With the atmosphere in Israel tense, the political opposition warning of constitutional upheaval and worries of a security crisis in the Palestinian arena, Prime Minister-designate Benjamin Netanyahu will need to bring forth a real achievement to ensure his new government withstands these circumstances.
The economic picture isn’t reassuring either: Experts warn of a long global recession and a state budget that’ll groan under the weight of promises to pressure groups. The only thing left is the diplomatic-security fields.
Here, Netanyahu doesn’t conceal his aspirations. There’s the continuing matter to which he has long pledged ideological commitment – thwarting the Iranian nuclear project. And there’s the new hope he has been touting lately – the signing of a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia.
But these issues are connected both to each other and to the complex relationship that may develop between the next government and the Biden administration in the U.S. In a way, despite attempts by Netanyahu and his associates to minimize the fact, this too relates to the Palestinians.
In the years when Trump was president, Israel and Saudi Arabia moved much closer, given the close ties of Netanyahu’s and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman with Trump and their mutual hostility to Iran. Foreign media outlets frequently reported extensive security and intelligence ties between Jerusalem and Riyadh. Once, in November 2020, Netanyahu alluded through his spokesmen’s posts on social media to a secret visit he’d made to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis, who fumed over the publication, took a step backward in the relationship.
In interviews before and after Netanyahu’s recent election victory last month, the prime minister-designate expressed a desire to sign an agreement with the Saudis, as a continuation of the normalization agreements reached with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain some two years ago. What will the Saudis ask for in return? Conversations with several people knowledgeable about the ties indicate that the crown prince, the de facto ruler of the kingdom, will have a number of demands, but they’ll be directed at the U.S. much more than Israel. With that, the Saudi interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is limited.
As long as there’s no clash over the Temple Mount and the heightened security problems in the West Bank don’t get out of hand, it’s highly unlikely that the Saudis intend to present a breakthrough in Israel’s process with the Palestinian Authority, which was frozen years ago, as a condition for moving ahead on relations with Israel.
On the question of Iran, the international press reports widespread intelligence ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Riyadh will probably also consider favorably any move by another country that raises anxiety in Iran. However, it’s hard to see Saudi Arabia contributing directly to any military action against the country. In recent years, both the Saudis and the UAE have been hit by heavy drone strikes by Iran, usually launched by the Houthi rebels in Yemen, but both greatly fear responding militarily.
In indirect contacts with the U.S. administration, bin Salman noted a number of requests, of which three are the most significant: Public tightening of ties with the U.S., backed up by positive declaration by Congress, equalizing Saudi status in purchasing American weapons to that of NATO members and American agreement to a civilian nuclear project in Saudi Arabia, taking advantage of the country’s large uranium reserves.
Two of these matters raise major difficulties. The removal of restrictions on weapons purchase would allow Saudi Arabia to purchase, among other things, F-35 fighter planes (the Trump administration wanted to remove a similar restriction with regard to the UAE in exchange for the Abraham Accords, but so far this hasn’t happened). And a civilian nuclear project in Saudi Arabia would change the status quo in the Middle East on a sensitive question, although this wouldn’t be a military program.
Another difficulty involves the relationship between the Saudi crown prince and President Joe Biden. A severe crisis emerged between bin Salman and the Democratic Party over the murder of anti-regime journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey by Saudi intelligence officials on bin Salman’s orders in 2018.
Despite the anger of the Saudis, Biden sought to improve ties between the two countries because of the world spike in global oil prices and Russia’s war in Ukraine. Biden flew to Riyadh and asked the Saudis to increase their oil production, but was given evasive responses. Ties between the two countries remain tense. At least some of the Saudi demands are expected to be opposed by Congress, and perhaps by departments in the administration.
Creeping normalization
In October, a delegation from the Washington Institute of Near East Policy visited Saudi Arabia. The institute’s executive director, Robert Satloff, said in a meeting after the delegation returned that senior Saudi officials had realized that Khashoggi’s murder had been a “serious error,” but they complained about what they saw as a harsh attitude on the part of the U.S. over the matter.
