Putin’s Strategic Failure
As
exposure to the atmosphere reduces all mummies to instant dissolution,
so war passes supreme judgment upon social organizations that have
outlived their vitality.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is teaching Russia these lessons anew. At the time of writing, barely three weeks in, it was already clear that his 24 February invasion of Ukraine was a grand strategic error. This war has unleashed forces that are weakening his country’s, and his own, position, on every political front.
Secondly, Putin underestimated Western cohesion and resolve. It is the third time in living memory that Russia’s growing threat to Europe has unleashed the West’s latent strength. In the late 1940s, Soviet ambition and overreach triggered the founding of NATO, a trebling of the US defence budget and United Nations intervention in the Korean War. Growing Soviet power in the late 1970s prompted NATO to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and the Carter and Reagan administrations to begin a new military build-up. Russian aggression has now provoked an even stronger and more united transatlantic response. The earlier mobilisations of Western power had been controversial, opposed in the late 1940s by large European communist parties, and in the late 1970s by the peace movement. But this time, support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia are virtually unanimous. Corporate, sporting and cultural boycotts amplify Russia’s unprecedented diplomatic isolation.
Beyond the West, Russia enjoys almost no support. Major Asian states have signed up to new export controls on semiconductors, and Singapore has imposed wider sanctions. China’s abstention on the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Russian invasion made a mockery of the Putin–Xi declaration of friendship with ‘no limits’ three weeks earlier. Except for Belarus, a co-belligerent, Russia enjoys no visible support even among post-Soviet autocracies. Only four countries joined Russia in voting against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution condemning the war. This is just 2% of the UNGA vote, compared to the 12% that supported the Soviet Union after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
This isolation is not only more comprehensive but will be far more costly, more quickly. Russia now faces a range of coercive economic measures never inflicted on a major economy. They include the freezing of central-bank assets; full blocking sanctions on several major banks and their exclusion from the SWIFT international network; a US ban on domestic purchases of Russian oil and new energy investments; a ban on semiconductor and other high-technology sales; and international cooperation to seize oligarchic assets. The United States had prepared these sanctions during the four months of Russian military build-up, and warned Russia of unprecedented measures in the event of invasion. But the European response is path-breaking. The European Union committed itself to funding arms supplies, and German policy underwent a revolution in a weekend by suspending the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, agreeing to send weapons and increasing the defence budget to a twenty-first-century high of 2% of GDP. Ukraine is midwife to the birth of a geopolitical EU.
Thirdly, Putin underestimated domestic opposition. His war against fellow Slavs is the most unpopular decision he has ever made. The stated aims – to ‘denazify’ a country with a democratically elected Jewish president, and to stop a ‘genocide’ that does not exist – lack credibility. Despite a severely repressed civil society, demonstrations began on the first day of the invasion, with more than 10,000 arrests made already. Restrictions on speech have become even more draconian. The authorities have closed more media outlets and are slowly suffocating social channels. Mention of ‘war’ rather than a ‘military operation’ risks 15 years in prison. These are not the actions of a regime in confident control of the information space. It is too soon to know how far the war will turn public opinion against the authorities. But it is already clear that the costs in blood (casualties) and treasure (sanctions) of the war pose an unprecedented challenge to the regime, and that the regime knows it.
Perhaps more significantly, Russian elites are disquieted. Anxiety radiated from senior government figures whom Putin browbeat and humiliated at an extraordinary televised meeting of the Security Council on 21 February. Technocrats like Central Bank governor Elvira Nabiullina have since appeared to be in something like shock. Several celebrities and influencers have expressed their opposition to the war. The tsunami of sanctions will hurt the entire business class, not only the oligarchs, whose signalling of unease has not protected them from asset freezes, property seizures and the work of a new US ‘klepto-capture’ unit to pursue their overseas wealth. Even among the siloviki (security officials) there are growing tensions. The head and deputy head of the foreign-intelligence branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) have reportedly been put under house arrest. Putin has ordered military prosecutors to punish officials responsible for sending conscripts to fight in Ukraine.
This article appears in the April–May 2022 issue of Survival: Global Politics and Strategy.
Karl Marx on the Crimean War, 1855
War is the ultimate test of a society’s resources, leadership and will. It reveals what forms of power matter and which countries possess them. War’s consequences are legion and unforeseen and, in modern times, have above all surprised those who start it.Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine is teaching Russia these lessons anew. At the time of writing, barely three weeks in, it was already clear that his 24 February invasion of Ukraine was a grand strategic error. This war has unleashed forces that are weakening his country’s, and his own, position, on every political front.
