“It’s like vegas,”
says Matt Moore, the owner of a small bike shop in Georgetown, a
neighbourhood in Washington. “You know you’re going to get screwed, the
only question is how to get screwed the least.” The system of
interchange—whereby banks and credit-card issuers charge merchants for
collecting payments—is loathed by many retailers. Merchants hand over
some $138bn in fees each year; according to the National Retail
Federation, a lobby group, it is their second-biggest cost after wages.
And while Mr Moore’s customers are less likely to have strong feelings
about the system, being mostly unaware of it, they also suffer as a
result of higher sticker prices.
America
is home to the heftiest interchange fees of any major economy—costs are
an order of magnitude greater than in Europe and China. That largely
benefits two firms: Visa and Mastercard, which facilitate more than
three-quarters of the country’s credit-card transactions. Doing so has
made them two of the most profitable companies in the world, with net
margins last year of 51% and 46% respectively. Rank every firm
(excluding real-estate-investment trusts) in the s&p 500
index by their average net-profit margins last year, five years ago and
a decade ago, and only four appear in the top 20 every time. Two are
financial-information firms, Intercontinental Exchange and the cme Group. The others are Mastercard and Visa.
At
first glance their position appears insurmountable. Already dominant,
in recent years the firms have been boosted by a covid-19-induced rise
in online shopping. American consumers used credit or debit cards for
45% of their transactions in 2016; by 2021, that had reached 57%. The
migration from cash is “a significant and long-running tailwind,” says
Craig Vosburg of Mastercard. Yet two threats loom. The first comes from
Washington, where legislators hope to smash the duo’s grip on payments.
The second is virtual. Payments have been transformed in Brazil, China
and Indonesia by cheap, convenient app-based options from tech giants
like Mercado Pago, Ant Group, Tencent, and Grab. After a long wait, new
entrants now look like they could shake up America’s market.
That
would be good news for consumers and retailers. Much of Visa and
Mastercard’s profits are ultimately driven by the fees that are charged
when a shopper uses a credit or debit card to make a purchase. The eu
has capped such fees for credit cards at 0.3% of the transaction value;
intense competition in China means that WeChat and Alipay collect
charges of just 0.1%. In America, debit cards are regulated by the
“Durbin amendment”, which gives the Federal Reserve the authority to
enforce a cap. But credit-card fees are unregulated and meatier, usually
sitting at about 2% of the transaction and rising to 3.5% for some
premium-reward cards.
These fees are
set by Mastercard and Visa, but collected by banks, which take a slice
and use them to fund perks, such as insurance and air miles, to lure
customers. For the right to use the card networks’
transaction-processing services, banks hand over enormous fees. The
result is that consumers pay through the nose for their perks while
remaining largely oblivious. According to a paper published last year by
Joanna Stavins of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and colleagues,
retailers raise prices at the tills by 1.4%, passing interchange costs
on to households.
Poor Americans fare
the worst. High fees are built into the price of goods, and prices are
typically the same whether you pay with card or cash, which the poor are
more likely to use. “The way to think about it is if you are not
getting your points you are essentially funding everyone else’s,” says
Brian Kelly, more commonly known as “the points guy”, who has forged an
entire business out of encouraging people to maximise use of available
perks. Households with an annual income of less than $25,000 (roughly a
quarter of the total number) on average get no net rewards, since any
they do receive are entirely offset by fees. Households that bring in
more than $135,000 a year recoup in points or perks around 0.6
percentage points of the interchange fees they pay.
These
fees do fund some benefits, not least the sort of consumer protection
that is provided by regulators or legislators elsewhere. In Europe, for
instance, regulation ensures that customers can return goods, especially
faulty ones, or that airlines compensate delayed passengers. In America
card networks have stepped into the breach. They offer consumers the
ability to “charge-back”—reverse their approval for a settled
transaction—if something is not delivered as described. Card networks
also use the fees to keep payment systems secure and free from fraud. In
short, Americans rely more on capitalism and competition to protect
consumers, rather than legislation and regulation.
