Two stories out of Italy have attracted international attention this week: The country’s chaotic election of its president, and a controversial video conference between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Italian business leaders. Both highlighted the ways in which Italy, which could play an important role in the European Union on the standoff between the West and Russia over Ukraine, has instead remained a silent bystander.
This silence is particularly notable given the expectations surrounding Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi: An economic mastermind credited with saving the euro, Draghi’s year in office has featured a strongly pro-EU platform and a tougher posture toward both Russia and China. In fact, as tensions began to rise again at the border between Russia and Ukraine, Italy had a front-row seat in high-level talks between the U.S. and Europe through the QUINT format, comprising the U.S., France, Germany, the U.K. and Italy. Draghi has even been included in video calls, as well as briefings preceding and following discussions between U.S. President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Given his political stature in Europe, as well as Italy’s ties with Russia, one would have expected Draghi to play a bigger role in diplomacy over the crisis, similar to that currently being played by the leaders of other European countries. For example, leaders from France and Germany have both pursued dialogue with Russia and Ukraine, bilaterally and through the so-called Normandy Format, in coordination with the United States. And EU foreign policy chief Joseph Borrell has openly advocated for the EU to take part in negotiations between the U.S. and Russia, framing the crisis as a European security concern.
By contrast, Draghi did not take a strong public position. This past December, like other European leaders, he remained unconvinced of the likelihood of a Russian invasion. He also raised concerns over Europe’s ability to deter Russia, pointing out its vulnerability to reprisals due to its dependence on Russian gas supplies, at a time when energy prices are spiking across the continent. He has also avoided openly defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and the inviolability of state borders, with the exception of joint communiques he issued with other European leaders about the conflict. Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio has likewise been completely silent.
The contrast with other European and NATO declarations became so striking that Italian Defense Minister Lorenzo Guerini intervened to clarify Rome’s position, confirming its strong commitment to the alliance and its willingness to contribute to strengthening deterrence on its Eastern flank, while still keeping the door open for dialogue with Russia.
Italy’s management of the crisis highlights the complicated diplomatic tightrope it walks with Russia, a country that provides more than a third of its energy needs and with which it maintains strong economic ties and friendly political relations across the political spectrum in Rome. Italy’s goal in managing the bilateral relationship with Russia has always been to make sure these relatively friendly relations remain compatible with its trans-Atlantic alignment.
Given his political stature in Europe, as well as Italy’s ties with Russia, one would have expected Draghi to play a bigger role in diplomacy over the crisis.
In fact, they have at times allowed Rome to act as an intermediary between the West and Moscow. It was former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, for instance, who pushed for the treaty that created the NATO-Russia council to be signed in Italy in 2002. In 2014, after the EU had imposed sanctions on Russia in response to the annexation of Crimea, Italy pushed for them to be reconsidered every six months to leave room for diplomatic engagement. Before that, then-Prime Minister Enrico Letta was the only Western head of government to attend the Sochi Winter Olympics in January 2014.
Italy’s business ties to Russia date back to the 1960s when then-President Giovanni Gronchi became the first leader from the Western bloc to visit Moscow in the aftermath of World War II. That same year, the Italian energy giant ENI signed its first contract for oil supplies with the Soviet government.
Since then, many other Italian companies have established their presence in Russia in the industrial machine, fashion, pharmaceutical and chemical sectors, and the two country’s economies continue to be intertwined. The first few years after the imposition of EU sanctions on Russia in 2014, for example, were particularly painful for Italy’s small and medium enterprises—for which Russia was the main export destination—although some of them have since found ways to get around the restrictions to keep trade flowing. In fact, Italy’s trade volume with Russia rose by 44 percent in the first nine months of 2021 compared to the same period of 2020, for a total of 20.2 billion euros.
It was therefore not surprising that Italian companies would hold discussions with their Russian counterparts under the auspices of the Italy-Russia Chamber of Commerce last week. But the timing of the conference—at the height of tensions over Russia’s military coercion of Ukraine—immediately created diplomatic challenges for Rome when word of the virtual conference spread.
To save face, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly declared that it had been unaware of the meeting, which seems to have been planned in 2021, while the government quickly urged any companies that are partially state-owned not to participate.
That Putin himself attended the videoconference highlights the political importance the meeting held for the Kremlin, allowing the Russian president to flaunt his ties with Italy’s private sector while seeding divisions in the West. And the fact that Italian business leaders rejected criticism over the meeting shows how divided Italy remains with respect to the balance of business and political interests with regard to Russia—worrisomely similar to the tensions over the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline that are roiling German politics these days.
But the same features that have complicated Italy’s response to the current crisis over Ukraine also make it an ideal candidate to act in conjunction with other EU member states to deescalate tensions between Russia and Ukraine, and to help the EU play a bigger role in the negotiations between Russia and the United States. This is particularly true for Italy under Draghi’s leadership. In the year since he took office, Draghi has raised Italy’s European and international status, gaining more trust within and influence over EU institutions. And in light of his experience heading the European Central Bank, Draghi is a strong believer in European sovereignty and closer political integration to allow the EU to better protect its borders and security interests.
But as Italy’s presidential election has once again shown, chaotic domestic politics have a way of undermining consistent and attentive foreign policy. For Rome, that means crisis management can at times run on autopilot or, worse, be outsourced to business interests.
Sergio Mattarella’s reelection as president now increases the likelihood of political stability for Draghi’s final year as a prime minister. Arguably, however, Draghi may emerge somewhat weakened from the presidential election, as he was angling for the post, but also because of the bitterness the process created among the political parties he depends upon in his technocratic government of national unity.
In any case, with all of Italy’s political parties likely to be ramping up their maneuvering ahead of national elections in 2023, it is quite likely that the domestic front will remain difficult to navigate for Draghi. But the fact that he is neither a politician nor likely to seek another term in office also gives Draghi the opportunity to be bold, particularly when it comes to the current crisis over Ukraine. He could use this opportunity to shore up his legacy by more firmly supporting the trans-Atlantic values with which he opened his mandate, as well as to push for a bolder role for the EU in guaranteeing its own security.
Giovanna De Maio is a visiting fellow with George Washington University’s Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies. Follow her on Twitter @giovDM.