MBS’s Visit to Europe: Seeking New Security Ties Through Greece and FranceBy Patrick Theros - August 9, 2022
Saudi
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), generally acknowledged to be
the de facto chief of government in the Kingdom, recently finished a
week-long visit to Europe to complete the political rehabilitation
kicked off by President Joe Biden’s July 15 visit to Riyadh. Until now,
Prince Mohammed has restricted his visits to capitals in Saudi Arabia’s
backyard—first across the GCC, then, in rapid succession, Egypt, Jordan,
and finally, Turkey. Almost all reporting in the European press focused
on energy issues, lionizing the Kingdom as Europe’s savior in its
ongoing energy stand-off with Russia. The Greek press reported
extensively on Saudi investment agreements in the country’s energy,
technology, communications and defense sectors. Saudi Arabia pledged to
make Greece an energy hub for the distribution of “green hydrogen”
throughout Southeast Europe. The Saudis signed an MOU encompassing
billions of dollars’ worth of business and investments across several
industries.
Meanwhile, the French press highlighted President
Emmanuel Macron’s effusive handshake with MBS upon his arrival at the
Élysée Palace—even if less newsworthy than Biden’s fist bump in Riyadh.
At the same time, European media has paid much less attention to these
visits as an attempt by MBS to recover his international legitimacy.
Only the American press focused on the boost to the Saudi Prince’s image
and lamented how the world seems to have forgotten the murder of Jamal
Khashoggi. Generally speaking, however, journalists on both sides of the
Atlantic have ignored two important, related questions. Why has
Mohammed bin Salman given the impression that he has been far more
forthcoming about energy supplies to Europe during his talks with
President Macron and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis than he
was with President Biden? In fact, why did the crown prince choose
Greece and France as stops for his first visit to Europe?
Spurning Washington
At
the risk of rubbing salt in a uniquely American wound, it certainly
appears that MBS wanted to take one more swipe at Biden by traveling to
Europe, despite the American President’s hefty consumption of crow
during his Saudi visit. Although we have seen few details of the
conversations between Biden and MBS, what little has leaked into the
public domain indicates that Biden left Saudi Arabia with only vague
promises to increase oil production in the fall. In stark contrast to
his dealings with the United States, MBS presided over several business
agreements and MOUs with Greece and implied that Saudi Arabia would
provide Greece with cheaper energy. More concretely, the Greeks scored a
$850 million deal after the Saudi STC Group announced that its
subsidiary Middle East and North Africa Hub “will cooperate with the
Greek telecom firm TSSA to build a data corridor that extends from the
Kingdom to Europe through a modern, high-capacity network of terrestrial
optical fibers under the sea and will connect Europe with Asia.” In
France, Macron basked in high-level political discussions that covered
Russia, Ukraine, and the stabilization of the world’s energy markets.
Both
Macron and Mitsotakis came away with political prestige-building
interactions with MBS, able to tout their respective countries’ roles in
saving Europe from an energy disaster in the coming months. It
certainly provides a fillip for France’s ambition to lead Europe
geopolitically. By contrast, MBS gave Biden little if anything to show
for his visit that would help him politically. The Guardian makes a
persuasive argument that indeed, the Saudis still hope that Trump
returns to power in 2024. Therefore, MBS may believe that hindering
Biden’s political livelihood in the short term may bring about a
favorable future arrangement for the Saudi leadership.
Thwarting Turkey
Was
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s choice of Greece and then France for
his first two stops in Europe pure chance, or an opportunity to
undermine Turkey’s ability to challenge Saudi interests in the region?
MBS has a lengthy list of complaints about Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdogan. Turkey still maintains a military base in Qatar—a base
that played an instrumental role in deterring Saudi military action
against Qatar during the 2017 Gulf Crisis. MBS also nurses a grievance
against President Erdogan for his full-throated campaign to bring down
the crown prince over Jamal Khashoggi’s murder in the Saudi consulate in
Istanbul. At a broader geopolitical level, Riyadh and Ankara compete
over influencing the Syrian opposition’s decisions and orientation.
Indeed, friction between the two states continues to play out across the
region. Riyadh seeks to stabilize Iraq while Turkish artillery and
airplanes carryout operations against the PKK in northern Iraq. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, Erdogan has recently flirted with the
regime in Tehran, hinting that he wishes to put Turkish-Iranian
relations on a better footing after several years of confrontation in
Syria and the Caucasus. This courting of Iran has made Erdogan an
outlier in NATO. Erdogan visited Tehran (the only NATO chief of state to
do so) in July of this year, followed by a trilateral summit with
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iran’s President Ibrahim Raisi in
Tehran. MBS has his own agenda with Russia and Iran, and he does not
need Turkey playing the spoiler.
