The massive explosion on 4 August 2020 killed more than 200 people [photo credit: @MatthieuKaram]
Firstly, the cause of the explosion is clear. The 2,750 tonnes
of ammonium nitrate offloaded from the MV Rhosus was stored in
Warehouse 12, the location where customs-confiscated goods are normally
impounded. On its own, ammonium nitrate is a fertiliser, and is not
classified as an explosive; to become so, it has to be mixed with fuel
oil or other more volatile explosives. Even then, when mixed to form an
explosive, in normal use it needs a booster charge before it will
detonate; an ordinary detonator is insufficient to initiate an
explosion. Nonetheless, ammonium nitrate on its own and whilst still a
fertiliser, is a potentially volatile substance, and in most countries
there are safety regulations governing its storage, in particular
because it deteriorates in storage and is susceptible to detonation when
subject to heat, shock or contamination with other chemicals and
materials.
On 4 August, conditions meant that the safety regulations for storing
ammonium nitrate were being breached in multiple manners. The ambient
temperature at the time and date of the explosion, reinforced by storage
in an unventilated warehouse, would have been at or near the annual
peak. The ammonium nitrate was being stored alongside a consignment of
customs- confiscated fireworks. Apparently, a repair team was
conducting welding repairs to the doors of the Warehouse 12. A fire
crew – Platoon 5 from the Beirut Fire Brigade – was called out to deal
with a fire in the warehouse created by the welding activity, and before
all perished in the subsequent two explosions, reported they were
dealing with a fire in the confiscated fireworks. There was an initial
explosion in the fireworks at 18.07, before the catastrophic explosion
occurred some 30 seconds later. The conditions and the sequence of
events, plus the reporting of those at the scene before they
subsequently were killed, make it absolutely clear that the initial
firework fire provided sufficient shock, heat and detonating effect to
ignite the ammonium nitrate which because of the storage conditions was
already unstable.
The hypothesis that the explosion was the secondary effect of an
Israeli attack on a nearby Hezbollah arms store is speculation based on
unsubstantiated sources, even if it may be a hypothesis which is
attractive to many. Supposed sightings by witnesses of a missile
striking the dock warehousing are not reflected in audio and video
footage of the period immediately before and after the explosion,
perhaps confused with bird flights in the area. Moreover, there have
been enough Israeli attacks on targets in both Lebanon and Syria in
recent years to identify what appear to be quite consistent targeting
parameters, namely it seems that there normally needs to be an imminent
and direct threat to Israeli safety and security. To the regret perhaps
of some, Israeli attacks are not mounted to protect Syrian civilians
from government barrel bombs, nor to advantage one side or other in the
ongoing internecine struggles within Lebanon and Syria. And whilst
Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Syria are not officially acknowledged,
there is a trademark pattern of leaks, entirely absent in this case,
which confirm Israeli involvement even in the most brazen such attacks.
There are however open questions, where evidence is much less clear-cut.
The FBI estimates
that only 552 tonnes exploded on 4 August, less than a fifth of 2750
tonnes of ammonium nitrate originally consigned to the warehouse.
‘Shrinkage’ in dockside warehouses worldwide is not uncommon, but who in
this instance profited from the disappearance of over 2000 tonnes of
ammonium nitrate? Was it agricultural merchants selling the fertiliser
for agricultural use, with customs officers taking a cut turning a blind
eye to the slow leakage? Or was the Syrian government, via its proxies
in Lebanon, using an available source of ammonium nitrate as a
feedstock for manufacturing crude explosives? Production of ammonium nitrate in Syria
fell from 87,412 tonnes in 2004 to 16,000 tonnes in 2013, suggesting
that by 2014 domestic supply was inadequate. Technically this drop in
output would not have been an insuperable production challenge for the
Syrian government in need of crude explosives to overcome, but perhaps
it was just simpler to source the material, readily available via their
proxies, from the Port of Beirut.
This raises the question as to whether or not the landing and empoundment of the 2,750 tonnes
of ammonium nitrate in 2014 was a ruse to get the material close to
Syria, avoiding scrutiny or sanctions. While there is no doubt that MV
Rhosus was in an unseaworthy condition, this could have been part of the
deception. On balance, if the Syrian government was always the
intended recipient, it would probably have been easier to smuggle the
cargo directly into either Tartous or Latakia; instead, the
beneficiaries were probably taking advantage of an opportunity which
presented itself.
Linked to the open questions regarding who benefitted from the
disappearance of 2000+ tonnes of ammonium nitrate from the warehouse
before the explosion, one must ask why any was left in the warehouse by
August last year. Local sources report that between 2014 and 2017
customs officials sent six letters to judges who had ordered the
deposition of the ammonium nitrate, asking for disposal instructions and
suggesting ways in which this could be achieved; none of these letters
had resulted in any action. Was the refusal of judges to sanction the
safe disposal of the remaining amounts linked to the gains being made by
those pilfering the material, whether the ultimate end users were
agricultural merchants and farmers, or the Syrian government?
As so often is the case in political cause célèbres, the main
interest in this case may not be the answers to these open questions,
but more who has been attempting to obstruct Judge Tarek Bitar’s dogged
attempts to resolve them. Quite what these parties seek to hide or to
gain by their obfuscation of the judicial review process is unclear, but
it is doubtful that any benefit will outweigh the damage being caused
to the well-being of the nation.