On August 20, 2022, political thinker and nationalist Aleksander Dugin was the target of an assassination attempt which ended with his daughter’s life instead. Speaking at her memorial service,
Dugin said that if any Russians were touched by her death, his daughter
would like them to remember that “they must fight for their great
country, they must protect their faith, and they must defend their holy
Orthodoxy.” Years before, in 2016, President Vladimir Putin and
Patriarch Kiril of Moscow inaugurated a monument dedicated to Vladimir
the Great, the 10th century ruler of Kievan Rus who established the
foundations of the Russian nation and culture by converting himself to
Christianity and marrying Anna Porphyrogenita, the daughter of the
Byzantine Emperor Romanos II. And in December 2015, the new Russian National Security Strategy formally recognized the use of the Russian “culture” as a way to ensure national interests.
Putin had revived Count Sergey Uvarov’s 19th century doctrine of “Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality,” having
been reintroduced into the Russian psyche along with other Russian
historical elements from contradictory Tsarist and Soviet times, as
well as given life to ideas from (Neo-) Eurasian thinkers. Putin and his
advisors had learned how to interpret the history and traditions of the
Russian people, while executing them into specific intellectual and
political contexts. The result was the creation of a cultural and
national identity in which Putin and Russia have become interchangeable.
When Putin first came to power, he began that ideological transition with the inauguration of his 2000 National Security Strategy which
called for the protection of Russian cultural, moral, and spiritual
traditions. Thus, ontological security was interpreted to be crucial by
Russian officials, as the Kremlin regarded defending Russian identity as
equally important to protecting its physical integrity. This created
the opportunity for a future clash with the Western post-1945 liberal
international order, as this Russian conception of national and
international affairs came to substitute communist ideology and its
expansion. This shift is also critical, because Russian military
doctrine defends the use of nuclear weapons to protect the survival of
the Russian state.
The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome is a recurrent reality in
the history of Russia, although it appears in a veiled way today. While
not many Russian intellectuals allude to it directly, other than the
Neo-Eurasian thinker Aleksander Dugin, it can explain both domestic and
foreign politics. The concept has experienced diverse transformations,
and this capacity for adaptation is what has allowed it to take deep
root into Russian national identity. Indeed, Patriarch Kirill I’s
objective has been to re-establish a powerful church, as the spearhead
of Russian society and a tool of influence in the world.
Hundreds of years ago, Muscovite Russia became
one of the most important religious centers in Christianity and rapidly
absorbed Byzantine traditions. The rulers always respected the
authority of Constantinople, and while relations were not always
peaceful, they never tried to usurp the power of the Byzantine Emperor.
After the fall of Constantinople, Moscow believed it had succeeded
Byzantium. From the 15th century, Russia justified many of its actions
on its condition as the people chosen by God to defend Christianity and
preserve Orthodoxy.
In the 19th century, there was a resurgence
of Pan-Slavism against the Petrine reforms, and the concept of the Third
Rome became more influential among political and intellectual circles.
Alexander I defeated Napoleon in 1812, successfully pushing back the
West, while Nicholas I and Alexander II protected Christian Orthodoxy in
the Balkans. Both Nicholas I and Alexander II were firm supporters of
autocratic principles, and they identified the defense of the Orthodox
religion outside their borders with the promotion of Russian national
interests.
Through Count Uvarov’s doctrine of “Orthodoxy,
Autocracy, Nationalism,” Russia supported the Greeks in their struggle
for holy sites in Jerusalem and aimed to weaken and divide the Ottoman
Empire, thus embarking on a war in Crimea. But in the Crimean War, the
Tsar did not enjoy the support of the European powers, and Russia was
defeated by the Ottoman Empire. The alliance between the Western
European powers and the Ottomans was viewed by Russia as treasonous to
the Christian cause, and it pivoted its priority to become an
influential force in Asia.
