Dr Barnett Rubin, an expert on Afghanistan, has written a classic essay in the genre, ‘If only they had taken my advice…’
He has advised at the highest levels of policy-making for decades. His essay makes a convincing case that his advice should have been taken, because, according to him, most of what he predicted would happen has happened. (So as not to disappoint, he includes a few predictions for the future of Taliban rule.)
An important question to ask is why his advice was not taken. It is not enough to say that Americans make lousy imperialists or that bureaucracies are myopic, ignorant, and stubborn, or that Afghans and their neighbours know which side their bread is buttered on, or that most attempts – from within or without – to impose a strong central government in a place like this must involve enduring multiple charades at once. All those things are already well known.
In Dr Rubin’s case, the question is about the adminstrative structure and personalities on his own country’s side. His depiction confirms the view that Richard Holbrooke was miscast in his final public role as special envoy to ‘Af-Pak’. The kind of hyperactive bullying and jawboning at which he excelled in the Balkans was ill suited to Afghanistan and its environs, or to the temperament of the president who appointed him, at least for this set of problems.
That verdict confirms what was said at the time, which was that Barack Obama erred in judging the character and the role of his two special envoys. George Mitchell might have done better in applying and selling ‘strategic patience’ in Central Asia; Richard Holbrooke might have dealt more forcefully and effectively with the Israelis and Palestinians and the problems their tragic relationship has caused for them and for others, including the American government.
The subject for another round of policy autopsies, probably.