Bongbong Marcos will move the Philippines closer to China
Beijing stands ready to help Marcos family consolidate power over the long term
Alvin Camba is assistant professor at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver and a faculty affiliate at the Climate Policy Lab at Tufts University.
Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos Jr., son of the former dictator Ferdinand Marcos, is on track to win the May 9 Philippine elections.
As Bongbong has himself said, he will move to maintain a strong relationship with Beijing while not completely abandoning ties with the West. Beijing likely expects Marcos to disregard the 2016 ruling by an arbitration court in The Hague that rejected Beijing's territorial claims in the South China Sea and kowtow to China on crucial international issues.
An underlying question is what does a Bongbong and China relationship means for the Philippines? I expect that China will be perfectly placed to help the Marcos family to consolidate their political power in the coming decades. The Marcoses will likely use Chinese commercial opportunities to reward local elites, concentrate development projects in their home province Ilocos Norte and generally strengthen China's soft power across the entire country.
The seeds for such a chain of events have already been planted.
First, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs established a consulate in Laoag in 2007. Officially, the consulate functions to facilitate commercial and investment relations in the surrounding regions. Unofficially, the Laoag consulate is a hub that actively creates connections between Chinese and provincial elites in Northern Luzon.
The consulate has regularly hosted events such as dinners, ceremonies and fundraisers, forming a space for Chinese state officials and investors to work not only with the Marcoses but also with provincial elites from Isabela, Cagayan, Pangasinan, Abra, as well as other regions.
A Bongbong administration will likely strengthen the capacity of the Marcos family to redirect Chinese commercial opportunities toward elites they favor. Currently, Chinese state agencies and companies regularly donate food, medical supplies and other goods to the Ilocos Norte provincial government, bypassing the national government and making their own decisions when it comes to distribution.
Shandong Province, in conjunction with the Chinese Embassy, donated medical supplies to Ilocos Norte in April 2020 and August 2021, respectively. In October 2021, the Chinese Embassy and the Laoag consulate donated 107 tons of rice to 10 provinces. The Marcoses facilitated the turnover of these donations to regional elites.
Across the country, the Chinese Embassy has increased its donations and visibility to various provincial elites. For instance, the Chinese Embassy gifted an ambulance to Bacolod City.
However, it is also clear that building a consulate in Laoag, a decision that was made when the Marcoses were removed from national political power, has been one of the China's most rewarding political moves. Conversely, the Marcoses will be able to strengthen their political power not only because they might soon reclaim the presidency but also because of their close working relationship with Beijing.
Second, within Ilocos Norte, the Marcoses have used Chinese investment, finance and networks to redirect existing opportunities and create new ones.
The Marcoses have ruled Ilocos Norte for decades. Imee Marcos, Bongbong's sister, is a former governor of the province and is currently a member of the Philippines Senate. Her son, Matthew Manotoc, is the current governor of Ilocos Norte, while Michael Keon, Bongbong and Imee's cousin, is the current mayor of the provincial capital of Laoag as well as being a former governor. In the regional municipalities, Marcos appointees and loyalists occupy key government positions.
During the Duterte years, the Marcoses capitalized on Chinese commercial and people-to-people opportunities. Ilocos Norte State University signed a memorandum of understanding with Chinese Universities to bolster research and joint exchange.
Shandong local elites and investors visited the Ilocos Norte in 2018 for business matching opportunities to explore new greenfield investments. Ilocos Norte agricultural exporters gained new markets through that visit. Ilocos Norte officials were part of a delegation to Shandong in 2019.
When it comes to foreign investment, Energy Logistics, a joint venture between Xidian Holdings Philippines and an unnamed Singaporean company, began construction on a solar and wind park in Ilocos Norte in 2019. Qingdao Hengsun Zhongsheng Group, the contractor of the project, started land reclamation until the local government halted the process later the same year after it found that the company was in violation of several local laws and regulations.
Heavily dependent on basic agriculture and food processing, a search of the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission database shows that there have been 217 new companies with Chinese investors in Ilocos Norte between 2001 and 2018. While the region has not been a target for Chinese development finance projects, a Bongbong administration will likely lead to Chinese loans for hard infrastructure projects.
Similarly, the Marcos family will target Chinese companies to help increase industrial capacity and bolster the province's transition toward higher productivity.
And finally, the Chinese consulate in Laoag will be a base for the Chinese state to increase its soft power right across the Philippines. As it relates to China, the term soft power refers to Beijing's ability to co-opt people to its way of thinking. This is why we see so many Chinese consular officials visiting local malls for special events, funding Chinese learning centers in universities and sponsoring provincial festivities.
The biggest thing holding China back in the Philippines today is the dispute over the South China Sea. However, in the long term, these ongoing soft power activities will have a positive impact on public opinion.
In sum, a Bongbong administration will not only impact the South China Sea and political tensions in Southeast Asia, but will move Manila and the thinking of ordinary Filipinos toward China in the coming decades.