From 1999, Putin sought to create a
new way of thought, genuinely Russian, derived from Slavic thinkers and
those political, cultural, and spiritual foundations. Patriarch Kirill I
believes that Russia was responsible for being the conscience of the
international community and that this historical commitment is also a
contemporary task for Putin. For Patriarch Kirill I, the Putin
presidency has been a miracle of
God, and Putin and Kirill both share a sacred view of Russian national
identity and its exceptionalism, namely that Russia is neither Western
nor Asian but a unique society representing a distinct set of values
that are inspired by God. During the annexation of Crimea, Putin announced the
Orthodox Church as the spiritual force that had unified diverse peoples
into the Russian nation. He meant to defend the idea that Orthodoxy is
the common foundation between Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia.
Prior to the annexation of Crimea, Putin clamored for Russia to preserve its identity in a rapidly changing world and denounced the West for its rejection of Christian values. In the 19th century, Russia believed its mission was to rejuvenate Europe as it was spiritually bankrupt, while aspiring to unite all Slavs under the same flag. Ukraine is so important to Putin because it represents the gap between the territorial and cultural body of Russia, that is, its perception as a nation. What is more, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the majority of the Ukrainian Orthodox Christians, who had since the 17th century obeyed the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus, switched to the Patriarch Filaret. Supported by nationalist sectors in Ukraine, Patriarch Filaret was elected Patriarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, causing a schism between the churches. The independence of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church meant for Moscow the loss of an important part of its historical legacy and a rupture with its imperial traditions and past. Indeed, it was in Ukraine where Prince Vladimir converted to Christianity in the 10th century, and in Kyiv where both the Saint Sophia Cathedral and the Kyiv Monastery of the Cave are located.
In 1991, 31 percent of Russian adults identified as Orthodox; this figure rose to 72 percent by 2008. Indeed, Orthodoxy came to be identified with what it meant to be Russian. Putin supports the restoration of Christian monasteries and returning Orthodox properties confiscated during the Soviet era, while Patriarch Kirill I diffuses his apocalyptic vision that humanity has terrible challenges ahead. The Orthodox Church has been critical of the West, declaring human rights to be an insult to the national and religious values of Russia. Some of its members have even expressed the need to reclaim the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome, arguing that Rome and Constantinople had betrayed the message of Christianity.
With the counsel of Vladislav Surkov, Putin came to talk about the importance of sovereign democracy,
which was absolutely necessary for the existence of Russia and without
which Russia could not exist in the world. This was meant to address the
dignity and strength of the Russian people, supported by the
development of policies that placed a strong emphasis on Russian
language, Russian literature, and Russian history, all of which
constitute the foundation of a people conscious of their identity. For
Putin, sovereignty and culture had become the same. The Russian state
began a process to protect religious values and symbols, and it created
the Russki Mir or Russian World, supported by Patriarch Kirill I, and
whose mission has been to diffuse Russian culture and its ambitions in
Ukraine and elsewhere.
Putin has an understanding of Russia as a
nation that is not defined by its territorial borders. While other
imperial powers underwent decolonization, the Russian Empire—absent seas
to fragment it and with a more stable yet still diverse national make
up—conserved its territorial integrity. Even when considering the
Russian Federation, it can be understood as an empire in everything but
name. Its borders are, roughly speaking, the same territories that Peter
the Great passed on to his successor. Putin shares with Nicholas I a
hierarchical conception of Russia in relation to other European nations,
placing emphasis on matters of national dignity and the need to
preserve both its internal order and its condition as a great power on
international matters. But Russia has also always felt the need to use
spaces or zones of influence to buy time in order to react to an
invasion or an attack. In fact, a constant historical problem has been
access to open seas from their territories. This has made it a priority
for Russian strategy to gain access to the open sea. Indeed, Russian
conquest of the North destroyed the Finnish tribes and restored the idea
of Russian unity.
When Putin came to power, he said “Russia can rise from its knees and hit hard”.
His aim was to give the Russian people a sense of dignity and the
nation an international status. Indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, Russia had gone through tumultuous times. While the presidency
of Boris Yeltsin produced the Russian Federation, it also caused the
social and economic collapse of the country. Yeltsin’s presidency had
never been celebrated by the Russian people,
and Russians had been exhausted by its failed attempt at westernizing
and democratizing Russia. While some Russians felt that these values
were alien to their upbringing under Soviet customs, a large segment of
the Russian population welcomed the changes. But by 1999, Russia
experienced economic collapse,
and a country which housed the largest oil reserves in Europe was
rationing fuel for heating, and even for some basic products, reminding
people of living conditions during the 1980s.
