China’s mixed signals over the Ukrainian crisis have prompted commentators to speculate about a forming Sino-Russian alignment. Beijing’s ambiguous position towards the conflict has, however, crucial implications that go beyond understanding the trajectory of Sino-Russian cooperation. How China responds to the ongoing conflict is bound to shape NATO allies’ perceptions of the Asian power. Over the last few years, the Atlantic Alliance has initiated a reevaluation of its strategic interests due to concerns over the challenges posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As NATO drafts its new Strategic Concept, Beijing’s response to the ongoing crisis in Ukraine offers NATO leaders the opportunity to reify or reject their perceptions and misperceptions about the PRC.
The Alliance’s posture towards Beijing is far from settled. While the overall view of China amongst NATO members has taken a negative turn in recent years, disagreements over the extent to which China is a potential threat remain. NATO members have been seemingly divided into three groups. The first group is composed of those states along the Eastern flank, for which the PRC has represented only a marginal concern compared to Russia. This position, which was clearly outlined by Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas at the 2021 Brussel’s Forum, is even more relevant in light of the recent developments in Ukraine. The second group consists of those states along the Southern flank that have been traditionally more concerned with instability in the Middle East and North Africa and its impact on migration patterns.
However, the third group comprises those states that have been more open to balancing China’s assertiveness and acknowledge the Indo-Pacific as an area of strategic interest. For example, France, Germany, the UK, and the Netherlands have all issued strategic documents emphasizing the importance of the Indo-Pacific and directly linking it to the Transatlantic region. In addition to the UK and France, which have a tradition of naval engagement in Asia, both Germany and the Netherlandsdeployed a frigate to the Indo-Pacific for the first time last year. In light of these divergent perceptions within the Alliance, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has been cautious to label China a direct enemy of the alliance.
Despite differences in opinion, since 2019, NATO has paid increasing attention to the relevance of the Indo-Pacific region. Much of this is the consequence of growing concerns over China’s assertiveness and its implications at the global level. The 2019 London Declaration reflected these concerns and included the first reference to the PRC as an actor simultaneously presenting opportunities and challenges for the Alliance. Since then, NATO’s wariness towards China has only increased. The NATO2030 report clearly emphasized the need to update NATO’s strategic concept in light of the increasing political, economic, and military weight of the PRC and recommended that the Alliance devote resources to address the security challenges posed by a “systemic rivalry with China.”
Similarly, at last year’s Brussels Summit, NATO leaders denounced China’s assertive behavior as a systemic challenge to the Alliance and the rules-based international order, adding that Beijing’s “coercive policies stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty.” These documents reflect a general recognition that China poses long-term multifaceted challenges extending beyond the mere military sphere and suggest that NATO is adjusting its strategic position.
Aligning the interests and priorities of the three distinct groups is no easy task. Yet, preoccupations concerning the extent of Beijing and Moscow’s cooperation could bring these groups together. As NATO increasingly sees Russia and China as two authoritarian powers working together, Beijing’s reaction to the Russian invasion of Ukraine could play an important role in reshaping NATO’s perceptions of China, thus shifting the Alliance’s strategic calculations in the Indo-Pacific. Although NATO’s eyes may be on Moscow and Kyiv, Beijing’s actions in this context continue to be under scrutiny.
So far, the PRC has chosen to follow an ambivalent, and at times contradictory position, reaffirming the importance of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference without condemning Russia’s actions. Speaking to the press, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated that the “friendship between the Chinese and Russian peoples is rock-solid.” Beijing has criticized Western “illegal” sanctions and has blamed NATO’s “Cold War Mentality” for causing the crisis. Moreover, Chinese state media and government officials have disseminated Russian narratives about Ukraine. Reports of Russia requesting military and economic aid from the PRC have also emerged. At the same time, Beijing appears uncomfortable with the scale of Russian actions. At least two of China’s state-owned banks have distanced themselves from Russian businesses. The PRC has also refrained from openly or unconditionally aligning itself with Moscow, even going as far as abstainingfrom the UN Security Council vote to condemn the Russian invasion, an action that has sparked conflicting interpretations in the West. Still, Beijing’s dilemma does not seem to have altered China-Russia relations which, according to Wang, “have withstood the new test of evolving international landscape.”
According to some commentators, China’s ambivalence has two main goals: gauging the West’s reactions and preventing NATO from meddling in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, such ambivalence risks having the opposite effect. If NATO members interpret Chinese ambivalence as a sign of Beijing’s complicity with Russian aggression, it could prompt less convinced allies to reorient their threat perceptions to encompass Beijing. During an extraordinary summit, NATO Heads of state have expressed concerns regarding China’s potential assistance to Russia. These concerns are all the more important given that the Atlantic Alliance is currently redrafting its new Strategic Concept, which is expected to be announced this summer. A deterioration in NATO members’ views of China, as well as perceptions or misperceptions concerning Beijing’s close alignment with Moscow, could have long-term implications for NATO’s strategic calculus. Beijing’s ambiguous position, if interpreted as a sign of closer Sino-Russian alignment, could even create the momentum to counter China in the Indo-Pacific.
Such a scenario should not be easily dismissed given the Biden Administration’s insistence on reinforcing the synergies among U.S. allies and partners beyond established regional divides. This goal is certainly not new. Last year, a spokesperson for the Pentagon already mentioned the possibility of engaging NATO and Indo-Pacific allies beyond their respective traditional areas. Indicative of this trend is the concerted reaction of U.S. Indo-Pacific allies to the Ukrainian crisis and their support of European security. In light of this context, a future role for NATO in the Indo-Pacific should not be excluded. First, NATO members could be more willing to bear a higher share of the defense burden in Europe to facilitate the U.S. repositioning in the Indo-Pacific theater. NATO could also intensify exchanges and further expand areas of cooperation with its Indo-Pacific partners, an objective already identified within the NATO2030 report. Given the intersecting challenges that bind the Indo-Pacific and Transatlantic regions together, such cooperation could cross various domains, including joint efforts to develop critical technologies and counter Beijing’s disinformation machine.
Far from eclipsing NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific, the crisis in Ukraine could have the opposite result. In light of the ongoing conflict, Russia remains the main priority. But this does not mean that the Alliance will have no role to play in contributing to the security of the Indo-Pacific. The debate over what NATO could do beyond its borders has already been initiated. At a first glance, an imminent Russian threat along the Eastern flank may reorient NATO’s attention towards its traditional area of interest, but we cannot exclude the possibility that perceptions of a growing Sino-Russian alignment may also lead to a deeper NATO Indo-Pacific outlook.