Which leads us back to the
question: why visit Greece and France? The answer may be found in both
countries’ tenuous relationship with Turkey, as well as their
increasingly close bilateral ties with one another. Erdogan has disputed
the maritime borders and the sovereignty of Greek islands in the
Aegean, labeled the Greek Prime Minister as someone who “no longer
exists for him” and brought the two countries to the brink of war
repeatedly over the last few years. It certainly looks like a case of
MBS cultivating the enemy of his apparent rival, a country that is a
military peer competitor to Turkey to boot. The fruitful economic
exchange in Athens stands in stark contrast with the rather sterile
joint statement released in Ankara during MBS’ June 2022 visit, which
“strongly emphasized a joint determination to start a new era of
cooperation in bilateral relations [between Saudi Arabia and Turkey]…
including political, economic, military, security and cultural
relations” and the “possibility” of developing and diversifying trade
and boosting investments and partnerships in various fields. The Ankara
statement closes with the formulaic “the talks were held in an
atmosphere of sincerity and brotherhood embodying the depth of excellent
relations between the two countries.”
It is hardly a coincidence
that MBS visited two countries that have recently signed a bilateral
defense agreement aimed at Turkey. Greece has also developed strong
military ties with Israel, with the apparent aim to deter Turkish
ambitions in the Eastern Mediterranean. An arrangement with Greece would
give Saudi Arabia a link to a powerful regional military grouping
without incurring the political costs of openly visible links to Israel.
Greece and France share another advantage over other European
countries; they are the only two EU countries with a permanent,
combat-capable deployment in the GCC. France opened a permanent naval
and air base in Abu Dhabi in 2009, housing about 500 troops and fighter
aircraft as well as supporting the French Indian Ocean naval squadron.
For its part, Greece deployed a full Patriot battery with supporting
units, with up to 140 troops, to Saudi Arabia in early 2022. Greek
forces now reportedly provide air defense for Yanbu’ and the Neom City
project in the Kingdom’s northwest.
The backstory of how the
Greek Patriot battery came to the Kingdom also provides an interesting
sub-text to Saudi attitudes towards Europe and Turkey. Greek sources
told the author that the United States approached several European
countries in 2019 to deploy Patriot batteries to Saudi Arabia to
backfill the redeployment of U.S. Patriots elsewhere (presumably in East
Asia). Apparently, only the Greeks accepted Washington’s request. The
other countries approached—reportedly the Netherlands, Spain and
Germany—all declined. The Greek sources noted that each of those
countries had important defense procurement contracts with Turkey and
have generally adopted pro-Turkish attitudes within NATO circles. All
three countries had deployed Patriot batteries to Turkey between 2011
and 2015, although Spain and the Netherlands have since withdrawn their
units. This connection to Ankara may not have had any bearing on their
decision to reject deployments to Saudi Arabia, but perceptions in
politics outweigh the facts every time. Agreeing to send a Patriot
battery out of the country was a particularly difficult decision for
Athens, as Greece faces a constant threat from Turkey and needs all its
air defense assets. The Patriot battery in question was the only unit
held in reserve and required time and money to return to operational
status. Furthermore, selling the project to Greek voters at a time of
intense Turkish threats was a challenge. The Greek Patriot battery has
now deployed under an arrangement that requires Saudi Arabia to provide
logistic support, including spare parts from Saudi stocks, but does not
compensate Greece for the troop deployment. (My Greek interlocutors
insisted Greek troops were not in the Kingdom as mercenaries, a point
probably not lost on the Saudis.)
Finally, the fact remains that
Macron and Mitsotakis are the only two EU leaders who have anything
approaching a coordinated defense and security policy, another point
probably not lost on the Saudis. French national security experts
characterized the mutual defense agreement between Greece and France,
referred to earlier, as a first step in realizing Macron’s goal of
European “strategic autonomy.” For his part, Mitsotakis has made it
clear that he supports the European security project, much like Macron.
Encouraging the EU to become a credible player in the region fits Saudi
security interests. The rest of Europe so far seems unwilling to do
anything other than hide behind the United States, and Saudi Arabia
recognizes—in a way similar to France, perhaps—that overreliance on the
United States imperils its own strategic autonomy. Hence, MBS had yet
another reason for favoring the two European states that have taken the
first steps toward developing a more independent security posture.
Throughout
his time in power, Mohammed bin Salman had not displayed much in the
way of foreign affairs skills, nor has he achieved many foreign policy
successes in the last few years. Perhaps his overtures to Greece and
France indicate that he has matured, learned from his mistakes, or
assembled a group of skilled foreign policy advisors.
Ambassador
Patrick Theros is a Strategic Adviser for Gulf International Forum.
Previously he held positions as Political Advisor to the Commander in
Chief, Central Command; Deputy Chief of Mission and Political officer in
Amman; Charge D’affaires and Deputy Chief of Mission in Abu Dhabi;
Economic Counselor in Damascus; and U.S. Ambassador to the State of
Qatar. In a career spanning almost 36 years, he also has served in
diplomatic positions in Beirut, Managua, Dharan and Abu Dhabi, as well
as in the Department of State. During that period, he earned four
Superior Honor Awards. After retirement Ambassador Theros served as
President of the U.S. Qatar Business Council in 2000-2017.