While the U.S. foreign policy establishment has prioritized Russia and China in recent years, North Korea (DPRK) remains a concern. Given the DPRK’s nuclear weapons arsenal, its record number of missile launches this year, and the U.S. military presence in South Korea (ROK), it’s important for Americans and policymakers to understand the complex geopolitical situation on the Korean peninsula and accurately assess what policies best serve U.S. national interests.
The DPRK is a problem to be managed, not solved
U.S. interests in the Korean peninsula are narrow: (1) containing and deterring threats to the U.S. and its allies and (2) avoiding escalation to direct conflict. Limiting the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal is a desirable but secondary aim.
The U.S. is strong; the DPRK is weak. Overwhelming U.S. conventional and nuclear superiority—which guarantees the DPRK’s annihilation in the event of a conflict—deters the DPRK from launching an unprovoked war against the U.S. and ROK.
The ROK’s military advantages over the DPRK are profound, and a DPRK invasion is unlikely. This balance of power advantage allows for the U.S. to reduce its force presence on the peninsula to reduce U.S. costs and risks.
The DPRK has enhanced the quantity and quality of its missile capability in recent years, and they’ve conducted over 70 missile tests this year alone. The DPRK’s missiles seek to deter a foreign attack and cause pain to an adversary if war erupts.
The DPRK is one of the most sanctioned countries in the world; the U.S. restricts many of its imports and exports. Sanctions have failed to compel the DPRK to denuclearize and continuing these policies will produce the same results.
Maintaining an operational nuclear weapons capability is vital to the DPRK’s security and is therefore non-negotiable to them.
Complete denuclearization of the DPRK is unlikely, if not impossible, at acceptable cost. The U.S. should instead pursue realistic objectives, like a cap on the DPRK’s nuclear and missile capabilities, which can be achieved via sanctions relief and steps toward normalization.
Timeline of recent U.S.-DPRK events
The DPRK will not denuclearize—but it could negotiate
Despite periodic nuclear diplomacy with the U.S., there is no evidence DPRK leader Kim Jong-un will agree to give up DPRK’s nuclear arsenal, which deters threats from the U.S. and ROK.
Kim Jong-un will, at best, trade good behavior, such as a halt to long-range tests, for economic and political concessions.
The U.S. has long pursued a failed approach to dealing with the DPRK: demanding complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) as necessary for obtaining U.S. concessions.
Because of the DPRK’s dependence on nuclear weapons, CVID is a non-starter, which keeps relations between the U.S. and the DPRK in the same stalemate.
The U.S. should reduce its demands with the DPRK to achievable arms control steps like testing freezes, stockpile limits, and missile restrictions in exchange for limited economic relief and reductions in U.S. forces in the ROK.
The U.S. is strong and safe; the DPRK is weak and desperate
The DPRK is a vulnerable state surrounded by wealthier, more militarily capable, and diplomatically powerful neighbors. The ROK and Japan are U.S. treaty allies with a combined $104 billion in annual military spending—more than nine times what the DPRK spends.
The DPRK is one of the poorest states in the world. The Bank of Korea estimates DPRK’s 2021 GDP to be approximately $25 billion—1.3 percent the size of the ROK’s GDP.
The DPRK depends on China for economic and political support, accounting for 95 percent of its trade. The extent of this dependency was illustrated in 2020, when the closure of the DPRK-China border due to the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to a 78 percent decline in bilateral trade. The Bank of Korea estimates the DPRK's external trade in 2021 was the lowest since 1955.
Russia’s war in Ukraine provided the DPRK with an opportunity to expand their limited revenue streams. The DPRK is discussing sending workers to Russian-occupied territories in Ukraine, and both Moscow and Pyongyang are in the process of resuming rail traffic.
Outside of concessions on its nuclear and missile programs, the DPRK can offer little to the U.S., which explains why long-standing U.S.-DPRK policy is to sanction, isolate, and avoid pragmatic diplomacy.
U.S., ROK, and DPRK military comparison
The balance of power favors the U.S. and ROK
At 5,428 warheads, the U.S. nuclear arsenal is 180 times larger than the DPRK’s. The DPRK’s small nuclear arsenal, estimated at 20–30 assembled warheads, compensates for its military’s inferiority and protects the regime from intervention by outside powers.
The DPRK’s conventional military forces are badly outmatched by the ROK’s, let alone the U.S. military. At nearly 1.3 million troops, the DPRK has the fourth largest army in the world, but its troops are poorly trained, endure malnutrition, and are sometimes tasked with menial jobs to make up for labor shortages.
The DPRK’s ground forces haven’t fought a large-scale conventional war since the 1950–1953 Korean War, and it is very uncertain how effective the Korean People’s Army’s command-and-control would be in a war.
