Saudi Arabia’s, China’s emerging strategic partnership
The developments in Riyadh could be further evidence of the birth pangs of multipolarity
It is not every day that US-made F-15 fighter jets escort a Chinese president’s plane as it lands in the capital city of one of the world’s largest petroleum producers – usually considered a staunch ally of the United States – but that’s exactly what happened last Wednesday.
On December 7, Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Riyadh for a three-day visit that not only marked a turning point in Sino-Arab relations but could give new impetus to Eurasian integration and broaden its scope to include the Middle East.
Judging by appearances, it would seem President Xi is giving a deliberate thumb in the eye to Anglo-American strategists, who, taking a leaf from the book by Halford Mackinder on geo-strategy, aim to stoke conflict and division across Eurasia by inhibiting the development of overland trade routes, which they believe would be inimical to the interests of the Western maritime powers.
Xi understands that the reliable flow of gas, oil and other natural resources is critical for China’s development and security, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud understands that he understands this.
Xi and Prince Salman [sic] spoke tête-à-tête to discuss their strategic outlook in view of what appears to be the emergence of a multipolar geopolitical order. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states will deepen their respective strategic alliances with China in light of prospects for market instability and de-dollarization.
What is at risk is the “international rules-based order,” believed in Beijing (as in most of the Global South) to be a euphemism for Western diktat.
The Gulf states, India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are clued in to all of this.
Cloaked in diplo-speak, John Kirby, the US National Security Council spokesman, also indicated he is clued in as to what’s going on: “We are mindful of the influence that China is trying to grow around the world. The Middle East is certainly one of those regions where they want to deepen their level of influence.”
This point was underscored in Xi’s statement about the visit that was released by China’s Foreign Ministry: “We will further synergize China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, deepen and substantiate practical cooperation in all areas.”
High-profile summits
In view of personal snubs and diplomatic faux pas, but more importantly a dynamically evolving geopolitical landscape, Prince Salman senses a turning point in foreign relations with the West in general and the United States in particular. For this reason, he seems disinclined to put all his eggs in one geopolitical basket. He will pursue a multidimensional foreign policy and the diversification of the Saudi economy.
To reinforce the importance of the state visit, King Salman, accompanied by the Crown Prince, chaired three summits while Xi was in Riyadh: a Saudi-China Summit, the Arab States-China Summit, and a summit between China and the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.
The summits covered issues related to energy, trade and investment. Exporting nearly a quarter of its oil to China – 17% of China’s oil imports come from Saudi Arabia – Saudi Arabia had every incentive to engage with President Xi.
During Xi’s visit, Saudi Arabia and China signed billions of dollars’ worth of trade and investment deals covering issues such as transportation, logistics, natural-resource development and security.
Saudi realpolitik
The Gulf states sense that the Western powers are giving increasingly short shrift to their security commitments in the region, in part due to the conflict in the Ukraine. For this reason, China and Saudi Arabia discussed military and security matters behind closed doors – much to the consternation of Brussels, London and Washington.
It has been reported that Riyadh is in joint ventures to produce some Chinese military equipment – a signal that diversification on all front is better than dependence on mercurial suppliers.
The role of the US dollar was also discussed – doubts about its long-term viability abound. It appears that Beijing has persuaded the Saudis (and others) to transact some of their oil trade in yuan rather than dollars. De-dollarization, while not imminent, is in the air and is increasingly a subject of discussion in the capitals of the Middle East and Asia.
The Saudis well understand that Western sanctions can impede the free flow of dollars, making it wise to have hedging mechanisms in place as well as alternative payment systems.
In its efforts to reduce economic and security dependencies, Saudi Arabia plans to invest some $500 billion in infrastructure and other projects over the next decade. This will be very attractive for Chinese firms and investors. China is able to help Saudi Arabia realize its proposed “space-age” city of Neom on the Red Sea, among other initiatives.
The Gulf Arab states’ use of Chinese fifth-generation (5G) telecom technology and systems and Chinese investments in sensitive infrastructure like ports and other transport hubs is contrary to US policy, and thus another bone of contention between Riyadh and Washington.
Saudi Arabia and Huawei signed a deal in Riyadh on Thursday.
President Xi is working on multiple fronts to keep the oil flowing. Saudi oil bound for China must be loaded on tankers in the Persian Gulf, traverse the Indian Ocean and make its way through the Strait of Malacca before entering the South China Sea. This is inherently risky for China.
It cannot be excluded that Xi is exploring with Prince Salman the possibility of a Saudi-Iranian pipeline connecting to China, possibly through Afghanistan. This would enhance China’s energy security by bypassing the Indian Ocean where the Western naval presence is strong.
While Saudi-Iranian relations, sensitive after a prolonged period of animosity, are improving, it remains to be seen if any such arrangement could be made by the Persian Gulf’s two leading states.
In any case, Riyadh’s and Beijing’s deepening strategic relationship raises the prospect of the Persian Gulf and the larger Middle East becoming a close partner of China and a key player in Eurasia. The developments in Riyadh could well be further evidence of the birth pangs of multipolarity.