“I
certainly would not eliminate credit cards because they work great,
they are convenient and people love them,” says Ms Stavins. Instead, she
would like costs to be passed on: “If you come to the checkout, and you
want to use a credit card, you would pay $103 for a $100 item.” That
way consumers would pay for the benefits, but only if they truly value
them. Such a solution used to be impossible: in their agreements with
merchants, the card networks explicitly banned the addition of such
surcharges. But a class-action lawsuit that was first settled in 2013
forced Visa and Mastercard to permit merchants to impose a surcharge.
Subsequent lawsuits have overturned state laws banning surcharges.
Even
though adding surcharges is now permitted and legal, it is still
fiendishly difficult. “When we talk to merchants, a lot of them do not
even know whether it is a plain card or a reward card, so they do not
know what their processing cost is until they get their monthly bill,
where all the costs are lumped together,” says Ms Stavins. It would be a
technological nightmare to implement a system that accounted for all
the different interchange rates. It would also be off-putting for
customers, who are unused to the idea. Typically businesses that do
surcharge are those, such as petrol stations or government enterprises,
where consumers struggle to go elsewhere.
That
might explain why legislators are eyeing up credit cards. On July 28th
Richard Durbin, the same Democratic senator who regulated debit
interchange a decade ago, introduced the Credit Card Competition Act (ccc).
It does not propose a cap on interchange, as the debit rule does, since
costs for credit cards are more variable than for debit cards, making
it harder to find the right level.
Instead, the ccc
would attempt to spur competition by breaking the links between card
networks and banks. At present, when a bank issues a credit card every
transaction on it is processed by the card network the bank stipulates,
meaning the bank is guaranteed the interchange fee the network sets. If
the ccc becomes law it will force banks to offer
merchants the choice of at least two different card networks. Crucially,
these choices could not be the two biggest—at least one smaller network
would have to be offered. These networks could compete for business by
offering lower interchange rates, and merchants would presumably jump at
the offer.
Two factors help the bill’s
chances. It is sponsored by Mr Durbin, who is the second-most senior
Democrat in the Senate, and it is bipartisan, co-sponsored by Roger
Marshall, a Republican from Kansas. The ccc’s best chance
is probably as an amendment to another bigger piece of legislation.
That was how debit-card regulation passed in 2010, notes an aide to the
Senate Judiciary Committee, which Mr Durbin leads.
Even
if the effort fails, or fails to work as intended, a potentially bigger
threat to the giants loom. So far new entrants to the payments market
have embedded Visa and Mastercard more deeply in the life of American
consumers, by making it easier for them to use their cards online. But
as the new fintechs have gained clout, their decisions about the sorts
of payments they offer could influence how much money travels along the
card networks.
Stripe, a large
payments-infrastructure firm, says it is working to provide merchants
with payment methods that will lower their costs. Current options
include a box for customers to put in card details, but also Klarna, a
“buy-now-pay-later” provider through which customers can pay for
purchases using bank transfers, thus avoiding the card networks. It
could soon include things like FedNow, a real-time bank-transfer system
being built by the Fed, which is due to be launched next year. In time,
it could even include central-bank digital currencies or
cryptocurrencies.
Competitors might
make little headway if the perks for sticking with credit cards are
sufficiently juicy. But merchants can offer their own incentives. When
your correspondent recently went to purchase a pair of linen trousers
from Everlane, an online retailer, she was encouraged to pay using
Catch, a fintech app. The app linked to her bank account via another
payment startup called Plaid. As a thank you for avoiding the card
networks, Everlane offered a shop credit worth 5% of the transaction
value. Catch has signed up a handful of fashionable, millennial brands
including Pacsun, another clothing retailer, and Farmacy, a skin-care
firm.
For evidence that this poses a
threat, look no further than Visa’s attempted purchase of Plaid. In 2020
the firm tried to buy the upstart for $5.3bn, only for the deal to be
scuppered by antitrust regulators on the grounds that the transaction
would have allowed Visa to eliminate a competitive threat. Ultimately,
Visa gave up, but the attempt was nonetheless telling. The house of
cards carefully constructed by the two payment giants is formidable and
long-standing. But it is not indestructible. ■
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