[Salon] Not in my backyard: Russia, China and U.S. squabble over spheres of influence. . . Ukraine and Kazakhstan become test cases for an old idea as a new reality.



Interesting, but, in my view, this confuses spheres of influence with strategic denial, which is less hegemonic, and does not take account of the division of "China."  Russia is not so divided.  Kazakhstan was not a case, like Czechoslovakia, of enforcing a sphere of influence but of responding to instability in a client state.  If we're going to bring back terms of statecraft from the past, we should be careful to preserve the distinctions between them to avoid muddy thinking and false analogies.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Not-in-my-backyard-Russia-China-and-U.S.-squabble-over-spheres-of-influence

 "The territorial integrity of Ukraine is not a vital U.S. national interest. The brute fact is that as a great power, Russia has the great power to influence what happens in Ukraine."

Ukraine and Kazakhstan become test cases for an old idea as a new reality

EIJI FURUKAWA, Contributing writer                    January 19, 2022

KYIV -- On Ukraine's eastern border, 100,000 Russian troops are massing, along with an armada of tanks, mobile artillery and aircraft, awaiting the Kremlin's command to invade. Across the frontier, Ukraine's defense forces are dug in and on high alert. In the midst of the drama, one place is growing especially nervous: Taiwan.

With Russia threatening to invade its neighbor unless NATO forswears Ukraine's membership in the bloc, the crisis is already reverberating far outside Europe. Many Taiwanese, for example, believe Beijing is watching the outcome carefully, and it could have dire consequences for their island, which lives with the constant threat of "reunification" with the mainland.

Alexander C. Huang, an associate professor at Tamkang University, New Taipei City, who specializes in China-Taiwan relations has been watching events unfold nervously.

Huang was in Brussels in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea by force and invaded the eastern part of Ukraine, and says he was shocked by the West's impotent response. "I was convinced that China would like to emulate Russia's military action when it invades Taiwan," Huang said. Taiwan's National Security Bureau apparently agreed, saying in a report to parliament in 2019 that "the Chinese Communist Party is copying the methods used by Russia to annex Crimea against Taiwan."

Ukraine and Taiwan face eerily symmetrical situations. Ukraine falls within Russia's "near abroad," a zone of former Soviet republics that Moscow considers a sphere of influence. Taiwan is claimed as a part of Chinese territory with which Beijing has pledged to reunify, by force if necessary. Chinese territorial ambitions also include most of the adjacent South China Sea, everything inside what China calls the "nine dash line" (see map). The crisis over Ukraine is thus seen as a precedent for a new kind of relations between great powers, which echoes an old kind of relations, when great powers were allowed to do what they wanted in their own neighborhood.

"China is watching what happens in Ukraine. I think the Ukraine story is fantastically significant here," said Hugh White, emeritus professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University and former Deputy Secretary for Strategy and Intelligence. "What Russia is trying to do in Eastern Europe is just what the Chinese are trying to do in East Asia."

Spheres of influence were previously quite common during periods of great power rivalry such as the Cold War, with superpowers dividing the world into zones of exclusive control that were thought to help prevent major conflicts. The U.S. and the Soviet Union formally recognized each other's spheres of influence in 1945 at the Yalta conference, and recognition of such zones of special influence was included in many other formal treaties.

In the post-Cold War era of U.S. primacy, spheres of influence have fallen out of favor. President Vladimir Putin is attempting to revive the idea, demanding that Ukraine be recognized as an integral part of Russian security architecture and not allowed to freely join foreign alliances.

"The Russians want to reassert the Russia position as a great power by defining and defending for itself a sphere of influence from which it excludes other great powers. And that's what keeping NATO out of Ukraine is all about," White told Nikkei Asia.

Russia's latest graphic demonstration of its sphere of influence came earlier in January, when it sent troops into neighboring Kazakhstan, at the invitation of the government there, during riots over fuel prices. The soldiers left after three days, once order had been restored. More than 200 people have been killed in the violence.

Russia claims the prospect of Ukraine joining NATO is an existential threat to its security. "They are saying, 'Back off. ... We don't want Ukraine to be allowed into NATO,'" White said. "In other words, they don't want America to have a strategic presence in their sphere of influence.

"In Zhongnanhai [China's political nerve center], the hope that [Russia] can achieve that objective without fighting a war with America is based on [Beijing's] hope or expectation that, when push comes to shove, America won't go to fight for Taiwan."

