The media blackout on the nuclear negotiations in Vienna between Iran and representatives of the West, Russia and China makes it difficult to see exactly what was achieved, who made concessions, and, primarily, whether we can expect to see an agreement signed in the near future.
The Russian representative Mikhail Ulyanov who tends to take to Twitter to bypass the blackout, this week tweeted that “we will be able to sign an agreement by the beginning of February.” The Chinese representative Wang Qun said that “talks are progressing and will continue.”
The United States has expressed cautious optimism and France has confirmed that there has been some progress but added that there is still “a long way to go.” These statements show that the initial pessimism and lack of faith in the possibility of negotiations – and the view that after they began Iran would try to stall for time – have been replaced by a working assumption by all sides that all parties are interested in formulating an agreement and doing so with haste.
The discourse that we have heard in recent days in Iran perhaps points to a breakthrough. For example, there was quite a storm in Tehran after Ulyanov tweeted that Russia and China have persuaded Iran to make concessions. Any hint of capitulation by Iran, especially if it comes from Russia, which is considered an ally, counters the narrative that Iran is trying to disseminate according to which the West is the party making concessions.
A spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, Saeed Khatibzadeh, quickly responded that “if we have a joint agreement on the draft, it has only come after the West has understood that it must withdraw from its maximalist positions. Today we see such a withdrawal, or, to be more precise, realism on the part of the West.”
Khatibzadeh, who did not give away any details regarding concessions by the West, thus confirmed that there is some kind of agreed-upon text. We can perhaps learn about the nature of this text from an article published on the Iranian website, Nur, which explains that the draft is that of the previous 2015 nuclear accords. In other words, the current draft is not based on new demands put forward by Iran on November 29. If this is correct, we can conclude that both the West and Iran have retreated from their earlier positions.
United States President Joe Biden wanted Iran to agree to discuss its ballistic missile program or at least to lay the foundations for future discussions on issues that trouble the West, such as Iran’s support for terrorist organizations and its involvement in regional conflicts. Iran initially demanded that all sanctions be lifted before negotiations resumed – they were frozen in January because of the presidential elections in the Islamic Republic. Later on, Iran submitted three documents in which it listed its new demands: It once again called for the lifting of sanctions prior to negotiations, American guarantees that it will not withdraw in the future from any agreement signed, as well as an agreed-upon mechanism to supervise the lifting of sanctions.
This explains Iran’s anger against Russia, which is now seen as harming Tehran’s tough-guy image and even as “conspiring with the United States against Iran,” in the words of Iranian commentators. The pundits found evidence of this “conspiracy” in a photograph of a meeting between Ulyanov and the head of the U.S. delegation Robert Malley.
In any event, experience shows that when there is a debate between partners to negotiations over which side made concessions, one can conclude that concessions have indeed been made. The question is: Are they enough to reach an agreement?
An answer to this question will perhaps be provided after the Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s planned visit to Moscow later this month in which he will meet with President Vladimir Putin. Raisi seeks to sign a security cooperation agreement with Moscow which will include the purchase of Sukhoi Su-35 jets and the upgrading of Iran’s fleet of MiG jets, as well as the purchase of S-400 anti-aircraft missiles. The deal is estimated to be worth some $10 billion over 20 years, and Iran is expected to pay for the weapons with an oil barter deal. It is doubtful however that Russia will approve the sale of the S-400s at the present time when it is engaged in a diplomatic duel with Washington over affairs in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Moreover, Russia may set conditions that are connected to the nuclear agreement.
Domestic pressure
At the same time, domestic pressures for Iran to move forward with a nuclear deal are increasing. At the beginning of the month, Raisi visited the important religious center of Qom as is the custom of prime ministers and the Supreme Leader. Senior clerics told him in their meetings that there is an urgency to moving forward with the negotiations and adopting a policy that will extract Iran from its international isolation.
“Iran must communicate with the world at the same time as maintaining its honor and authority. The government must broadcast a message of peace and friendship with the rest of the world,” said Grand Ayatollah Loftollah Safi Golpaygani, while another senior Ayatollah Abdollah Javadi Amoli pushed Raisi to negotiate with the West. “We have to negotiate with them and shake hands with them whether we want to or not, but we have to count our fingers afterward.”
Some clerics have not hesitated to admonish Raisi for failing to keep his promise to improve Iran’s economy and have blamed him for “leading the train into the abyss.”
Yesterday, Raisi heard these accusations again, but in a far more caustic manner, from members of parliament after he presented the budget deficit that he plans for the coming year. Unlike the clerics, members of parliament have the authority to demand the firing of failed ministers, and even to depose the prime minister.