Satloff said his impression from the ambitiousness of the Saudi plans for economic growth and what he defined as “the emergence of a strong, self-assured Saudi nationalism in which Islam is just one of many attributes, not a determinative or particularly central one.” In contrast, he described the Saudis as immune to Western criticism of their country’s human rights record.
According to Satloff, ties between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are in serious crisis, but he believes that the two countries can overcome their differences over the extent of oil production. However, on the long-term he expects a weakening of the relationship, mainly because of opposition on the extreme right and the progressive left in the U.S. to Riyadh’s positions. As for ties with Israel, Satloff said his delegation had found signs of “creeping normalization” everywhere they visited in the kingdom. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to conclude that full normalization was “around the corner. The relationship to Israel, Satloff added, is less important to the Saudis than it is to the countries that signed the Abraham Accords.
At the moment, the Saudi regime has different priorities, first and foremost the ambitious project to construct the futuristic city of Neom in the northwestern part of the country near the Straits of Tiran. But the normalization agreements with Israel could open the way to huge business and technological collaborations with Israeli companies, that could become integrated into still-unnamed projects the Saudis are planning.
Meanwhile, the crown prince is gradually allowing relaxation of the harsh restrictions of religious life in the kingdom. For example, the possibility is being considered of legalization of the sale of alcohol to foreigners in defined zones like hotels, as well as lifting the prohibition against non-Muslim prayer.
Over the past two years, more Israelis have visited Saudi Arabia than ever before, most of them using a foreign passport. In late October, the chairman of the board of Bank Leumi, Samer Haj-Yehia, attended an economic conference in Riyadh, at which other Israeli business people were present, keeping a low profile and without publication of their names. Israeli athletes have also visited the kingdom.
Torn between two tasks
Netanyahu is also expected to face serious obstacles, although normalization with Saudi Arabia, as with the Abraham Accords before it, is likely to win wall-to-wall support from the public and the political world in Israel. To promote the Saudi channel, and certainly to rebuild the Israel Defense Forces’ assault capabilities against Iran’s nuclear program, Netanyahu will also need close assistance from Biden.
Sharp disagreement emerged between Netanyahu and his successor as prime minister, Naftali Bennett, over the question of military preparedness for an assault in Iran. Bennett said that this option was seriously neglected in the years after the U.S., ordered by Trump and encouraged by Netanyahu, left the nuclear agreement in 2018. Over the past year the IDF has once again been investing efforts and money in improving preparedness for assault.
However, some of the work involves purchase by the Israeli Air Force of American weaponry, and in this area there have been major delays. Israel needs new refueling planes for this purpose, another squadron of F-15s that the air force wants to purchase, and on the longer term, another squadron of F-35s. At the moment, refueling planes are due to be supplied only in 2026. Some in Washington believe this should be moved forward to signal to the Iranians U.S. support for Israel and upgrading its military capabilities.
However, the U.S. administration might connect progress on military purchases to the situation in the Palestinian arena. Except for public lip service, the Biden administration has done nothing to jump start the diplomatic process.
But if there is long-term escalation in the territories, the U.S. could signal to Israel that it won’t get what it wants with regard to the Iranian issue if it does not act to rein in violence with the Palestinians. These are the tensions that could develop, both around the status quo on the Temple Mount and the declared plans of the Religious Zionism party to expand construction of settlements and legalize dozens of illegal outposts.
Although the importance of the Palestinian issue has declined greatly from the point of view of the Sunni Arab countries, which are more or less in a peaceful relationship, or at least in secret ties with Israel a prolonged, high-caliber clash with the Palestinians could change their positions, especially if it is against a religious backdrop. This could overshadow ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain and ratchet up public opposition in those countries to normalization.
And there’s another difficulty, from the perspective of the IDF. In recent years most of the attention has been devoted to building strength and to operational activities ahead of a conflict with Iran and the northern front. The escalation in the West Bank, which began in March of this year, gradually compelled the army to invest more troops and resources in that arena.
Over time, the conflict could demand more attention and more money. The army plans to call up many dozens of reserve battalions to service in the West Bank in the year to come, after it extended the service of regular army units there and on the seam line. While Netanyahu is expected to seek billions more shekels to build a military response to Iran, the territories could demand their own attention and resources. The senior command could find itself torn between two tasks.