On 11 October, in an apparent reversal of his previous effort to cultivate the Kingdom, President Biden vowed he would impose “consequences”
on Saudi Arabia for collaborating with Russia to cut oil production.
The question now is what, if anything, President Biden can do to follow
through on his latest promise to hold MbS to account.
Biden’s fundamental problem is that the relationship between the US
and Saudi Arabia remains of key strategic importance. As long as the
world depends on oil, the US needs Saudi Arabia to control its flow
globally, regardless of whether it needs the oil for its own consumption
or not. As Jim Krane pointed out in our recent podcast:
“There's this kind of fiction here in the US that somehow the US
president controls US gasoline prices, when in reality he has very, very
little influence over gasoline prices. It's really the Saudis that have
had that influence.”
Besides that, the Kingdom also helps the US achieve many other
strategic goals in the region, such as expanding and deepening
Arab-Israeli normalisation and containing Iran’s nuclear and regional
ambitions.
Still, such a complex relationship suggests there are ways Biden could seek a “recalibration.”
At a recent discussion organised by the Arab Center in Washington DC experts posited a number of possible US policy options, including using NOPEC legislation to tweak U.S. antitrust law, cutting weapons sales to Saudi Arabia and putting the spotlight on human rights.
The US administration could also leak damaging information to the
media about the Kingdom, as it recently did with the United Arab
Emirates.
On November 12 the Washington Post published details
about a classified U.S. intelligence report concerning extensive
efforts by the UAE to manipulate the US political system. This is the
first time the US government has leaked an intelligence report about the
UAE, a significant new development and potentially a sign of what could
be coming next for MbS.
The problem with any of these measures however is the high
probability they would end up damaging US interests more than Saudi ones
NOPEC legislation, not yet enacted, is a blunt tool that would create
all sorts of diplomatic troubles and carry with it disproportionate
risk. Ending US arms sales would punish the US military-industrial
complex to the benefit of defence sectors of other countries. Legal
action against MbS in US courts is no longer possible since he was
awarded sovereign immunity. Sanctioning him personally could lead to
calls for sanctioning Chinese President Xi Jinping and Iranian Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei, who are, according to the UN, both even worse human rights abusers than MbS, complicating the administration’s strategies toward both nations.
It is important to recognise however that despite the breakdown in
relations between Biden and MBS on a personal level, relations on a
state level between Saudi Arabia and the US remain unchanged. Full
cooperation in all spheres is proceeding as usual.
In other words, the problem is with Prince Mohammed bin Salman himself.
But he has fortified his position extremely well internally and
options to target him personally without causing chaos and/or standing
openly accused of regime change are extremely limited.
As we suggested
in February, the only path open is to find a way to remove MbS through
an internal Saudi political process, without any foreign intervention.
This currently unlikely scenario would start with MbS being pressured to release his uncle, Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz,
as well as other top princes who are currently in prison. When they are
able to operate freely inside and outside the country, the rest of the
royal family would quickly rally around Prince Ahmed as the new King and
there would be no further need for any outside help. King Salman would
be declared unfit to rule and both he and his son would be immediately
removed, senior royal family members would give bay’ah to
Ahmed, who would become King, and every tribe and other authority in the
Kingdom would then pay him their allegiance. The security apparatus
would not intervene in these circumstances because they are loyal to the
royal family, not MbS personally.
According to Kirsten Fontenrose, who briefly oversaw Gulf policy for
the Trump administration, the Biden administration attempted this policy
by having MbS release the former interior minister Prince Mohammed bin
Nayef and other senior princes, but failed. On March 18, 2021 she told the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on the Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism:
There is one arena in which the US does not currently have
sufficient leverage to effect human rights related change in Saudi
Arabia—domestic royal politics. Both the Biden administration and the
Trump administration called for release of Mohammed bin Nayef, the
former crown prince and one of America’s strongest counterterrorism
partners during his tenure, at the top of their talking points when
engaging privately with Saudi leadership. Mohammed bin Salman has been
unmoved. Bin Nayef poses a perceived succession threat, as do other
royal family members who remain in detention, like Prince Salman bin
Abdulaziz bin Salman Al Saud, on whose behalf French President Macron
intervened to no avail.
On Tuesday the Guardian published a long article containing new information about the fate of Prince Mohammed bin Nayef, who has not been seen in public since March 2020.
The Guardian reports:
A royal family source, who privately denounced Nayef’s treatment
but has remained silent in public to avoid retribution, told me that he
would not be surprised if Nayef were to suddenly make an appearance in
public someday alongside MBS, giving his blessing to the man who crushed
him. Similar to the staged video after the 2017 coup, that would be
another defining image of the age of MBS – and his violent rise to
power.