Foreign Affairs has assembled a group of experts to assess whether NATO expansion was a mistake. It’s an interesting cross-section of the debate, and there are several confirmed skeptics and opponents of expansion included in the mix. If I were asked to give a response, I would strongly agree (confidence level 8) that it was a mistake but I would include a caveat. The first is that NATO expansion was first and foremost a mistake for the United States. I can see why former members of the Warsaw Pact wanted to join, and I can understand why nations that had previously been dominated from Moscow would want to be behind the alliance’s shield, but I don’t agree that this was a compelling reason for the U.S. and the rest of the alliance to extend security guarantees to them. The truth is that the U.S. agreed to extend these guarantees on the assumption that they would never need to be honored, and so little serious thought was given to what it meant to pledge to defend these countries. Another caveat might be that NATO expansion was a series of mistakes and not just one big one. There were several opportunities to stop or turn back, and every time the U.S. and its allies chose to keep going.
The first round of NATO expansion was the least provocative and the least objectionable, but it would have been better if there had been no expansion at all because the alliance had already served its purpose and didn’t need to take in new members. If expansion had stopped there and no other states had joined, it would not have become the major irritant in the relationship with Russia that it became, but because Russia was unable to stop the first round their objections to later expansion were also ignored. The second round was a more serious error than the first, and its conclusion coincided with a time of giddy triumphalism in Washington during the early Bush years. Russia accepted the second round grudgingly, but the limit had been reached and many enthusiastic Atlanticists were oblivious to the dangers that further eastward expansion involved. Then the Bush administration agitated for bringing in Ukraine and Georgia, and the alliance came up with the worst-of-both-worlds position at Bucharest that has haunted us ever since. The refusal to repudiate the empty promise made in 2008 compounded the earlier error.
Dan Nexon is correct that the debate over NATO expansion is a “proxy for other disputes,” and that is why the debate continues and remains so heated until today. In the U.S. context, NATO expansion divides advocates of restraint and defenders of current U.S. strategy. As restrainers typically see it, NATO expansion is both proof of U.S. and NATO overreach and hubris in the late ‘90s and early 2000s and one of the main causes of the deterioration of U.S.-Russian relations over the last twenty-five years. For the defenders of current strategy, NATO expansion is evidence of the far-sightedness and success of U.S. leadership. The gap between these two views is as wide and deep as a chasm, and that is reflected in the results of the expert survey as committed supporters of expansion fiercely deny that it was a mistake and opponents vehemently insist that it was. While they are arguing about the merits of NATO expansion, they are also arguing about the proper role of the U.S. in Europe and in the world.
The answer to the question about that role is very much an open question, and we are being confronted once again with the prospect of further NATO expansion with the pending applications from Finland and Sweden. Unlike many other aspirants, Finland and Sweden would be able to contribute meaningfully to the alliance, and their military capabilities are substantial. Once again, it is understandable that they seek to join the alliance, but it is worth asking whether it makes sense for the alliance to continue growing. As Michael Kimmage pointed out just a few months ago, the alliance has become “a loose and baggy monster of 30 countries” and it is a fair question to ask whether it makes sense to increase that to 32. If it makes sense to close the door to further expansion, the door should be closed to all comers.
Christopher Chivvis has written a very thoughtful article on the merits and weaknesses of adding Finland and Sweden. He warns the U.S. against hasty acceptance:
But that same border is also a potential headache for NATO, which would have to develop and resource a credible plan to defend it against Russia. And herein lies the rub. It’s unrealistic and would be unwise to expect the United States to shoulder any major part of such a new commitment, given America’s domestic politics, other global defense priorities, and the fact that European allies should be capable of carrying the lion’s share of the burden on their own.
Washington needs to press pause and avoid rushing headlong into commitments that it might later regret.
Finland and Sweden have remained secure as armed neutrals for decades, so it is not obvious that they need NATO membership. As EU members, they can also call on fellow EU members for support. The U.S. has never considered these countries to be worth fighting to defend, so the case needs to be made that it is vitally important for U.S. security that our government commits to going to war for them. I certainly haven’t seen that case made so far. The U.S. needs to be shifting the burden for European security to European allies, so it doesn’t make much sense to be adding to the alliance’s responsibilities in Europe at the same time. No matter what you may believe about previous rounds of NATO expansion, further expansion does not seem warranted or in the best interests of the United States. Insofar as further expansion is intended simply to spite Russia, it is likely to create more problems than it solves.