Bahrain: the crown prince strikes
Summary: a major overhaul of the government, with key hardliners
in the ruling family being sacked, signals that Crown Prince Salman is
back in the driver’s seat.
The biggest cabinet reshuffle
in the history of Bahrain happened in a hurry. A well-placed Bahrain
source told Arab Digest “people were taken by surprise.” The source
added “it was very secretive then suddenly it was out in the open.”
Indeed at the weekly cabinet meeting
chaired by Crown Prince and Prime Minister Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa
on 13 June he said “the Cabinet will soon welcome new members who will
bring new ideas and a renewed drive to continue advancing the public
sector for the good and development of the country and its citizens.”
The very next day the sword fell when his father, King Hamad, announced
that 17 of 22 ministers were out. Among the big changes: the oil
minister and the justice minister were sacked in a sign that the
hardline element of the ruling family, the Khawalid branch, have lost
significant ground while the crown prince has strengthened his hand
considerably at their expense.
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The Crown Prince of Bahrain taking the 'passing out parade' salute
at Britannia Royal Naval College in 2018 [photo credit: @RoyalNavy]
The hardline justice minister Sheikh Khaled bin Ali al-Khalifa had
been in place since 2008. He presided over a ministry that sat back
while hundreds of peaceful protesters were paraded before military
courts and given lengthy prison sentences in the weeks and months after
democracy protests had roiled the small Gulf island state in February
and March 2011.
The banning of political societies, the use of the courts to shutter
independent media, the silencing of online criticism using anti-terror
laws and the continuing arrest, detention and sentencing of protesters,
often convicted with evidence allegedly secured under torture, all
happened under his watch. Among the many victims are the human rights
activist Abdulhadi Alkhawaja sentenced to life imprisonment (see our 3
June podcast
with his daughter Maryam “A highly functional injustice system”) and
the leader of the banned Al Wefaq party Sheikh Ali Salman, similarly
given a life sentence.
Sheikh Khaled’s replacement is the former ombudsman Nawaf Mohammed
al-Maawda. The post of ombudsman was created in the wake of an
independent investigation into how the regime had handled the protests
of 2011. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) released a
damning report in November 2011 that detailed the extensive abuses committed by police and security forces against mostly peaceful protesters.
The Office of the Ombudsman was heavily supported by the UK government and often cited as an example that reform was underway. However, al-Maawda did little
to properly investigate allegations of torture and abuse in Jau Prison,
which sits in the desert outside the capital Manama. Nor were issues
concerning overcrowding, education of young prisoners and improper or
lacking medical treatment at the prison rigorously investigated.
Still, the source believes that the crown prince is keen to see a
release of “minor prisoners.” As for high profile prisoners like
Abdulhadi Alkhawaja and Ali Salman, the source said “that remains
politically very difficult,” a sign that the Khawalid, though shaken by
the reshuffle, still remain a powerful force within the ruling family.
“Salman can’t move too quickly but it is a step that further down the
road he may take.”
Another hardliner shown the door was the oil minister
Mohammed bin Khalifa bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, son of the powerful head of
the Bahrain Defense Force. His replacement Mubarak bin Daina is firmly
in the camp of the crown prince, the source confirmed.
Also out as deputy prime minister is Ali bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, the
son of the former prime minister Sheikh Khalifa. Ali’s father was, at
the time of his death in 2020, the world’s longest serving PM. When
Khalifa’s nephew Hamad came to power in 1999 and launched a reform
project, the main beneficiary was Salman. The prime minister suffered a
diminishment in his power but at the time of the Arab Spring he
reasserted his authority in alliance with the Khawalid leaving Salman to
lick his wounds and slip into the background.
“The Khawalid,” the source told us “claimed to have saved the throne in 2011.” Others would argue that it was the arrival of Saudi and Emirati troops
in March 2011 that kept Hamad secure, protecting key infrastructure as
the security forces of the ruling family rampaged through Shia
communities.
The majority of Bahrain’s indigenous population of roughly 750,000
people are Shia, while the ruling family is Sunni. Salman, even while he
was in the background, kept his relations with the Shia on a good
footing and in the reshuffle nine were named to the cabinet, the most
ever by far. However, the source noted that the portfolios, like those
chosen to run them were “not the most outstanding.” Still the crown
prince “understands that the Shia need to be treated fairly and that
they should be included, not excluded.”
Such a major undertaking could not have been carried out without
agreement from Bahrain’s powerful GCC friends Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
The source said that both Mohammed bin Salman and Mohammed bin Zayed had
been consulted prior to the reshuffle, “especially MbZ who has very
close relations (to the ruling family).” And unsurprisingly Salman’s
emphasis is on reshaping government to deliver economic and social
dividends whilst steering clear of any serious political reforms and
maintaining a strict surveillance society, a strategy that has been
largely perfected by MbZ. (For more on his strategy see Matthew Hedges’
just released Reinventing the Sheikhdom published by Hurst.)
With the reshuffle the crown prince, after a long time in the shade,
has made his bold move with the full backing of his father the king and
the support of MbS and MbZ. The path forward looks straight enough but
he has been burnt before. The source says “(the Khawalid) are definitely
feeling nervous and isolated. They have lost two key posts and gained
no new positions.” However, they are far from spent as a political
force: “they will try to delay and disrupt,” on issues like the release
of political prisoners. And two of the faction - the head of the BDF and
the Royal Court Minister - remain in place.
Another potential threat, the source says, is Iran’s IRGC who are “a
pernicious influence” in Bahrain. “The IRGC don’t like to see stability,
they like to cause problems where they can.”
The history of Bahrain since independence from Britain in 1971
follows a cycle of reform leading to calls for change, repression in
response when the ruling family deemed those calls were too loud and
therefore dangerous and then after a period of frequently savage
repression a return to reform. This time is no different. As the source
says: “his enemies have been weakened but how much the crown prince can
deliver on his socio-economic plans needs to be seen.” As for any
serious political reform, if it comes at all, it will come only very
gradually.
Note: Our podcast guest this week is Matthew Hedges. He will be
talking about his new book Reinventing the Sheikdom and about his
arrest, detention, abuse and subsequent sentencing to life imprisonment
at the hands of Emirati authorities while researching the book.