Strategic chokepoints: the new U.S.-China battlegrounds
Washington wary of Beijing's advances in Solomon Islands, Panama Canal
TOKYO -- Kurt Campbell, the Indo-Pacific coordinator on the U.S. National Security Council, did not mince his words on a visit last week to Honiara, the capital of the Solomon Islands.
If China takes steps to establish a de facto permanent military presence, power projection capabilities, or a military installation in the Solomon Islands, "the United States would then have significant concerns and respond accordingly," his delegation told Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare and two dozen members of the Pacific nation's cabinet and senior staff, according to a White House readout.
Sogavare assured the American delegation, which included the deputy commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Lt. Gen. Stephen Sklenka, that there would be no such Chinese base, presence or power projection capability.
The visit came after the Solomon Islands signed a new security pact with China that is believed to include clauses that allow Beijing to send troops and ships to the country.
The tensions over the South Pacific islands are part of a new battle over strategic chokepoints, and show how Washington is concerned that China's quiet approaches to these key locations could alter the geopolitical landscape.
Other chokepoints raised by U.S. officials in recent weeks include the Panama Canal, the 82-km waterway that connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the Argentinian port of Ushuaia, located on the southernmost point of South America and a key gateway to Antarctica.
Honiara is on the island of Guadalcanal, which was a key battleground between the U.S. and Japan during World War II. The Imperial Japanese Navy sought to establish a base there to win air superiority and cut off the U.S. from its ally Australia.
China established its first, and so far only, overseas military base in the eastern African nation of Djibouti in 2017. Concerns that China may be moving to open its second base in the Solomon Islands have rung alarms bells among the U.S. and its allies.
This week, Japan sent Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kentaro Uesugi to Honiara, symbolically on a Self-Defense Forces aircraft.
Masahiro Matsumura, a professor of international politics at Momoyama Gakuin University in Osaka, said China's ambitions overlap with those of the then Imperial Japanese Navy, in that Beijing wants to secure strategic locations to strengthen its position.
But he also noted that China may face the same problems the Japanese did. "It is often said in the military world that amateurs talk strategy, while professionals talk logistics. The Japanese Navy's southernmost limit in providing logistics was Chuuk Lagoon," some 1,800 km north of the Solomon Islands, Matsumura said.
Japan's inability to provide fuel and food to its troops in Guadalcanal ultimately led to its defeat on the island.
Beijing's goals, therefore, may be more political than actually preparing for a military conflict, Matsumura said. "There are countries like Palau that recognize Taipei and not Beijing. China's moves in the Solomon Islands may be aimed at pressuring these neighboring countries to switch allegiance."
Yao Cheng, a former commander in the People's Liberation Army Navy, told a New York-based overseas Chinese TV station, that if China succeeds in establishing a military outpost in the Solomon Islands, it would benefit the PLA's space activity. "Each time China launches a satellite, it currently sends out a ship to the South Pacific to collect data. A permanent location would enhance China's space functions, which is key to modern warfare."
The South Pacific is not the only chokepoint that the Chinese seem to be interested in. At a recent Congressional hearing, Army Gen. Laura Richardson, the head of the U.S. Southern Command, noted that Chinese state-owned enterprises are increasingly involved in developing infrastructure near strategic maritime chokepoints such as the Panama Canal and the Strait of Magellan.
"In Asia, Africa and the Middle East, [China] has abused commercial agreements at host country ports for military functions. Our concern is that they are attempting to do the same right here in this region, close to our homeland," Richardson told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 24.
"For example," she said, "in Panama, [China]-based companies are engaged in or bidding for several projects related to the Panama Canal, a global strategic chokepoint, including port operations on both ends of the canal, water management and a logistics park."
In 2016, in a $900 million deal, the China-based Landbridge Group acquired control of Margarita Island, Panama's largest port on the Atlantic side, according to Washington think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
On the Pacific side, China Construction Americas has built the Amador Convention Center using Chinese loans.
Panama in 2017 severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognized China. More than 40 large Chinese companies currently operate in Panama, according to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, including Huawei, ZTE and Baowu Steel Group.
Richardson also informed senators that a Chinese state-owned enterprise is securing rights to build installations near the port of Ushuaia, which would give China a presence at the Strait of Magellan and improve access to Antarctica.
The Strait of Magellan located in the southern tip of South America, is a key chokepoint for U.S. aircraft carriers -- too large to pass through the Panama Canal -- as they sail between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.