
Beckley and Brands conclude, “Beijing turns violent when confronted with the prospect of permanently losing control of territory.” One might ask the obvious question: how is this any different from how other states act? If any major power were confronted with the prospect of losing control of territory, it would fight to prevent that outcome. If this is what causes China to “lash out,” as they claim, wouldn’t the wiser course of action be to stop hemming them in with an anti-China coalition? If that is what provokes China to use force, it would be genuinely stupid to make an explicit security guarantee to Taiwan. It would also be pretty dim to argue “that the United States and its allies need to rapidly shut China’s windows of military opportunity,” since it is supposedly the closing window of opportunity that would drive China to strike.
Beckley and Brands are arguing that the U.S. should gamble with provoking an unnecessary war on the assumption that the U.S. and its allies can effectively “close” the “window” before China can act. This amounts to playing a game of chicken with another major power in the belief that they will swerve to avoid the collision first. It’s exceptionally dangerous and irresponsible, and the U.S. should want no part of it.