Daniel Ellsberg wrote in his 1972 book, Papers on the War, (a must-read book for everyone on this email list, along with his book Secrets, and more recently, The Doomsday Machine) in regard to opposition
to the Vietnam War, on pp. 11-12, that "Each failure of political opposition to the war has challenged the adequacy of earlier
explanations. Each has suggested the need for a broader, deeper, in this sense more radical,
appreciation of the “stalemate machine”: the system of factors that support the war process and each other. Indeed, so called “radical” analysts
have had less backtracking to do in recent years than most others, having
seen and reported the nature of the war with an uncommon clarity. The writing of Noam Chomsky and Gabriel Kolko,
and of the “revisionist” historians of the Cold War following the lead of William Appleman Williams’ The Tragedy of
American Diplomacy (New York, 1962), powerfully illuminates the economic and
corporate motives underlying our defense budget and our militarized imperialist foreign policy.
Yet these works seem least enlightening about the causes of our specific intervention in Vietnam, and its continuation.”
(Emphasis added.)
The reason for that, as Dan put it, was: "If these studies, too, seem far from satisfactory, perhaps the main reason is that they tend to neglect the rules both of the bureaucracy and, more importantly it seems to
me, of the U.S. domestic political system, including the special role of the President. It is these last factors that are emphasized in two of the principal essays here, “The Quagmire Myth and the Stalemate Machine” and “Murder
in Laos.” I recognize, however, that both essays leave unanswered important questions concerning broader social and economic interests that may influence the political and bureaucratic fears that seemed to
me directly to drive policy. One problem is that few analysts personally command experience or data concerning more than a few of the many dimensions of this process.
Another is a relative lack of specialized studies in some of these areas, e.g., on the domestic politics of US foreign policy.
Above all, crucial data and the bureaucratic decision process have been closely guarded, limited to a few analysts-- I was one-- and publicly lied about.
"I repeat the premise: efforts at better understanding cannot be put off till the triumph of resistance, the end of the war (any more than continued resistance can await a perfect understanding). It was in this belief that I
undertook, beginning in the fall of 1969, to reveal to Congress and the American people the documents and analysis that came to be known as the Pentagon Papers. That was, of course, itself
an act of resistance, but of a particular sort, aimed at a broader and ultimately better understanding of the war process. And it is in that same spirit that I offer these essays."
FN 2
"To be specific: I am increasingly convinced of the direct influence on officials’ behavior--as argued in these essays-- of fears of a McCarthyite “right wing backlash” if they should be associated with “losing Indochina.” But how realistic have those fears
been over the last decade? Why do those officials act on them still without testing their reality? And why do they so often act, in addressing the public, to give them greater reality? Whose interests, finally, are served by a policy adapted to those fears
and a society organized around them? My recent research has made these further questions seem highly cogent:
my answers are yet very tentative, and in any case they will have to wait further research.”
End
Dan Ellsberg has made a lifetime project in continuing this “further research” to understand the “war process,” and issues "concerning broader social and economic
interests that may influence the political and bureaucratic fears that seemed to me directly to drive policy.” The issues Dan raised back in 1972 remain with us today, and his research
project is even more relevant as we no longer have an antiwar movement. And those few who are anti-war are up against a “vast right-wing (meaning militarist) conspiracy,"which includes a large majority of the Democratic Party (Clintons, Biden, et al.), and
the Republican Party as a whole, notwithstanding those few who prioritize enriching the pro-war Oligarchs as their main mission, in collaboration with the likes of the late Sheldon Adelson (and now his widow Miriam) to fuel the war process with the wealth
of the Oligarchs. The Kochs have funded a vast array of “conservatives” and “libertarians,” with many, or all, willing to resort to the most outrageous lies to achieve their goals of getting pro-war Republicans elected, like Machiavelli, the subject of the
attached files, taught.
So to this outstandingly astute article by Daniel Larison, I suggest it be approached as Dan Ellsberg suggests, for a truer understanding of how "domestic politics” are essential to the war process, with obfuscation
part of that process, to mislead, redirect, etc., with that “war process” not just a “snapshot” in time. This is why Larison had to go from The American Conservative. He was capable of deeper thought and analysis than were the journalists, shouting “Stop the
Presses” everytime Trump redeployed forces from the Mideast to Europe and/or East Asia, as if he were “ending the endless wars. And he was honest, unlike the Straussian Claremont Fellows whom “traditional conservatives” took to their bosom (see “The Republican
Workers Party,” by the Leo Strauss enthusiast F.H. Buckley, like the "German Workers Party” of the 1920s in tactics of deception, in my opinion, as a student of each.
