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Former
Australian prime minister Kevin Rudd, who has written a book titled
‘The Avoidable War’, has spoken about how Beijing may be thinking about
decoupling © AAP The
title of my note today is taken from a new book by former Australian
prime minister Kevin Rudd, which has become ever more timely since it
was published a couple of months ago. I had the chance to hear Rudd —
who speaks fluent Mandarin and is, for my money, one of the smartest
westerners to opine regularly on China — talk last week about his book,
as well as how Beijing may be thinking about decoupling at an Asia
Society virtual event. Here are the five most interesting points he
made: 1.
The 2020s will be the “decade of living dangerously”, as China tries to
bolster not only its military strength but also its ability to fight
any future western financial sanctions. Rudd pointed out that China is
determined not to be vulnerable in either area, particularly in relation
to Taiwan. But in lieu of any kind of managed competition, with clear
red lines for the west and China in regards to Taiwan, the South China
Sea, cyber security and space, the risk of accidental confrontation is
high. 2.
Rudd himself argues for managed competition, in which both sides duke
it out on everything apart from security issues — economics, foreign
policy, finance, trade (he thinks that where supply chains go, currency
does too), talent markets and the marketplace of ideas. All these areas
are, in his view, open to battles. He believes that the victory will
come down to a competition of values, between liberal democracy and
authoritarianism, and “may the best system win”. 3.
There are potential areas of collaboration — such as climate, global
finance, and vaccines and future pandemic prevention. But in order to
leverage those, Washington and Beijing need executive-level
co-ordination and a line directly into top leadership (meaning the
president’s or premier’s office) at all times. 4.
China’s hope is that it can simply use the “gravitational pull” (a
direct _expression_ by President Xi Jinping) of its economic might to pull
the west and Europe, in particular, into its orbit without triggering a
hot conflict with the US. Beijing knows that it has alienated Europe
with its stance regarding Russia’s war in Ukraine. “But there’s a deep,
cynical, pragmatism in Beijing about the war” and a belief that European
desire not to lose out on Chinese and other Asian high-growth markets
will create a “selective amnesia” about the war by this time next year,
he says. 5. Rudd, who has met Xi a number of times, says he’s “not somebody I’d like to cross”. Xi’s father was persecuted by Mao Zedong,
and he knows what it’s like to be on the outside within the system.
Rudd says Xi makes sure to purge any potential threats to his power
before they even have a chance to become threats. “He’s a man of
ideology, politics, and history” with a “resilience of steel”. What
do I take from all this? Well, for starters, decoupling is clearly
inevitable. Rudd, like me, believes that regionalisation is the future,
though both the US and China will try to limit it to areas that won’t
hurt them too much economically or geopolitically. Secondly, if I were
US national security adviser Jake Sullivan, I’d definitely be trying to
create some behind-the-scenes red lines around the hot-button issues. I
think Rudd is quite right that in lieu of those, the risks of an
accidental conflict are simply too high for comfort. But on the Chinese
side, I wonder given Xi’s reputation, if there is reluctance to engage —
the Chinese never take well to public pressure and even the hint of US
secondary sanctions must surely be backfiring in Beijing. Finally,
I’m not sure Rudd is quite right on Europe. While I wouldn’t want to
underestimate the lobbying abilities of European multinationals in
Brussels (particularly German exporters who are desperate to keep access
to Chinese markets), I think it will be very difficult for the EU,
which has taken such a tough stance on digital rights and technology
regulation, to make peace with state surveillance, and the assumption
that there is no data privacy to be had in China. |