The delay in confirming President Biden’s
nominees for positions in the State Department and USAID has already
caused immeasurable harm to our national security. That is easier to
assert than to prove. Yet, there is a highly plausible case to be made
that an absence of leadership at key political levels has contributed to
damage done to our international standing.
There is an unprecedented number of presidential appointments being stymied by senators
who are holding nominations under the threat of a filibuster in a
fruitless attempt to influence policy. They will fail in what they say
is their goal (one wants to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Russia
to Germany, a bargaining chip in the strategy now being employed to
deter Russian aggression against Ukraine, and the other has called for
the resignation of the secretary of State). As they persist, they are
weakening our responses to crises and disabling the administration’s
efforts to conduct a viable foreign policy. That may be their intention
and, if so, that is reprehensible.
Why you may ask is
it so important to have presidential appointees in place a year after
the inauguration of a president? Why can’t professional foreign service
officials provide the leadership needed?
I have been both a career professional and a political appointee, and this is my take.
Career
officers are supposed to be apolitical; they aren’t always, but they
are most effective when they remain that way. Their professionalism and
institutional knowledge are invaluable. They are a vital balance wheel
on the ship of state. They are also human, and, in general terms, they
are looking for a political framework within which they can contribute
their knowledge and ingenuity.
Political appointees to
leadership positions at State and USAID also bring professional
knowledge to bear — sometimes from a different realm — but they are
usually well attuned to the policy positions of an administration. Many
provided advice during the presidential campaign and contributed policy
ideas that were embraced by the candidate and his most senior aides.
They have no need to search for a framework as they contributed to it.
Their job is to lead in the implementation of it.
The top echelon of the administration’s team— Secretary Antony Blinken, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman and Administrator Samantha Power
— are experienced, tested leaders, but they are operating at a major
disadvantage. They need trusted acolytes that can amplify their
influence over the thousands of dedicated people in their charge.
As the administration moves to counter the diabolical chess moves of Vladimir Putin and the threat posed by the autocratic alliance of Putin and China’s Xi,
pundits ponder the impact of previous missteps. They are used by our
foes to undercut the administration’s effort to reengage constructively
and to shore up alliances.
George Packer in the Atlantic describes with
sad and colorful anecdotes the messy evacuation and the “betrayal” of
many of our Afghan allies. The administration is held accountable as it
should be, but it is also true that it inherited some real poison pills,
some of which could have been countered if appointees had been in
place.
For example, Afghans who had worked with our
government were eligible for Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs). A
relatively small number had received them or were in the system, but the
previous administration’s anti-immigrant White House (Stephen Miller) made the process so onerous it
was near impossible to gain approval for an SIV. That became disastrous
for a huge number of at-risk Afghans in the final hours.
One
cannot expect a secretary of State to be in the weeds of the visa
process, but he was blamed by many for the outcome, including by the
senators who had denied him the staff needed to get the job done. An
appointee with knowledge of the obstacles imposed might have already
eliminated them.
Another embarrassing undiplomatic moment involved the sale of nuclear submarines to Australia,
an arrangement that abrogated a deal France and Australia previously
had made. The French government was furious and even pulled its
ambassador back to Paris to underscore its bruised feelings.
At
the time of that announcement, there was no U.S. ambassador to France
and the assistant secretary for European affairs had been in the job for
less than a month. Had there been a competent and informed ambassador
in place the secretary most likely would have been amply warned of the
implications of announcing the deal before informing the French. In the
end, the president of the United States had to personally apologize to
the president of France for the “clumsy” way that the matter was
handled, saying the deal “was not done with a lot of grace.”
After four years of an administration that went out
of its way to be undiplomatic, the career service inherited by the Biden
administration was demoralized and decimated.
Many senior professionals cashed it in and retired. That just made the
appointment of a new leadership team even more important. Reengaging
with a skeptical world was not going to be easy. Even a complete team
would have found it a challenge.
We are fortunate to
have outstanding people in the highest ranks of State and USAID. They
are supported by a solid yet depleted career corps. That is not enough.
The Senate should do its job and prevent a minority of two from blocking
the president’s nominees. The national security of the United States is
being compromised by senators employing the pettiest of politics.
J. BrianAtwood is
a visiting scholar at the Watson Institute at Brown University. He was a
career foreign service officer, dean of Professional Studies at the
Foreign Service Institute, and served in three presidentially appointed
positions: assistant secretary of State for Congressional Relations,
undersecretary of State for Management and administrator of USAID.