Two against one

Chinese goodwill has been essential to Russia's efforts to confront NATO. After tough discussions with U.S. President Joe Biden and European leaders over Ukraine, Putin in December held a video call with Chinese President Xi Jinping. After Putin explained his security demands to the U.S., Xi responded, positively, saying he "understands Russia's concerns and fully supports [Russia's] initiatives to work out these security guarantees for Russia," according to Putin's aide, Yuri Ushakov.

Putin for his part lent support to Xi by confirming his attendance at the opening ceremonies of the Beijing Winter Olympics on Feb. 4, which the U.S. and some of its allies are diplomatically boycotting over China's human rights record. Their expected meeting will be the first time in two years that the leaders have spoken in person, as both have avoided trips abroad since the COVID-19 pandemic began.

It was during another Beijing Olympics Games -- the 2008 Summer Games -- that Russian troops invaded Georgia. Putin, then prime minister, arrived at the opening ceremony but quickly flew back to the military headquarters set up in southern Russia to command an operation against the country.

The immediate causes of that war are still in dispute, and Russia claims it invaded after Georgia shelled Russian peacekeeping troops in South Ossetia. But the background to the conflict was Russian fear over NATO expansion. In a joint NATO communique at a summit in Bucharest months before, the organization had said "Ukraine and Georgia will become members of NATO."

Beijing opens the Winter Olympics on Feb. 4, and Putin has confirmed he will attend the opening ceremony.   © Getty Images

Putin's main demand for the U.S. today is to withdraw this provision and legally assure Russia that NATO will not be extended to former Soviet republics.

Putin since October has gathered 100,000 troops near the border with Ukraine. U.S. intelligence has warned of a possible large-scale Russian invasion involving 100 battalions with 175,000 troops as early as January.

During his video call with Putin in December, Biden warned of severe economic consequences "like nothing he's ever seen" if Russia were to invade Ukraine. Yet he ruled out the possibility of the U.S. military going into Ukraine independently to confront Russia. Putin responded by threatening "adequate retaliatory military-technical measures" over Ukraine if the West fails to meet Russia's demands.

A series of U.S. and NATO talks with Russia that took place earlier in January failed to de-escalate the situation.

Hostile neighbors

Facing growing numbers of Russian troops across the border, Ukraine's joint forces and border guards are on high alert. Along the eastern border with Russia and some 30 km from Ukraine's second largest city, Kharkiv, a tall barrier fence extends 80 km on the snow-covered land. Ukraine since 2015 has been installing a video surveillance facility to detect any moves within 10 km as well as an anti-transport ditch and shaft to prevent the advance of tanks.

"In 2014 when Russian aggression started in the Donbass region, there was nothing between Ukraine and Russia and all guards stayed along the borders, holding guns 24 hours a day. We have made huge progress since then," said one border guard on the Ukrainian side.

The mission of the Eastern Regional Department of State Border Guard Service covers the 1,500-km border with Russia from the northeastern Sumy region to the Donbass region, parts of which have been occupied by pro-Russian militants supported by Russian forces. Ukraine's government announced last year that it would introduce the same border defense mechanism to the other parts of the region.

Despite Russia's overwhelming military strength, the border guard said, "We are ready."

Ukrainian border guards are on high alert. These are posted on the Russian border, close to Sumy, Ukraine, on Dec. 21, 2021.   © Ukrainian Board Guard Press Office/AP

The streets of Ukraine, in comparison, seem to remain calm, to a degree. "The world seems to have forgotten till now, but Ukraine has been under Russian attack for the last eight years," Ilya, a journalist who has been reporting the war since 2014 told Nikkei in a slightly angry tone. "We are resilient and of course everyone is sick and tired, and in that psychology, there is a tendency to turn their eyes away from threats."

Russia's invasion has impacted Ukrainian society in other ways, too. According to an opinion survey conducted in November by the Center for Insights in Survey Research, 54% of Ukrainians support joining NATO, up from 34% in March 2014. The approval rating for accession to EU membership reached 58%, while that for joining the Eurasian Economic Union, Russia's economic bloc, lagged at 21%.

Even in Kharkiv, said to have many residents who feel close to Russia, the mood seems to have changed steadily.

Igor, a 31-year-old IT analyst said: "I think it's in both parties' interests to incite the threat of a new invasion. But we must join NATO for there is no other way to protect sovereignty and territory from aggression." Meeting the criteria for membership also has the advantage of advancing anti-corruption and other reforms, he added.

Irina, whose mother is of Russian descent, said she used to think NATO was untrustworthy but now is in favor of joining the bloc. "Because it turned out that Ukraine alone could not protect the country, and my parents now share the same opinion, though I am very sad to be estranged from my relatives living in Siberia."

