On Feb. 11, U.S. President Joe Biden issued an executive order that proposed a plan for the $7 billion of frozen Afghan reserves that have been locked up in U.S. financial institutions since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August. Half was to be placed in a trust that would benefit the Afghan people, with the rest remaining frozen until a U.S. court rules as to whether it could be used to settle the Taliban’s legal debts with the families of 9/11 victims. The president did not determine whether that latter portion could in fact be used for 9/11 reparations—but he also did not exercise his executive power to protect it from being used for this purpose.
The decision caused an outcry at the time. Washington Post columnist Daniel W. Drezner referred to the seizing of Afghanistan’s reserves to benefit U.S. citizens as “theft.” The Afghan Women’s Network, which represents 4,000 Afghan women’s rights organizations, also immediately opposed the plan, as did former Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
“The Afghan people are as much victims [of the Taliban] as those families who lost their loved ones are, and withholding money or seizing money from the people of Afghanistan is unjust and an atrocity against the Afghan people,” Karzai commented during a press conference in February. “I request President Joe Biden to reconsider his decision and to return the totality of Afghan reserves back to the people of Afghanistan.”
The potential use of the reserves for the 9/11 settlement has been seen as particularly unethical given the near-famine conditions in Afghanistan since the U.S. withdrawal, which have been caused largely by Afghans’ inability to access their own savings in the central bank. And since that February executive order was announced, the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan has only worsened. The latest figures from the United Nations paint a bleak picture of malnutrition among children in the country, and the nation as a whole is enduring extreme hardship and deprivation.
Even families of 9/11 victims have pushed back. An advocacy group named 9/11 Families for Peaceful Tomorrows has even circulated a petition against appropriating the funds for reparations, arguing that “[d]epriving innocent Afghans who had no part in 9/11 does not bring justice.”
“I think the Biden administration should have moved months ago to make sure that the entire $7 billion in funds were made available for the Afghan central bank to deal with the crisis there,” Aidan Salamone, who lost his father in the 9/11 attacks, told The Intercept. “September 11 families know very well what it’s like to have your life rocked by atrocity. To think that these lawsuits are actively contributing to other people suffering through famine-like conditions is really hard to stomach.”
But this handling of the Afghan reserves may not only be unjust. It may also be bad for national security.
Over the past three months, researchers associated with the Human Security Lab at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, in collaboration with the global survey consulting firm RIWI Corporation, have collected data for a nationwide public opinion survey—the first such effort to understand Afghan citizens’ views toward this issue. The preliminary data confirms that the policy of appropriating the reserves for the 9/11 victims is vastly unpopular in Afghanistan, and may even be perceived as a good way to drive Afghans into the arms of the Taliban.
“The Afghan people are as much victims [of the Taliban] as those families who lost their loved ones are, and withholding money or seizing money from the people of Afghanistan is unjust and an atrocity against the Afghan people.”
More than 2,000 Afghans randomly selected from all adult internet users in the country answered a question about what the U.S. should do with the frozen reserves. A majority of the respondents—61 percent—said that if they are held back at all, they should be held in safekeeping for a future, inclusive Afghan government. This is consistent with the findings of another Human Security Lab report released earlier this year, in which all of the Afghan civil society activists consulted reportedly “insisted [that] the Afghan reserves belong to the Afghan people, not to the U.S. or the Taliban.”
However, there is one twist to the near-universal opposition to the 9/11 reparations policy. The gap between support for the policy and opposition to it changes when taking into account the political alignment of respondents. Of those respondents who said they support the Taliban “a lot,” a full 30 percent stated that if the reserves remain frozen, a portion should go to the 9/11 families, compared to only 16 percent of those who do not support the Taliban at all. Only 50 percent of Taliban supporters said the reserves should be kept in safekeeping, compared to 74 percent of those who do not support the Taliban at all.
Until this data is fully analyzed, including a rigorous analysis of open-ended comments, it will be tough to get a clear sense of what motivates the preferences of these Taliban supporters. However, it is possible that they see some value in U.S. policies that are perceived as unjust by the majority of Afghans. If so, it would confirm Michael Kugelman’s argument that the only winners of the 9/11 reparations policy would be the Taliban themselves. The policy, he explained, was a “propaganda victory” for the Taliban, which could “lash out at Washington for stealing the family silver, perhaps gaining some goodwill by taking a stand that the Afghan public supports.” As one respondent on the recent Human Security Lab survey wrote to the U.S., “Give us back your money for yourself, otherwise people will hate you more.”
Not only do U.S. and Afghan citizens alike oppose the 9/11 reparations policy, but its realization could legitimatize the Taliban and undermine U.S. and Afghan efforts to pressure them on human rights for women and other matters. For these reasons, the Biden administration should consider protecting the Afghan national reserves from the U.S. courts, as both a gender issue and a matter of national security.
Biden can do this by using his executive power to inform the 9/11 judges that U.S. national security is best supported by leaving the reserves alone. A variety of options have been discussed for using these resources to benefit Afghans, including engaging the Taliban; working through civil servants at the country’s central bank; and channeling them directly to Afghan citizens through U.N. mechanisms. But if any assets are to be held back, it would be wiser and more consistent with most Afghan citizens’ desires to ensure they remain frozen for a future, inclusive Afghan government, instead of treating them as a reparations fund.
Charli Carpenter is a professor of political science and legal studies at University of Massachusetts-Amherst, specializing in human security and international law. She tweets at @charlicarpenter. Her weekly WPR column appears every other Friday.