Let us review the circular logic of the confrontation that is now dominating the front pages in much of Europe and North America. 1. In 1990 representatives of the West promised the leaders of a weak USSR that NATO would not exploit the situation by someday adding new members from the Warsaw Pact. No. The references to NATO in conversations between Americans and Soviets referred to NATO assets in a unified Germany, if Germany remained in NATO, for which America desired Soviet assent. 2. At this time the prospect of NATO expansion toward the East, including membership for former Warsaw Pact members, was not considered. No. It was, and it was discussed by officials from several governments in public and in private. But whether it was implicitly part of the above-mentioned promise – or contingent upon it – is contested, and will probably never be resolved one way or the other. 3. When NATO expansion finally took place nearly a decade later, Russia had accommodated itself to it. No. Russia has opposed the letter and the spirit of NATO expansion consistently from the outset. That it has collaborated in talks and institutional arrangements with NATO does not negate its opposition. 4. NATO expansion before and after 2004 are qualitatively different. Yes. But that does not obviate the above response to point number 3. 5. NATO expansion in some form was necessary to provide security assurances, particularly on the part of the USA, for Eastern and Central Europe, against both Germany and Russia. No. There were other options. 6. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe, given their tragic histories, are right to need these assurances. Yes. But again, expanding NATO was not the only way to provide them. 7. It was just a matter of time before Russia would once again threaten the security of these nations. No. Nobody can predict the future with certainty. As to the past, this exact point has been made about other large powers and their neighbours, and has been both right and wrong. 8. Nevertheless, these nations prefer that Russia receive all the blame for being a menace to the peace of Europe. Yes. But expanding NATO made this impossible. Whether or not that’s fair is beside the point. 9. Russia has a free choice between a military-technical solution to this crisis and a political-diplomatic one. No. What both Russia and NATO and others have been doing all along has been diplomacy by other means. 10. The confrontation between Russia and NATO has independent significance. No. It is happening in a rich context of military aggression by both NATO and Russia since the mid-1990s, and with regard to a range of other relationships, from those with China to the prospect of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, etc. Which is another way of saying that the resolution of this crisis will not happen when one or the other side blinks over the Donbass. It will only happen when Russia and the members of NATO stop trying to command one another’s thoughts and actions, and begin, finally, to acknowledge and, to some degree, respect, one another’s independent legitimacy, power, and interests. Only then can they begin to reach a viable mutual accommodation. That it may come at the expense of the independence, power, and interests of smaller states like Ukraine may, unfortunately, be the price to pay for peace. It also doesn’t have to be that way. If you liked this post from Talleyrand, why not share it? © 2022 Talleyrand Unsubscribe |