One reason why Putin is stepping up his offensive against Ukraine stems from his concerns over the growing rift between the Ukrainian population and Russia, a result of his use of force, analysts have said. Although Putin has stressed his concern over the possibility of Ukraine joining NATO, the Ukrainian crisis has implications beyond security issues. Putin's lengthy paper, published in July on the Kremlin's website in Russian, Ukrainian and English, shows the leader is obsessed with the mission of returning Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence.

Putin, pictured at the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics, has expressed concern over the growing rift between Russia and Ukraine.    © Reuters

In the paper, Putin presented his own historical narrative -- the West has tried to separate the Russians and Ukrainians, who are "one people" -- and criticized the current pro-Western Ukrainian government. "True sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia" Putin claimed.

According to one widespread view, the nation could pose a major threat to Putin's authoritarian regime in Russia if it succeeds in making democratic reforms and moves toward integrating with Europe.

Power play

Russia's current buildup against Ukraine took shape after Putin's first meeting with Biden in Geneva in June. Biden invited Putin to the summit following an earlier Russian mobilization in the spring. In Geneva, Biden urged his Russian counterpart to establish "stable and predictable" relations, with the US. Right before the summit, U.S. infrastructure came under a cyberattack that allegedly originated in Russia, which resulted in the closure of a major East Coast fuel pipeline.

Despite fierce opposition from Ukraine, other east European states and within the U.S. Congress, Biden has withdrawn sanctions imposed by the former Trump administration over Russia's construction of a subsea pipeline dubbed Nordstream 2 that ships natural gas directly to Europe. Because existing pipeline routes travel across Ukraine, an alternative pipeline leaves Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian pressure as it weakens Kyiv's leverage over Moscow's gas exports.  

"The view of the Kremlin is clear," said Andrei Kortunov, Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council in an interview with Nikkei Asia. "The Biden administration has perceived China as the strategic adversary, and [its] primary focus is on the Indo-Pacific region to counter China. Russia becomes only an irritating distraction for them, and that's why Putin tries to reach agreements with Biden on the new security architecture in Europe."

In addition, Russia, as well as China, took the U.S.'s tactical withdrawal from Afghanistan as a sign of weakness. "Kyiv is obsequiously serving the interests of its overseas patrons, striving to get into NATO. ... But was the ousted pro-American regime in Kabul saved by the fact that Afghanistan had the status of a principal U.S. ally outside NATO?" Nikolai Patrushev, Putin's close aide and the secretary of Russia's Security Council argued in an interview with Russian media in August. "A similar situation awaits supporters of the American choice in Ukraine."

Andriy Zagorodnyuk, Ukraine's former defense minister and chairman of the Center for Defense Strategies views Russia's behavior this way: The U.S. and Russia are like two cars rushing at each other. They will collide unless one swerves, and Russia is betting that the U.S. will not risk a collision for Ukraine's sake.

"Full-scale invasion is unrealistic because the price Russia would have to pay for occupying Ukraine is unbearable," Zagorodnyuk said. "The biggest danger is actually not war with Russia but that the U.S. starts negotiations with Russia and makes a compromise against the will of Ukrainians."

Zagorodnyuk then added, "China is looking at all this."

Though they speak only on condition of anonymity, other Ukrainian officials share Zagorodnyuk's concerns. There is even speculation among policymakers that it was some groups in the White House that have been exaggerating the full invasion scenario in hopes that it would allow Biden to sit down with Putin to strike a deal on European security rearrangements to focus on China.

Flexing muscles in Kazakhstan

Against the backdrop of the Ukraine crisis came another political meltdown, one that allowed Putin to demonstrate his readiness to deploy troops to cement Russia's sphere of influence.

On Jan. 2, anti-government protests began in Zhanaozen, Kazakhstan, over a doubling of fuel prices, and spread to Almaty, the largest city. The demonstrations at first were peaceful, but on Jan. 5, an organized mob hijacked a protest. Not long after, at the request of Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Putin promptly dispatched a Russian force under the aegis of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led security bloc that includes Armenia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan to help restore order.

A week after the peak of the unrest, calm has returned to Almaty. The streets have been cleared of burned-out vehicles and other signs of the trouble. But a strong whiff of smoke persists. In its lofty position overlooking the city, Almaty's once pristine, white stone Akimat, or city hall, is now a blackened, charred wreck, having been stormed by a violent, organized mob.

Work has begun to clear the rubble and broken glass from the building, which is now shrouded in green construction netting. Inside, teams of workers in orange hi-vis vests are throwing the detritus out of the blown-out windows, causing clouds of dust to billow from the ever-growing mounds of debris.