Yeltsin’s open
doors policies provoked the massive entry of drugs which, along with
uncontrolled alcohol consumption, had a devastating effect on the
population. Far from facilitating an orderly transition to a capitalist
and democratic system, Yeltsin allowed the exploitation of the Russian
economy while discrediting Russia on an international scale. Yeltsin’s
fragile government, doomed by its foreign debt, and unable to pay the
pensions, subsidies, and salaries of the public sector, was forced to
request billions of dollars from the IMF. At the same time, NATO expanded East
towards Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, while it intervened in
Kosovo. These events were humiliating for Russians and their pride.
In
this background, Putin portrayed Western values and politics as a
trojan horse and instead promoted a national culture, entrenched in old
customs but proliferated by new technologies. When he dealt with the
military problem in Chechnya, he solidified his position as a strong
national leader and created the personality that Russian people
required, one that would be capable of mitigating their anxieties and
giving stability to a people whose culture has given more value to order
than to law. Putin annihilated the decentralization of the state under
Yeltsin and moved to centralize power. He reigned in the oligarchs, by
respecting the privatizations made under Yeltsin, in exchange for their
non-interference in the Kremlin’s policies and politics. The high demand
for hydrocarbons and oil prices
allowed the Russian state to multiply its revenues and led to a
decrease in unemployment, the payment of pensions, and the forging of a
new middle class.
Despite the fall of the Tsarist Empire, the
collapse of the Soviet Union, and the beginning of the post-Soviet era,
the transformations in Russian national identity have been slow, and
this has helped to generate a collective national identity that has been
particularly constant. While much has been written about
the debates and the different directions between Westerners and
Slavophiles in Russia, the truth might be blurrier in practice than in
theory. Both Westerners and Slavophiles agree that the unique identity
of Russian civilization is an essential factor that provides unity to
Russia and gives it the ability to confront external threats. Both agree
on a union between Slavs and that those peoples who speak similar
languages or dialects to Russian should constitute a unique political
entity with the Russian people. Both agree on the importance of Ukraine,
in terms of identity, sovereignty, and security. In fact, after the
fall of the Soviet Union, while Westerners were more predominant, as
exemplified by Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev, who did not
view the United States or NATO as enemies and sought some kind of
rapprochement, one of their primary objectives remained to reunify the
former Soviet republics into Russia.
The Kozyrev doctrine was
later replaced by Putin with Eurasian policies, and the Primakov
doctrine sought to maintain a balance with the West while recovering
influence through the integration with Eurasia. What has been
challenging for Putin, especially before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine,
was how to engage in the development of commerce and technology with the
West while maintaining stability in internal affairs, which has always
been a constant in Russian history.
Henry Kissinger believes that
to understand Putin, you need to understand Fyodor Dostoyevsky. While
Dostoyevsky originally felt that the purpose of the Russian man was to
reconcile European contradictions, he later came to believe that Russia
was not European and that its mission consisted in uniting Slavs,
looking towards Asia, and civilizing and conquering that continent. Back
then, nihilism—introduced to Russian society through the work of Ivan
Turguev to awaken a sense of rebellion and reconfigured by Dostoyevsky
as threats to Imperial Russia from theories originating in Western
Europe—foreshadowed how Putin and the Orthodox Church perceive Western
values as threatening contemporary Russia as well as the measures they
have taken to confront those Western ideas.
While it is difficult
to know how much of an expert Putin is on Dostoevsky, what is extremely
clear is that Russia has proliferated policies grounded in Russian
traditions and history that seek to guide the Russian citizen and that
Putin has many times alluded to Russian thinkers including Konstantin
Nikolayevich Leontiev. What’s more is that Russian ambition for
recognition and their feeling of exclusion from the West has created a
certain national resentment and pattern for an aggressive foreign
policy. There is no doubt that while these precepts create a unique
vision for Russia, they also foment a clash of civilization with the
West.
Carlo J.V. Caro is a political and military analyst. He holds graduate degrees from Columbia University.