https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Putin-and-Xi-manifesto-signals-start-of-a-new-era
Putin and Xi manifesto signals start of a new era
Moscow and Beijing's unity stems from mutual distrust of the U.S.
James Crabtree is executive director of IISS-Asia in Singapore. He is author of "The Billionaire Raj."
Clocking in at more than 5000 words, the duo's tract on "international relations entering a new era" presents a radical prospectus for future cooperation and one with potentially significant implications for the United States' attempts to refocus its geopolitical efforts on Asia.
The new Sino-Russian manifesto is a spirited affair, lambasting "certain states" at length for foisting their vision of democracy and human rights on others. More specifically, it signs China up to Russia's demand to cease the expansion of NATO, a body the two nations accuse of "ideologized Cold War approaches."
The push back from Beijing and Moscow is not just against the U.S., but its partners in Asia too. They are "seriously concerned" by the AUKUS pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. Meantime, they "stand against the formation of closed bloc structures," a likely reference to the Quad grouping of Australia, India, Japan and the U.S, whose foreign ministers meet this week in Melbourne.
At one level, this ought not to be surprising. Of late, the U.S. and its partners have pushed a range of new security arrangements, of which AUKUS and the Quad are merely the most visible. Rather than alliances, these tend to be ad hoc "mini-lateral" deals promising cooperation in particular areas.
China and Russia's new relationship now looks similar. The two powers have been drawing closer for decades, leaving old Cold War-era enmities behind. No longer are their ties based mostly on trade in arms and energy. Indeed, as China's military has advanced, it has grown far less reliant on imported Russian weapons.
Much as the Quad drew together via mutual anxiety about China, so Moscow and Beijing's unity stems from distrust of the U.S. Both desire a post-American "polycentric world order," and both are increasingly willing to cooperate to achieve this vision.
"Russia and China stand against attempts by external forces to undermine security and stability in their common adjacent regions," the document states -- a view suggesting both countries are quite comfortable with a new world of spheres of influence.
Here a note of skepticism is needed. Beijing and Moscow still have important differences, not least the fact that last week's document pointedly did not back Russia's actions in Ukraine, a sign that Beijing remains skeptical about Putin's assertive approach.
Other tensions are geographic, such as China's aim of stronger ties in Central Asia, which Moscow views as its own backyard. Scenarios in which the two combine to press the U.S. on two fronts also seem unlikely for now, especially via simultaneous military operations in Taiwan and Ukraine.
Ultimately, China and Russia care about different things. Moscow wants to rearrange Europe's security order, but it is more content with how things stand in Asia. China holds the opposite view, a point made by Michael Koffman of CNA, a Washington-based think tank. Rather than an alliance, Koffman suggests, Beijing and Moscow are now operating according to a kind of nonaggression pact. Both are playing down tension with one another to focus on taking on the U.S. in their own areas.
This is significant in two respects, the first being new forms of cooperation. The two nations are set to codevelop military technologies, from missile systems to artificial intelligence, just as is true for AUKUS. There are likely to be more joint military exercises, as well as more close coordination in forums like the United Nations.
Closer ties in Asia are also possible, as Russia looks to play an enlarged role in the region. Last week's recent Sino-Russian tract was notable for including, albeit only in its very last paragraphs, a nod to the importance that both powers place in the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations and its regional security architecture.
The second lesson is for Joe Biden's strategy. Last June, the U.S. president opened a new dialogue with Putin at a summit in Geneva, aiming to stabilize relations and allow Washington to focus more efforts on China. Whatever the outcome of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine, it will surely distract from that planned Asian realignment -- a plan that Biden has, in any case, moved slowly to realize.
Yet even if the U.S. moves only gradually forward with plans to refocus on Asia, it must expect a reaction. Washington tends to view groupings like the Quad as defensive, with the aim of deterring China from actions that challenge the existing regional order. Viewed from Beijing, however, these groupings are offensive vehicles for containment, in much the same way Russia views NATO.
This creates an uncomfortable dynamic for the U.S. and its Quad partners. In some areas, they may succeed in deterring China in Asia, much as NATO may succeed in deterring Russia in Europe. But in doing so, they are also likely to drive their adversaries to work together.
The Asia Pacific is entering a new period of turbulence. Earlier eras of geopolitical instability -- Europe prior to the Second World War is a good example -- have led to all manner of new security arrangements, concordats, pacts, treaties and indeed formal alliances.
It would be naive to assume Asia's recent rash of security arrangements will develop only between the U.S. and its friends. In this sense, Putin and Xi's recent manifesto does indeed suggest that international relations are entering a new era -- one in which the U.S.'s adversaries are likely to cooperate ever more closely.