The infiltration of a drone from Lebanon deep into Israeli territory on Friday has highlighted a problem that Israel’s military and political leadership are well aware of, but have not been discussing openly: the limited achievements of Israel’s policy of waging a “military campaign between the wars” in a theater of operations in which there is a particularly high chance that it will deteriorate into a war.
According to senior security sources, hundreds of thousands of missiles and rockets in Hezbollah’s possession are creating a balance of deterrence that is making it difficult for Israel to act against the Lebanese militant group.
In 2018, the Israel Defense Forces set five goals for the campaign between the wars: reducing the existing and developing threats to Israel; deflecting the prospect of war and creating better conditions for winning one; maintaining and strengthening deterrence; increasing Israel’s “equity” as an asset in the eyes of its partners; and maintaining the IDF’s freedom of action while reducing that of the enemy.
In recent years, this policy has in large measure achieved its goals and helped stop Iran’s entrenchment in the region through strikes in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and other countries. But according to security sources, the situation vis-à-vis Hezbollah is different. They believe this is because the organization has put a price on Israeli attacks on it and its members – particularly on Lebanese soil – which has created a mutual deterrence between the two sides.
Iran, Syria and others that have viewed Israel as being responsible for action against them have also issued similar threats. Sources who spoke to Haaretz said, though, that while there is a possibility of limited clashes on other fronts that do not cross the line into all-out war, the situation is much more explosive in the Lebanese theater, and the danger of a deterioration into a general confrontation has grown.
Drones at a war museum operated by Hezbollah in southern Lebanon.Credit: Mohammad Zaatari/AP
As a result of Hezbollah’s power, such a confrontation would be liable to paralyze the Israeli economy for a considerable period, and the civilian home front would take a considerable hit. “In Lebanon, we’re having a hard time creating the right formula for how to act without getting into a war,” one senior defense official acknowledged, adding that he was referring to overt and “noisy” operations, as opposed to clandestine ones.
“We’re constantly looking for a way to counter Hezbollah’s moves to strengthen itself in Lebanese territory. There’s no doubt that at this stage this situation benefits Hezbollah, but that won’t continue for the long term.” Another senior official who recently participated in a discussion on the threats in the northern theater, put it like thus: “In Lebanon, we’re deterred. We’re walking on eggshells there.”
The IDF has, therefore, taken pains not to strike Hezbollah members or its strategic targets in Lebanon, and the Israeli responses to the organization’s aggression has been relatively measured, intended primarily to send a message. So, for example, Israeli Air Force planes circled the skies of Beirut in response to the infiltration of the drone, and the firing of an anti-tank missile at a military vehicle on the border was answered with smoke shells fired from tanks.
All told, dozens of aerial attacks in Syria – and dozens of others on more distant targets – have been attributed to Israel, whereas there have been few operations in Lebanon, a clear majority of which have been in response to Hezbollah’s activity. Hezbollah has also recently been claiming responsibility for its operations, which it tended to refrain from doing in the past. So, for example, it was quick to announce that its members were the ones who sent the drone into Israel, in response to the downing the day before of another aircraft belonging to the group.
Recently, at a discussion attended by IDF Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi and other senior defense officials, they presented the operations carried out as part of the campaign between the wars in 2021, and discussed how the policy would be enacted in the coming year. According to sources present at the meeting, Israel still enjoys aerial freedom of action in the region, but one senior official warned: “In Lebanon, the story is a bit different. We aren’t in a good place there.” He explained that the ability to maintain such freedom of action there entails acquiring technology that Israel does not currently have.
“For years, Israel took the airspace for granted,” a former senior officer who knows the Lebanese theater well told Haaretz. “With means that were not the most advanced but with determination, Hezbollah managed to present a challenge to its freedom of action. It didn’t establish an air force and didn’t build an advanced aerial defense system, but it managed to create an array of drones and various means that might not down airplanes, but will threaten our UAVs and maybe enable it to intercept munitions. It’s absolutely disturbing.”
On Wednesday, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, delivered a lengthy speechfocusing on the balance of forces with Israel. He declared that his organization has managed to undermine the aerial freedom of action that Israel had enjoyed since the 2006 Second Lebanon War and claimed that the Israeli drones that in the past had hovered over his country’s skies unhindered no longer operate with the same frequency.
Nasrallah also discussed the organization’s plan for producing more precise missiles, which Israel deems its second most serious threat behind the Iranian nuclear program. The Hezbollah leader said that because of its fear of a war, Israel has not managed to undermine this enterprise. Israel’s foiling Iran’s efforts to arm the group, he added, has led Hezbollah to develop its own capabilities. Nasrallah said that it would only be possible to damage Hezbollah’s array of missiles and rockets in a war between the two sides, and not through targeted, “surgical” operations.
“Nasrallah’s right,” a senior defense source told Haaretz. “His stockpile is such that it’s impossible to hit it with a pinpoint operation, but only in a war.” He added, “If one of the reasons to go to war is that Hezbollah has built an array that Israel can’t tolerate on its border, today it’s in that position.”
In the defense establishment, they indeed do believe that as Israel crippled Iranian-backed efforts to get more precise missiles to Hezbollah, the Lebanese group has managed to build a system that lets them create precision missiles in Lebanon. And even if they are not producing these missiles in large quantities, the defense officials believe that Hezbollah plans to fire them at strategic sites in Israel during wartime.
The Israeli assessment, a senior source said, is that Hezbollah does have a limited array of precision missiles, “but no one can really say how many missiles Nasrallah possesses against Israel today.”
Brig. Gen (res.) Dror Shalom, the former head of the research department of the Intelligence Corps, recently echoed such remarks in an article published by the Institute for National Security Studies. “In many respects, the precision is already here,” stated Shalom, who is currently the head of the Defense Ministry’s state security division. “Hezbollah, with Iranian assistance, has held to its effort to develop an independent capability in Lebanon to create and convert precision missiles, despite Israel’s efforts to foil it.”
Progress in this field, he added, would present Israel with “a serious strategic threat that would sharpen the dilemma regarding preemptive action.” Shalom also warned that efforts to bring advanced anti-aircraft systems into the area point to an effort to erode Israel’s aerial superiority.
One senior defense researcher said that Israel cannot continue to delude itself that every precision missile project and all advanced weaponry destined for Hezbollah has already been struck in attacks in Syria or further afield. “In Lebanon, there really isn’t a campaign between the wars for various reasons, some of which are absolutely correct, but it seems that there also isn’t discourse about the right way to proceed. No one really knows what’s happening in Lebanon. No one knows how much we would be surprised,” he said.
Israel’s most significant failure, he said, was that it did not act in Lebanon “during a time when Hezbollah is fielding severe criticism at home and the country is collapsing economically. Israel hasn’t managed to find the winning formula that would make it possible to weaken Hezbollah in the public sphere in Lebanon without entering into a war.”