Ukraine battles on as Europe’s will wilts
Kiev’s grim resistance is pitted against Moscow’s strategic patience as cracks appear in EU’s not-so united front
David’s surprise victories against Goliath in the early phase of the Ukraine War are now a distant memory. Moscow has got its game on and, in the Donbas, Kiev’s main force troops are desperately fighting to hold open a tightening vice.
While the strength of Ukrainian resistance is proving extraordinary – as witness weeks of agonizing combat in a salient around which Russia enjoys positional, firepower and mobility advantages – the final outcome looks inevitable.
Meanwhile, Western support is proving underwhelming
In the first months, Western anti-armor weapons showed themselves to be critical in taking out Russia’s columns, trapped on roads by Ukrainian mud. Now, with the campaign season on and the ground hard, Russia’s armor is tactically deployed and the balance has shifted.
Ground war requires fire and maneuver, and the Russians are deploying massive firepower to enable minimalist maneuvering. Thus far, Western partners have failed to fill the gaps in Kiev’s armory – aircraft, artillery assets and ammunition stockpiles – that would be necessary to shift the battle.
In this situation, strategic patience favors Russia, reckons Gastone Breccia. Breccia, a professor of military history at the University of Pavia is the co-author of the just-published La Guerra Della Russia (The Wars of Russia). He talked to Asia Times about the changing phases of the war, weakening European support and what a final settlement might look like on the ground.
Recorder of war and analyst of conflict, Gastone Breccia. Image: Courtesy Gastone BrecciaAsia Times: Phase 1 of the Ukraine War is over. Where are we now?
Gastone Breccia: The Ukrainians lived, in April, a moment when they felt close to victory. The Russians exited the north of the country, while in Mariupol the Azovstal resisted beyond all expectations and Kiev launched a counteroffensive in the Kharkiv area, pushing the Russians to the border in some places.
The counteroffensive Ukraine launched in the Kharkiv area proved to be a waste of forces with no strategic significance. The only military objective of such an action could have been to cut the line of communication between Belgorod and Izyum, to put the Russian “northern front” in the Donbas into crisis, but it wasn’t achieved. Since the end of April, the initiative has returned to the hands of the Russians, who are adopting a prudent strategy of attrition in the Donbas.
“The artillery conquers, the infantry occupies,” it was said in the Great War, and the Russians have a considerable advantage in terms of artillery. In addition, advancing only a few hundred meters a day and consolidating positions, means not exposing lines of communication to sudden attacks, at which the Ukrainians proved to be very adept during the first weeks years of war.
AT: What are the lessons learned so far?
GB: Never get too excited after a victory. Never forget that the “center of gravity” of a “symmetrical” conflict between sovereign states is the political will of the opponent and his allies to keep fighting.
AT: Speaking of sustainability: Who does the manpower matrix favor? The Ukrainians have mobilized their general population, but are losing about half a battalion a day, while the Russians have 100 Battalion Tactical Groups in theater, and 40 in reserve, all staffed by professionals.
GB: The time of mass armies is dead and gone. Russia’s 100 + 40 BTGs – more or less 110,000 men – is something the Ukrainians could easily match with their population. But the real issues are training and equipment, not manpower.
They have to establish a network of boot camps run by professionals to produce a steady flow of men (and women?) to the frontline. Let’s say 10,000 per month: that is not unrealistic. But they are not receiving – or repairing – enough arms to keep up the pace.
AT: Russia’s advances are very, very slow. Whose side is time on?
GB: To carry out such a well-conceived campaign you need to have time as an ally. This is Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Russian commanders’ current bet: they are confident that time will play in their favor.
Despite the valiant Ukrainian defense, it is logical to assume that it is them, and not the Russians, whose resources (human and material) will first be depleted, and resources are necessary to continue the fight. At that point – when men are too few and too tired, ammunition too scarce – the front will begin to crumble and the Kiev government will have to ask for a truce under very difficult conditions.
AT: In a war of attrition, which side does the external political environment favor?
GB: From a political point of view, time could help the Russians: Putin relies a lot on divisions among the non-belligerent allies of the Ukrainians, without whose help defeat in the regular campaign will be inevitable.
I should add that we – the Italians, with the “pacifist” Matteo Salvini and similar – are in the forefront of opposition, meaning we are the weak link in the European chain. Mattao Salvini is the leader of the Northern League, a former autonomous party, now right-wing populist. Usually rather hawkish, he took a pacifist stand in opposition to Mario Draghi’s pro-NATO, pro-EU hyper-loyalist behavior.
A destroyed Russian tank in Ukraine. The massive armored losses of the early stages of the campaign are now a thing of the past. Image: TwitterAT: It strikes me that the Anglosphere, most of Eastern Europe and the Baltics will fight to the last drop of Ukrainian blood. But the French and Germans, the core of the EU, are far less florid. Will this gap widen?
GB: It is already happening. Public opinion in Europe is clearly wavering. Just have a look at recent polls in France and Italy. It’s mandatory for EU political leaders to find an exit strategy they can then sell to their voters – Joe Biden and Volodymyr Zelensky permitting.
AT: Pope Francis recently repeated his belief that NATO’s expansion encouraged the war. How will this pronouncement be accepted by the EU’s Catholics?
GB: He will be more or less ignored, except for in Italy, where St. Peter’s dome still casts a shadow.
AT: Are there any chinks in Russia’s strategic patience?
GB: Russians have their problems too, of course. For example, they seem to be running out of ammunition for the old 122mm pieces with which they armed the units of the separatist republics. And those same pro-Russian “patriots” of Luhansk and Donetsk look like they are tired of being used as cannon fodder.
About any internal opposition in Moscow I cannot speak. But even Putin cannot ignore internal discontent without time limits – a lesson taught by the 1979-1989 war in Afghanistan.
South Korean soldiers patrol along a barbed wire fenced area of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North and South Korea, in this file photo. Is this the future for a divided Ukraine? Photo: AFPAT: Let’s look ahead. Some are suggesting that the future is a Korean-style, Demilitarized Zone style separation of Ukraine. But the DMZ is 250kms across, while a “line of control” from northern Donbas to Kherson would be 800km – around 1200km if the Russians advance to Transnistria. Is a cordon sanitaire of that length remotely feasible?
GB: First of all, I don’t believe Russia can overrun Odessa and reach Transnistria. If so, it will be the end of Ukraine as we know it, for it will be reduced to a mere appendage of Poland.
The most likely outcome of the ongoing struggle is a cease-fire line from east of Kharkiv to Sloviank-Kramatorsk, south to Donetsk, west to the Dniepr River near Zaporzhzhia, and Kherson. Kherson is the main goal of the Ukrainian counter offensive now, but it will be defended with all means by the Russians.
This frontline could be manned by 100,000 troops, most from among the pro-Russian separatists [from captured/annexed areas] in strong prepared positions, backed with artillery, as long as is needed.
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