Comprehensive opposition
Firstly, Putin underestimated Ukraine’s cohesion and will to resist. When he declared war, he called on Ukrainian forces to lay down their arms. Many have died rather than surrendering, while many Russian soldiers have done the opposite – indeed, some have deserted. Doubling down on his delusion, Putin then called on the Ukrainian military to overthrow President Volodymyr Zelensky. Instead, Ukrainians who have never used a gun are now learning to do so, and to make Molotov cocktails, in defence of their country. The invasion remade Zelensky, whose popularity had fallen to 25% before the invasion, as an inspirational war leader who has united his country and rallied Western support. Putin is inadvertently completing the work he began in 2014 of uniting Ukrainian society and reinforcing its national identity.Secondly, Putin underestimated Western cohesion and resolve. It is the third time in living memory that Russia’s growing threat to Europe has unleashed the West’s latent strength. In the late 1940s, Soviet ambition and overreach triggered the founding of NATO, a trebling of the US defence budget and United Nations intervention in the Korean War. Growing Soviet power in the late 1970s prompted NATO to deploy intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, and the Carter and Reagan administrations to begin a new military build-up. Russian aggression has now provoked an even stronger and more united transatlantic response. The earlier mobilisations of Western power had been controversial, opposed in the late 1940s by large European communist parties, and in the late 1970s by the peace movement. But this time, support for Ukraine and opposition to Russia are virtually unanimous. Corporate, sporting and cultural boycotts amplify Russia’s unprecedented diplomatic isolation.
Beyond the West, Russia enjoys almost no support. Major Asian states have signed up to new export controls on semiconductors, and Singapore has imposed wider sanctions. China’s abstention on the United Nations Security Council resolution condemning the Russian invasion made a mockery of the Putin–Xi declaration of friendship with ‘no limits’ three weeks earlier. Except for Belarus, a co-belligerent, Russia enjoys no visible support even among post-Soviet autocracies. Only four countries joined Russia in voting against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution condemning the war. This is just 2% of the UNGA vote, compared to the 12% that supported the Soviet Union after its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.
This isolation is not only more comprehensive but will be far more costly, more quickly. Russia now faces a range of coercive economic measures never inflicted on a major economy. They include the freezing of central-bank assets; full blocking sanctions on several major banks and their exclusion from the SWIFT international network; a US ban on domestic purchases of Russian oil and new energy investments; a ban on semiconductor and other high-technology sales; and international cooperation to seize oligarchic assets. The United States had prepared these sanctions during the four months of Russian military build-up, and warned Russia of unprecedented measures in the event of invasion. But the European response is path-breaking. The European Union committed itself to funding arms supplies, and German policy underwent a revolution in a weekend by suspending the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, agreeing to send weapons and increasing the defence budget to a twenty-first-century high of 2% of GDP. Ukraine is midwife to the birth of a geopolitical EU.
Thirdly, Putin underestimated domestic opposition. His war against fellow Slavs is the most unpopular decision he has ever made. The stated aims – to ‘denazify’ a country with a democratically elected Jewish president, and to stop a ‘genocide’ that does not exist – lack credibility. Despite a severely repressed civil society, demonstrations began on the first day of the invasion, with more than 10,000 arrests made already. Restrictions on speech have become even more draconian. The authorities have closed more media outlets and are slowly suffocating social channels. Mention of ‘war’ rather than a ‘military operation’ risks 15 years in prison. These are not the actions of a regime in confident control of the information space. It is too soon to know how far the war will turn public opinion against the authorities. But it is already clear that the costs in blood (casualties) and treasure (sanctions) of the war pose an unprecedented challenge to the regime, and that the regime knows it.
Perhaps more significantly, Russian elites are disquieted. Anxiety radiated from senior government figures whom Putin browbeat and humiliated at an extraordinary televised meeting of the Security Council on 21 February. Technocrats like Central Bank governor Elvira Nabiullina have since appeared to be in something like shock. Several celebrities and influencers have expressed their opposition to the war. The tsunami of sanctions will hurt the entire business class, not only the oligarchs, whose signalling of unease has not protected them from asset freezes, property seizures and the work of a new US ‘klepto-capture’ unit to pursue their overseas wealth. Even among the siloviki (security officials) there are growing tensions. The head and deputy head of the foreign-intelligence branch of the Federal Security Service (FSB) have reportedly been put under house arrest. Putin has ordered military prosecutors to punish officials responsible for sending conscripts to fight in Ukraine.
This article appears in the April–May 2022 issue of Survival: Global Politics and Strategy.