Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives Syrian President Bashar
Al-Assad in Tehran on May 8, 2022 [photo credit: The Office of Supreme
Leader website]
Iran, for its part, sees advantage in the departure of Russian
forces. From an economic point of view, Tehran seeks to participate in
reconstruction projects in Syria. During Mamluk's visit, Iranian
officials complained that they had not been involved in economic
projects and that the Russians had been given the inside track. Bashar
al-Assad, who had sought to play one off against the other in the
reconstruction game, now may find himself making Tehran his key economic
partner. As for Iran, the country's dire economy, already seriously
weakened by sanctions, urgently needs a financial injection.Tehran, in
the longer term, will seek to turn Syria into one of its top export destinations .
Iran's enhanced role in Syria also has geopolitical benefits. As the
Ukraine war grinds on, the Iranians will strive to strengthen their
military clout in proximity to Israel. Iran has increased
its territorial presence in Syria and intensified its arms smuggling
into Syria and Lebanon, with weapons such as reconnaissance systems,
missile defence systems, and drones.
And the Israelis have other anxieties
about the withdrawal. They have a deal with the Russians that allows
Israeli strikes inside Syria on Hezbollah and IRGC targets. Hoping to
keep any official Israeli support for Ukraine at a tepid level, the
Russian embassy issued a statement
one day into the war that sought to reassure Tel Aviv: “Our military
officials discuss the practical issues of this substantively on a daily
basis. This mechanism has proven to be useful and will continue to
work.” And so it has, with the Israelis carrying out multiple strikes
since the Ukraine war began (and hundreds since the beginning of
Syria’s civil war.)
However, in a sign that Israel is worried about losing its fighter
jets as Russian influence recedes, it is resorting to missile strikes,
the most recent being the 11 June attack on Damascus International Airport.
And what happens, the Israelis are wondering, if the S-300
anti-aircraft system, rated highly effective by defence experts and now
operated in Syria by the Russians, is turned over to regime troops?
Particularly as Assad is being forced into a closer relationship with
Tehran.
The big losers
The big losers in Iran's enhanced presence in Syria are the Arabs and
Israel. Arabs states, and especially the United Arab Emirates (UAE),
sought to distance Syria from Iran by pursuing a process of
normalization with the regime.
In the aftermath of Assad’s visit to the UAE in March 2022, some speculated
that Abu Dhabi might utilize its improving ties with Syria and
expanding relationship with Israel to push Damascus and Tel Aviv towards
an accommodation of sorts. However, opposition to Israel and emphasis
on support for Palestine as well as “resistance” forces were predominant
themes in Assad’s meetings in Tehran: “Strategic ties between Iran and
Syria have become the main factor preventing Israel’s dominance over the
region,” Assad said during a meeting with Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei in Tehran.
Assad's visit to Tehran showed that Syria will remain on the ‘axis of
resistance’ and that the Abraham Accords will maintain its distance
from Damascus. His meeting with the Supreme Leader enabled Tehran to
demonstrate, once again, the cohesion of the axis in the region.
Iran, by stepping into the vacuum Russia has created, will strengthen
its loyal proxies in Syria, thereby putting pressure on Israel and the
Arabs. One instance of that: on 2 March Faleh al-Fayyad the head of the
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Authority - a militia affiliated with Iran - travelled
to Syria and met with Bashar al-Assad. During the meeting, he followed
up on Iran's security concerns. Iran wants Assad's forces to limit the
movement of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) between the Iraqi and
Syrian borders and to put pressure on the American-allied Syrian
Democratic Forces (SDF).
In Deir ez-Zor, Iran has turned
the region into a hub for its militias. The IRGC, Hezbollah, Baqir
Brigade, Liwa Fatemiyoun, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, and Kataib Sayyid
al-Shuhada units are positioned on a line from Bukemal in the south to
Tebni in the north. This massive militia presence is a statement about
the logistical strength of Iran’s Iraq-Syria militias. Tehran uses these
militias to counterbalance both the SDF and Russia, and is trying to
make militias a permanent actor in Deir ez-Zor through cultural centres,
NGOs, and real estate purchases.
The strengthening of Iran's proxies in Syria will lead to more
intense Israeli attacks on their bases, resulting in more unrest in
Syria and the continuation of US sanctions against Damascus. It will
also interfere with the plans of Arab states like the UAE to bring Assad
in from the cold in pursuit of a normalization process.
Finally, the Russian withdrawal will serve to drive Bashar al-Assad
ever closer to Tehran. However, it remains to be seen whether Russia
will be able to regain its former influence in Syria if Iran and the US
agree on nuclear talks or there is an end to the Ukraine crisis.