Washington and other allied capitals have been abuzz with talk of nuclear submarines since the surprise announcement of the new trilateral pact
known as AUKUS in September. Aside from the frictions with France, the
new agreement has been met with nearly universal adulation from the U.S.
foreign policy establishment.
Some
have raised legitimate concerns about the impact of the deal on nuclear
non-proliferation. How to prevent myriad other countries from leaping
into the domain of nuclear power for military applications when this is
exactly how the leading powers are proceeding with selected “special
friends”?
The most devastating critique of AUKUS, however, was delivered
by someone well acquainted with the relevant facts: former Australian
Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. He asked incredulously how a country
with no civil nuclear program whatsoever was going to put together a
near-term program for nuclear submarine fabrication and operations?
Turnbull
concludes: “There is no design, no costing, no contract. The only
certainty is that we won’t have new submarines for 20 years, and their
cost will be a lot more than the French subs.”
Yet,
there is a related issue that may raise even more fundamental questions
for U.S. national security. This concerns whether the AUKUS deal might
accelerate an undersea arms race that is already underway, and could
paradoxically tip the balance against America and its allies. True,
China is making steady upgrades to its own nuclear submarine fleet and
has recently significantly enlarged its own nuclear submarine building capacity.
A new article appearing
in Global Times on Oct. 14 in Mandarin, but not in English reveals
another side to this arms race: “Faced with increasing pressure from the
maritime sector, China and Russia should vigorously strengthen
cooperation in the maritime dimension.”
“As
land-sea hybrid countries, they are facing the imperative to optimize
and integrate land and sea resources,” the author continues. “The
comprehensive strategic cooperation between the two countries in the
maritime dimension can give play to their respective comparative
advantages … so as to rationally coordinate their land and sea
resources.”
Notably,
the article proposes that Russia-China maritime cooperation go beyond
the Pacific to extend into the Atlantic and the Arctic.
Beijing
and Moscow have been coordinating maritime strategy for some time
already. Indeed, many of China’s aircraft, submarines, and missiles have
Russian origins. The Chinese fleet has already made some limited
appearances in both the Baltic and Black seas.
Yet,
recent developments may portend a significantly tighter alignment. In
August 2020, it was reported that China and Russia will cooperate in
building a conventional submarine — a first. More recently, Beijing
appears to have made
a very large order of Russian naval attack helicopters. Now, the
Chinese fleet has been exercising with the Russian Pacific Fleet off of
Vladivostok in the Sea of Japan.
Notably, the Chinese have brought along their top-of-the-line new surface combatant, the Type 055 cruiser. According to PLA Daily, the exercises demonstrate the great value of continuous and “back to back” naval exercises between the two navies.
There
are many reasons to be skeptical AUKUS is a “silver bullet” when it
comes to the Chinese maritime challenge. The PLA Navy has spent the last
two decades trying to close the gap on anti-submarine warfare and
progress is evident, whether in the buildup of light frigates or
maritime patrol aircraft. Moreover, nuclear submarines may not be
optimal for the shallow and often confined waters of the East Asian
littoral. Modern diesel submarines are arguably both quieter and much
cheaper.
Some
strategists have argued the U.S. submarine force should cease its
exclusive focus on nuclear propulsion for submarines. But the stark
reality is that submarines are unlikely to make a major difference in a
Taiwan scenario since their magazines are simply too small and they will
confront difficult obstacles, such as mine fields. They would be
powerless to stop the legions of Chinese troops, hopping over to the
island via helicopters and parachute drops, or even by small boats.
Even
so, the biggest problems with AUKUS are not confined to its
feasibility, time horizon and relevance to various scenarios. Rather,
there is the major danger that this submarine partnership will cause
China and Russia to double down on their own naval partnership. It is
within the realm of possibility the Russian Navy will operate decades in
the future with Chinese-made aircraft carriers, even as the Chinese
Navy navigates all the world’s oceans in the most cutting-edge
Russian-made nuclear submarines, while they collaborate to build lethal
drones and vertical-launch fighters.
A
semi-permanent marriage between Russia’s military design genius and
China’s industrial production acumen on large projects may be the most
concerning legacy of the AUKUS deal.
Lyle J. Goldstein is director of Asia engagement at think tank Defense Priorities.