"My friend and I were going to a photo exhibition, and then all that madness started," Nazira, a resident of Almaty, told Nikkei. "They opened fire at 5 p.m. We were like: What's going on? Then that building was burning, this building was burning.

"They were shooting from here, from the direction of the presidential residence, from the direction of the Akimat."

Nazira was not convinced that the CSTO troops were needed.

"I doubt whether it was necessary to bring them in, at the request of the government," she said. "But now it's done, there's no point in talking in conditionals."

As the CSTO troops guarded key facilities, Kazakhstan's security forces battled against the violent mob. Tokayev is now referring to the unrest as an attempted coup. Officially, the death toll stands at 225 but is likely to be higher. More than 12,000 have been arrested.

The invitation to send in troops was an unexpected opportunity for Moscow to bring its closest ally closer. There was no need for saber-rattling on the border, like with Ukraine. Kazakhstan simply fell into Russia's lap. Now Russia is in a strong position to influence its southern neighbor. It has already objected to an appointee in Kazakhstan's new government for being "anti-Russian."

China also offered military assistance via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but Russia has shown that it remains the go-to security option for Central Asia, with the CSTO dispatching its "peacekeepers" to a member state for the first time in 30 years. Moscow did not inform Beijing about its decision to dispatch troops in advance, according to a source in Moscow.

Experts said China's main concerns are protecting its substantial economic interests in Kazakhstan, keeping oil and gas flowing, and keeping trains rolling onward to Russia and beyond. "There seems to be a gentleman's agreement between Moscow and Beijing that there is a rough division of labor in Central Asia. China will take the lead on the economic side, and Russia will take the lead on the military side" said Andrew Scobell at Washington D.C. based United States Institute of Peace.

In his telephone talk with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi "supports the CSTO in assisting Kazakhstan in playing a positive role in restoring the stability of Kazakhstan on the premise of respecting the country's sovereignty, the Global Times reported.

Cautious coexistence

Contrary to Western expectations that Russia and China will clash over a sphere of influence that includes former Soviet republics in central Asia, China is coming to terms with Russia's sphere for now.

It has seemingly assisted Russia by having frequent governmental talks with Belarus, for example, which has relied on Russia's patronage throughout the course of fierce crackdowns government opponents and since it has been sanctioned by the West.

In December, China held a diplomatic meeting for the first time with representatives of the Georgian republic of Abkhazia, which Russia unilaterally recognized as an independent state as the result of the 2008 war. Though China has not officially recognized the republic, the meeting created shock waves in Georgia.

Ukraine officials are also wary of China's siding with Russia in the region. Though Beijing has avoided taking a clear position on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian expressed China's support to the Nord Stream 2 project, saying "we oppose the politicization of business projects and oppose unilateral and illegal sanctions." His comment came when the U.S. and European allies called for halting the project, which would bypass Ukraine to send natural gas from Russia directly to Germany.

Chinese media outlets such as the Global Times, which is affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, have been increasingly critical of Ukraine, claiming it has fallen under U.S. influence. In particular, criticism has emerged over the issue of the Ukrainian government's decision to block a Chinese company from buying Motor Sich, a Ukrainian maker of advanced aviation engines.

Beijing retaliated last March by sending a group of Chinese businessmen to Crimea, a step Beijing had avoided taking. Chinese diplomats even hinted that China might recognize Crimea as Russian territory and pressed Ukraine to allow the Chinese to take over the manufacturer, a diplomatic source said.

The new (old) world order?

Some experts argue superpower spheres of influence will become inevitable as the post-cold war U.S. hegemony fades into an era of great power competition.

"The territorial integrity of Ukraine is not a vital U.S. national interest. The brute fact is that as a great power, Russia has the great power to influence what happens in Ukraine" said Graham Allison, a professor at Harvard University who was assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration.

Allison argues that the objective should be a framework in which both the U.S. and Russia accept an independent Ukraine with its current borders, and agree that it will not for the foreseeable future be a member of NATO.

"If the U.S. should get dragged into a military conflict in Ukraine," Allison said, "that would create a window of opportunity for Chinese action against Taiwan that could not go unnoticed in Beijing."

Said Kortunov in Moscow: "I agree with the view that America needs a strategic readjustment. But Biden is not ready yet."

With the world at risk of being divided up by great powers, the situation in Ukraine may become a turning point.

Additional reporting by Paul Bartlett in Almaty and Andy Sharp in Tokyo and Yu Nakamura in Taipei.



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