What Southeast Asian nations want from Washington
The U.S. should remain deeply engaged in regional affairs but not exacerbate tensions
BY BRAD GLOSSERMAN
CONTRIBUTING WRITER
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- Aug 17, 2022
My recent trip to Southeast Asia during the first half of August was revelatory — and frustrating.
The visit by Nancy Pelosi, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, to Taiwan drove tensions in the Taiwan Strait to new highs and U.S.-China relations to new lows. Military exercises were taking place across the region; most had been scheduled well in advance, but there were improvisations triggered by the Pelosi trip. A new government was finding its feet in Manila, while the Kishida administration was taking a higher profile in regional security affairs.
Against this backdrop, the message from Southeast Asian experts and officials was unequivocal, albeit a little convoluted. The United States should be more consistently and deeply engaged in regional affairs, but it should do nothing to exacerbate tensions. (There was near unanimous condemnation of the Pelosi visit.) Washington should continue to provide security for the region but regional governments are reluctant to be seen as participating in those efforts. That line is difficult to walk in the best of times — and may be unsustainable, regardless of U.S. discipline and creativity.
Regional views of China are consistent. Southeast Asian governments have no illusions about their counterpart in Beijing. In just about every conversation, there was reference to the “salami-slicing” tactics by which China inexorably pushes its presence forward, while ensuring that its actions remain below a threshold that would justify an armed response.
For example, dredging previously unoccupied reefs in the South China Sea and then building military facilities on them is a provocation but no military will intervene despite the violation of international law. Similarly, China deploys fleets of civilian fishermen to swarm disputed territory in the South China Sea, to establish a presence, gird Beijing’s claims that the waters are its territory and to collect information. While subsidized by the Chinese government, they are ostensibly private actors and therefore do not — again — justify an armed response.
Southeast Asian Interlocutors well understand what is happening and know that their own interests will be challenged and compromised some time in the future. Nevertheless, they are reluctant to call out Chinese behavior or to join efforts that would reinforce regional security. They are determined to protect themselves — and they seek U.S. assistance to do so — but joining multilateral initiatives that include external powers is too much. That hesitancy persists even as they acknowledge that only broad coalitions will have an impact on China.
It is also evident when discussing potential crises. Even in the face of direct Chinese aggression against them, regional governments will not seek direct U.S. engagement if it creates a risk of them becoming proxies in a great power competition.
Their reluctance is the product of presence and politics. Geography makes China an integral part of Asia. It spans the region. Moreover, it is increasingly influential within regional economies: As one Indonesian expert complained, China is viewed as the source of prosperity.
The U.S. presence is appreciated but it is also recognized as contingent. They value the flow of U.S. officials through the region and efforts to raise Southeast Asia’s profile in Washington. Military exercises are welcome, especially when they focus on national capacity building. Larger multilateral initiatives raise alarms for being provocative. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative — an effort to beef up the U.S. presence in the event of a contingency — was acknowledged and largely dismissed as insufficient.
The chief concern is consistency. Regional experts and officials highlight the zigs and zags of U.S. policy and the all too present gap between rhetoric and behavior. They worry that any commitment made by the Biden administration will be undone by its successor. Even among its best friends and partners, U.S. trustworthiness is a constant complaint.
It’s equally important, however, that friends and partners understand the sources of U.S. frustration with them. First, recognition of “the China challenge,” in particular Beijing’s comfort with and increasingly proficiency in “gray zone” activities, coupled with the subsequent failure to call out that government or take actions that they admit are necessary to deter it is grating. Interlocutors counter that they can’t afford to stick their necks out if the U.S. won’t be there to back them up. It’s a reasonable reply, but it becomes a chicken and egg problem since their failure to speak out fuels U.S. doubts about the commitment of its partners and prompts questions about the value of defending them.
One of the most common requests by U.S. officials and experts to Southeast Asian counterparts is for them to publicly back the 2016 arbitral court ruling that dismissed many of China’s claims to contested territory in the South China Sea. While most governments applaud the ruling, they have done so quietly and they haven’t explicitly called out China for its misbehavior. They either claim to be a disinterested party or note that Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte downplayed the decision, which gives them license to do the same. I doubt that a change in government — and a change in policy — in Manila will have much effect.
Second, U.S. efforts to raise awareness of the scope of the China challenge encounter pushback amid charges that they threaten to unleash nationalist sentiment among Southeast Asian publics. There is a fear that rather than being channeled toward Beijing, public anger will be directed against local Chinese diaspora or Chinese businesses. The irony is that in the very next breath, we are reminded that governments — democracies and despots alike — must take public sentiment into account in their decision-making.
Third, there is also pushback against U.S. efforts to raise public awareness about the value of partnership with the United States. This is perhaps the most frustrating. There is considerable military-to-military cooperation — often the most fruitful or productive — over the horizon or away from public scrutiny.
This is often the case with counter-terrorism programs. Downplaying those efforts, and especially the successes, undermines the case for partnership. Citizens in both countries are deprived of evidence of how working together can advance and protect national interests. This is especially frustrating when the Southeast Asian chorus in the very next breath urges the U.S. to do more to win the hearts and minds of regional publics.
A final irritant is insistence on the bifurcation of security and economic interests, that China is the economic partner of choice while the U.S. is the preferred security partner. This division is an integral part of the regional outlook. It is convenient. It is also wrong.
The division of labor is being challenged. The U.S. is trying to balance the Chinese economic presence with the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, although I am skeptical that it will succeed. I’d be happy to be wrong. Meanwhile, China is offering to do more for regional security with the announcement of the Global Security Initiative earlier this year.
More significant is the erosion of any neat division between the two spheres. China’s resort to economic coercion when challenged is one demonstration that economic and security concerns are deeply intertwined. The convergence is also evident when one country violates another’s exclusive economic zone. Economic relations intrude on security considerations.
Nevertheless, belief that there is a firm division between the two will persist. That permits the compartmentalization of concerns and facilitates the creep of Chinese influence — a development that few in the region will challenge and I fear even fewer will fight.
Brad Glosserman is deputy director of and visiting professor at the Center for Rule-Making Strategies at Tama University as well as senior adviser (nonresident) at Pacific Forum. He is the author of “Peak Japan: The End of Great Ambitions” (Georgetown University Press, 2019).
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