On Feb 9, 2022, at 1:32 PM, Chas Freeman via Salon <salon@listserve.com> wrote:
(TP- Larison could/should have added Tucker Carlson to this as well, as he does this so well.)
https://original.antiwar.com/Daniel_Larison/2022/02/08/china-hawks-arent-antiwar/
China Hawks Aren’t Antiwar
by Daniel Larison Posted on February 09, 2022
The Biden administration recently accused Republican Sen. Josh Hawley of "parroting Russian talking points" when he suggested that the U.S. should oppose Ukraine’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The administration’s response was
insulting, but it was also wildly off the mark because Hawley’s objections to bringing Ukraine into NATO had nothing to do with Russia or Russia policy as such. A closer look at Hawley’s argument against NATO expansion shows that his doubts about adding Ukraine
to the alliance are based entirely on a hawkish preoccupation with containing China. It appears that he opposes further NATO expansion only because it might detract from a larger military buildup in East Asia that he wishes to see. Opposing new security commitments
in one region so that the US can entangle itself more deeply in another is just another kind of militarism and overreach. The China hawks aren’t antiwar.
Hawley’s case against expanding US commitments in Europe is a simple one. He writes, "we must do less in those secondary theaters in order to prioritize denying China’s hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific." This is consistent with the so-called "strategy of
denial" outlined by Elbridge Colby in his book of the same name, according to which containing Chinese power should be the overriding concern of US foreign policy. China hawks are frustrated by the attention Europe is currently receiving because it threatens
to derail or at least delay the confrontational policies they want the US to pursue on the other side of the world. If they had their way, the US would jump out of the confrontational frying pan into the militaristic fire.
China hawks do not really object to taking an overall hardline approach to Russia as long as it doesn’t take up too many resources. In Hawley’s case, he isn’t even absolutely opposed to bringing Ukraine into NATO as long as European allies pick up more of the
slack with increased military spending. As he says, "Concerns about NATO enlargement might be lessened if our European allies were shouldering their fair share of the burden of our collective defense. Were they doing so, then it might not be so difficult for
NATO to admit new members, without jeopardizing America’s ability to keep its focus on the Indo-Pacific." Hawley seems oblivious or indifferent to the fact that bringing Ukraine into NATO would create an obligation to defend a country that the US and its allies have
no ability to defend successfully against a nuclear-armed state. All the same risks and dangers of adding more members would remain the same. More European military spending here and there would not change the reality that this is an irresponsible and reckless
commitment for the alliance to make.
Hawks like Hawley have proven to be opportunistic and unreliable in their embrace of antiwar arguments in the past. When Biden first announced the US forces would withdraw from Afghanistan, Hawley agreed with the decision but also attacked Biden for moving
too slowly. Then, when the withdrawal happened, he condemned Biden for it and demanded his resignation. In response to the latest Biden administration criticism, Hawley said that Biden would be responsible for any Russian attack on Ukraine because he refrained
from imposing Nord Stream 2 sanctions and didn’t do enough to "aid" Ukraine earlier. When faced with the slightest opposition, the senator responded with the most unthinking hawkish talking points imaginable. Even when it seems as if he might be on the right
track on this or that policy, it seems that he is mostly just looking for any angle that he can use to bash a Democratic president no matter what the issue is. If Biden had ruled out further NATO expansion, it would not be difficult
to imagine Hawley claiming that this was a great betrayal.
Hawley was never "parroting Russian talking points," but he is reciting the conventional wisdom that China is the great enemy that must be contained at all costs. That view is much more dangerous for the United States because it is so widely shared and so rarely
questioned in our foreign policy debates. It is most often the policy views that enjoy broad, bipartisan support that are the least scrutinized and likeliest to produce costly failures later. The assumption that the US has to contain China and "deny" its regional dominance
is setting the US on a path to more military spending and ruinous, avoidable conflicts. That is the path that China hawks would have us take, and it would be every bit as dangerous as the continued pursuit of NATO expansion on Russia’s doorstep, if not more
so. Rather than courting great power conflict in Europe or Asia as it is doing now, the US would do well to focus on managing and reducing tensions with both Russia and China.
Daniel Larison is a contributing editor and weekly columnist for Antiwar.com and maintains his own site at Eunomia. He is former senior editor at The American Conservative. He has been published in the New York Times Book Review, Dallas Morning News, World Politics
Review, Politico Magazine, Orthodox Life, Front Porch Republic, The American Scene, and Culture11, and was a columnist for The Week. He holds a PhD in history from the University of Chicago, and resides in Lancaster, PA. Follow him on Twitter.
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