In contrast, the ROK boasts one of the world’s most modern militaries, with defense spending increasing every year since 2012. The ROK military operates U.S. weapons systems like the F-35, invests in its naval and land capacity, consistently modernizes its military with an emphasis on its missile, tank, and reconnaissance capabilities, and is an arms exporter in its own right.
The ROK’s advanced military capability, combined with the DPRK’s aging conventional platforms, means the U.S. and its regional allies should not overreact to DPRK missile launches, military drills, or even nuclear tests—all attempts at balancing against a conventionally superior adversary.
The U.S. only loses by initiating a preventive war against the DPRK
While the DPRK can’t compete conventionally with the U.S. in a war, its nuclear weapons render a U.S. military attack unacceptably risky, particularly with the limited U.S. interests at stake.
Beyond such defensive usage, nuclear weapons are essentially useless. History and scholarship suggest the DPRK cannot use them to coerce the ROK into surrendering territory or sovereignty.
Even a targeted preventive strike against DPRK targets presents risks and could quickly spiral into a full-blown war. Because the DPRK may assume any military operation is geared towards regime change, strikes could prompt a “use-it-or-lose-it” scenario for their nuclear arsenal.
Little is known about the DPRK’s nuclear weapons safety regime. The U.S. should make efforts to form working-level communications with its DPRK counterparts to ensure its nuclear stockpile is secure.
China, Russia, and other nuclear powers have a similar interest to the U.S. in DPRK nuclear safety and could serve a constructive role in pursuit of this objective.
Absent a U.S. policy shift, expect more DPRK missile tests
Absent a verifiable agreement on caps or rollbacks, the DPRK will continue to bolster the capability of its nuclear and missile programs.
The DPRK is in the process of developing a credible second-strike capability with a reasonably large number of truck and train mobile launchers.
The DPRK’s testing schedule seeks to: (1) improve its self-defense capacity by testing and producing more diverse weapons systems, (2) comply with Kim Jong-un’s January 2021 order to enhance its deterrent, and (3) increase its leverage if talks with the U.S. resume.
The rapid tests illustrate the DPRK’s top priority is to maintain and strengthen its military power for the purposes of self-defense, even if it comes at a high economic cost.
DPRK missile tests by year as of December 20, 2022
The continued failure of strategic patience
The Biden administration has reverted to the Obama-era policy of strategic patience: toughening restrictions on the DPRK’s economy and hoping more economic pressure will eventually compel the DPRK to negotiate.
But such a policy failed in the past to cap, let alone eliminate, Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal. The DPRK interpreted the policy as evidence of U.S. hostility and renewed justification for its military development. Strategic patience resulted in a larger DPRK nuclear arsenal and more capable missile systems.
Strategic patience will continue to fail. The DPRK will continue to reject vague U.S. overtures until the U.S. shifts to reasonable and attainable objectives.
U.S.-DPRK talks broke down in October 2019. The Biden administration expressed interest in resuming diplomacy without preconditions, but denuclearization remains central to U.S. policy. The U.S. is also increasing economic sanctions against the DPRK and third-party entities that assist its nuclear and missile programs.
U.S.-China antagonism contributes to tensions on the Korean Peninsula. China, wary of a U.S. containment policy, is impeding U.S. initiatives related to the DPRK by blocking additional U.N. sanctions and enabling the DPRK’s sanctions evasion.
A realistic approach would secure concrete gains for the U.S.
A U.S.-DPRK war is unacceptable given it could escalate to the nuclear level. The approximately 80,000 U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and Japan would be targets for DPRK attacks.
The U.S. will benefit most by pursuing incremental and attainable steps toward peace and normalization with the DPRK.
To boost the prospects of a reasonable deal with the DPRK, the U.S. could (1) incentivize the DPRK to re-enter its 2018 moratorium on nuclear and long-range ballistic missile tests, reducing the risk of a destructive war; (2) constrain the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs by prohibiting future tests; (3) establish direct communication with the DPRK leadership to minimize risks of miscalculation.
In addition to sanctions relief, the U.S. can offer the DPRK: (1) a pause or reduction in joint U.S.-ROK military exercises, (2) a formal end to the Korean War, (3) a reduction of U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, and (4) normalized relations between the two countries.
The U.S. should finally transition war-time operational control to ROK forces. War-time operational control transfer has been repeatedly delayed, but the recent Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise in August 2022 signals the transition could occur soon.
The ROK should lead in moving diplomacy forward. In the event of moves toward inter-Korean rapprochement, the U.S. should support those efforts through the necessary sanctions relief, not hinder them in pursuit of unrealistic goals.