In
its 10 months in office, the Biden administration has been generally
rudderless but steadfast in its China-bashing policy, which remains a
rare bipartisan rallying point in current American politics.
Lately,
the administration has seemed determined to be more provocative about
Taiwan, which Beijing maintains is a renegade province it will
eventually recover.
The latest round of intense speculation about US-China conflict over the island started on October 21, when President Joe Biden was asked
whether the United States would defend Taiwan if it was attacked by
mainland forces and he told CNN: “Yes, we have a commitment to do that.”
That
was followed by a statement issued on October 26 by Secretary of State
Anthony Blinken, saying: “We encourage all UN member states to join us
in supporting Taiwan’s robust, meaningful participation throughout the UN system and in the international community.”
In an obviously orchestrated moment that same week, Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, confirmed
to CNN the presence of US troops on the island. Citing a threat from
Beijing that was growing “every day”, she said: “We have a wide range of
cooperation with the US aiming at increasing our defence capability.”
This was tantamount to spitting in Beijing’s face while holding
Washington’s protective hand more tightly.
However, while Beijing has been unequivocal in regarding Taiwan as among China’s core interests,
and people have reason to be anxious about what might come next, I do
not foresee any real possibility of Beijing initiating war over Taiwan.
A
lot is being said about China’s current politics and top leader, but
talk about Beijing’s imminent attack on Taiwan is wide of the mark.
As Beijing has judged that “the East is rising and the West is declining”
and is confident that time is on its side, it is not in a position to
retake Taiwan – a move that would be economically and geopolitically
damaging, to say the least – unless Washington and Taipei force its
hand.
In
this regard, it is telling that when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi
met Blinken on October 31, he warned the Americans not to “bring
subversive damage to overall China-US ties” by mishandling the Taiwan
issue.
On
the same day, Blinken was asked by CNN to clarify Biden’s comments on
Taiwan and said: “There is no change in our policy.” Still, the game of
muscle-flexing and bluff is sure to continue between Beijing and
Washington.
A
deeper concern remains, however. Where is the current administration
heading in its relationship with Beijing, given not only China’s growing
economic prowess and geopolitical influence but also the US’ need to
sort out its domestic problems (which, in a way, is inextricably linked
to its handling of the bilateral relationship)?
According
to an NBC News poll, released on October 31, Biden’s approval rating
has fallen to 42 per cent, lower than that of any other modern
first-year president except Donald Trump.
Meanwhile,
Biden’s US$1.75 trillion social spending bill is struggling for support
even within the Democratic camp. And the prospect of the Republicans
making a forceful comeback in the 2022 midterm elections, or Trump seeking re-election in 2024, looms large on the horizon.
And
it is against this backdrop that the US trade representative, Treasury
secretary and special presidential envoy for climate speak of
cooperation with China.
Back in January, I raised the hope of a steadier US-China relationship
under the Biden administration, given the appointment as Indo-Pacific
tsar of Kurt Campbell, who could be expected to put the relationship on a
realistic footing. But I also warned that Washington might scapegoat
China as it lumbered through its daunting domestic agenda.
Unfortunately,
I hit the nail on the head in the second regard. Biden’s China team –
acting on a belief that “we are the good guy and China is the bad guy,
so we will win” – keeps doubling down on their hawkishness despite the
less-than-desired resultant ramifications. One only has to look at the
Afghanistan withdrawal fiasco and the “clumsy” (Biden’s own admission) handling of the Aukus alliance for proof of how they have blundered.
Beneath this lurks a more fundamental unease. In his 1952 book on US foreign policy, The Irony of American History,
Reinhold Niebuhr gave his fellow Americans penetrating advice when he
warned them against their “pretensions of innocency”. He associated the
American exceptionalism they hold dear with what he called the “deep
layer of Messianic consciousness” that underlies US foreign policy.
Niebuhr’s
contemporary, English novelist Graham Greene, held a similar view on
American immaturity and coined a memorable _expression_ in 1937, writing
about the “the eternal adolescence of the American mind”.
With
the Americans’ “Messianic consciousness” reinforced by their liberation
of the world during the second world war, and then their accidental
victory in the Cold War, Washington’s elite could be forgiven for
ignoring Niebuhr’s warning and instead applauding Francis Fukuyama’s
proclamation of the victory of liberal democracy and the “end of
history”.
Fast-forward
to the present, however, and it seems American exceptionalism has run
its course. The US should wake up to the fact that it may no longer be
exceptional, while recognising that the evil it discerns in others might
just as likely reside in itself.
Otherwise,
what is to stop it from yet another “clumsy” policy misstep? On the
matter of free will and its limits, Arthur Schopenhauer once said: “Man
can do what he wants but he cannot want what he wants.” In other words,
the freedom to do what one desires should not be mistaken for the
freedom to choose what one desires. Is America, so persistently
innocent, capable of making this distinction and growing up?
Terry
Su is president of Lulu Derivation Data Ltd, a Hong Kong-based online
publishing house and think tank specialising in geopolitics