Written by John Gaddis in 1997-8:
“For Russia does indeed have a choice: it is in the interesting position of being able to tilt one way or another in a strategic triangle that is likely to define the geopolitics of the early twenty-first century. It can continue to align itself, as it has patiently done so far, with the United States and Western Europe. Or it can do what the United States did a quarter century ago under the guidance of President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: it can tilt toward China. Given the complementarity that exists between Russia’s capacity to export military technology and China’s ability to produce marketable consumer goods, there is nothing inherently implausible in this scenario -- indeed there is a good deal of logic in it. It would not be the first time Russia and China had linked up out of concern, even if misguided, over American aggressiveness: we know from Soviet and Chinese documents that this was precisely the reason behind the 1950 Sino-Soviet alliance. And of course classical balance of power theory tells us that this is what we should expect to happen: that if country A feels itself threatened by country B, it is apt to align itself with country C. Which in this case is a country less likely even than Russia to see its interests as compatible with those of the United States.”