https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/opinion/welcome-to-the-multipolar-world
Welcome to the multipolar world
The US-led West is entering the global competition with its rivals with a marked advantage
LEON HADAR July 4, 2022
THAT the United States plans to make its biggest military expansion in Europe since the end of the Cold War, including its first permanent presence in Poland - as Sweden and Finland prepare to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) alliance in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - is a clear indication that the post-Cold War era shaped by American global preeminence is over.
But contrary to the notion advanced by neoconservative and liberal internationalist strategists, the series of measures against Russia adopted by the US and its allies in the aftermath of the invasion of Ukraine would not restore the post-Cold War Unipolar Moment during which Washington was in a position to impose its will on the international system, whether it came to dominating the balance of power across the Atlantic or the Pacific or in the Greater Middle East.
Contrary to earlier Western assumptions, the process of globalisation didn’t result in the political and economic liberalisation of China, Russia, and other leading members of the international system -- the so-called "Rest" (of the world).
Instead, by integrating them into the global economy and its new technological frontiers, the West helped to strengthen their geo-economic power, and by extension their geo-strategic position, including their ability to challenge the US dominant position, facilitating the rise to power of authoritarian and nationalist leaders not only in China and Russia, but also in middle-size global players like India, Turkey, and Brazil.
The US, especially in the aftermath of the military setbacks in the Middle East, the 2007- 2008 global financial crisis, and the economic shocks precipitated by the Covid-19 pandemic, isn’t in a position to reverse this process and regain its hegemonic status that, in any case, was a temporary episode.
Reshaping globalisation process
Instead, the US can try to reshape the globalisation process in line with its interests, recognising that trade partners like China are also its geo-economic competitors and that the free market forces by themselves are not going to provide the US with an advantage over them. Maintaining its economic and technological superiority would require Western governments to play a more activist role in the markets.
The US Congress with bi-partisan support, including from pro-free market Republicans, is about to approve the US Innovation and Competition Act (USICA) with its goal of improving US capabilities in research and technology development relative to China and other competitor nations, including US$52 billion in direct funding for semiconductor R&D and manufacturing.
This reflects the dramatic change in the consensus in Washington since the roaring age of globalisation in the last years of the 20th century when a Democratic administration pushed for normalising trade relations with China and inviting it to join the World Trade Organization (WTO).
A similar change in consensus is taking place in the European Union (EU) as the faith of integrating Russia into Europe and strengthening peace in the continent mainly through trade, including by approving the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline to Russia, is replaced with the following recognition: The old ways of doing business with Russia only helped enhance the geo-strategic leverage of its nationalist leader whose notion of co-existence is based on ensuring his country’s strategic advantage.
In a way, the Russian invasion of Ukraine -- like the US failure to reshape the Greater Middle East based on its interests and values -- should be seen as a rendezvous with reality, a recognition of the limits of operating on American military power in face of opposition at home and resistance abroad.
In the aftermath of the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars, Americans have concluded that invading large Muslim countries and trying to change their regimes are bad ideas, which explains why the US isn’t going to invade the Islamic republic of Iran and oust its ruling Ayatollahs anytime soon.
At the same time, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that the US has reached the limits of its ability to force Moscow to accept its shape of the balance of power constructed by the Americans and its Western allies in post-Cold War Europe.
That isn’t to say that the unification of Germany, and the bringing of Poland, Hungary, and the other former Warsaw Pact members as well as the Baltic states into Nato, didn’t amount to a major victory for the West, especially in light of the lessons of the two World Wars and the Cold War.
Clear Russian signal
But every celebration has to come to an end, and the steps Russia has taken, starting with the earlier incursions into Georgia and Ukraine, and culminating with the invasion of its neighbour, have sent a clear signal to the US-led Western alliance that from now on it would face the resistance of a global nuclear power to any move that is seen as a threat to its core national interests.
The effective resistance of Ukraine to Russia's attack with the support of the US and its Nato allies demonstrates, on the other hand, the limits of Russia’s military power, which it would have to accept, probably through a deal that would provide for an independent Ukraine while securing Russia’s position in the eastern part of the country.
That Sweden and Finland are about to join Nato is a strategic blow to Russia, whose goal was to prevent Ukraine from joining the alliance. Similarly, the pledge by Nato to increase its high-readiness forces to more than 300,000 troops from about 40,000 now, sends a clear signal to Russia that the Western alliance, including a more militarily assertive Germany, is ready to protect its interests vis-a-vis Moscow.
But it would be a mistake to describe what is happening now as a return to the Cold War, which pitted not only two global powers against each other, but also involved a struggle between two blocs representing competing ideologies.
Return to geo-strategic rivalry
Contrary to the narrative promoted by the liberal internationalist President Joe Biden - that of a bloc of democratic nations facing an axis of authoritarian governments - America’s rivalry with China and Russia looks more like a return to the geo-strategic rivalry between great powers that dominated international relations in the 19th century.
From that perspective, alliances between nations will be based mainly on economic and military interests, and the ability of either the US or China and Russia to form alliances with other nations wouldn’t be constrained by ideological considerations, providing for more fluidity but also more instability in the way the international system operates.
Hence, that countries like India, Brazil, South Africa and Saudi Arabia haven’t joined the US-led West in imposing economic sanctions on Russia has nothing to do with ideological orientations but more with cold hard interests.
In fact, it’s quite possible that during his upcoming visit to the country, President Biden would be able to win an agreement by Saudi Arabia to increase its oil production and help reduce energy prices that resulted from the economic sanctions on Russia, in return for US security guarantees for the Arab oil-states concerned over the threat posed to them by Iran.
Similarly, the ability of the US to win the support of the Southeast Asian nations as it tries to contain China’s power wouldn’t be based on the pull of its democratic model, but on the military and economic advantages that continued US presence in the region would provide them.
Moreover, the US-led West is entering the global competition with its rivals with a marked advantage. The West, defined as the Anglosphere (the US, Canada, Britain and New Zealand, the EU, and thriving economies of East Asia, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore), together account for close to 60 per cent of global gross domestic product. It has a major head start over China and Russia, and the nations Belarus, Kazakhstan, North Korea and Pakistan that are allied with Russia and China.
Notwithstanding some advances by Russia and Chinese businesses, Western companies continue to lead in major fields, like biotechnology, commercial aviation, semiconductors and software. Catching up with them will take time, especially if Western governments take steps to make it difficult for these countries to do that.
The West also has a major advantage in terms of its ability to maintain economic and technological superiority, which helps sustain military capabilities and draw other countries into its sphere of influence, especially when it comes to human capital and the ability to attract future talent pools.
It’s also important to remember that America’s open economy immigration policies have helped create an innovative research environment that attracts the best and the brightest from around the world, including Russia and China, and rejuvenates the country’s population, while the Russians and the Chinese are getting older.
Hence the irony of American “nationalists” calling for closing the country’s borders for immigration and punishing its high-tech sectors while at the same time warning of the threat that China poses to America.