Re: [Salon] Salon Digest, Vol 7, Issue 105

[Barbara Koeppel <bkoeppel@comcast.net>]

I used the password that was sent to me--avnaxegi---and still couldn't access the articles.
Barbara
> On 03/30/2022 9:06 AM salon-request@listserve.com wrote:
> 
>  
> Send Salon mailing list submissions to
> 	salon@listserve.com
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> 	https://mlm2.listserve.net/mailman/listinfo/salon
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> 	salon-request@listserve.com
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> 	salon-owner@listserve.com
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Salon digest..."
> To access the full archive of posted links, visit the Salon Archive https://mlm2.listserve.net/mailman/private/salon/  If you never set up a password for your account (It’s optional), just enter your email address and click the Password “remind” button. The system will send you a randomly generated password that you can use to log into the archives.
> Today's Topics:
> 
>    1. Asian Giants Tread a Fine Line on Putin?s War (Chas Freeman)
>    2. Envoy says US seeks to ensure Putin suffers 'strategic
>       failure' (Chas Freeman)
>    3. Abu Dhabi: staking a bold claim (Chas Freeman)
>    4. Biden?s New Defense Budget (Chas Freeman)
>    5. China reverses roles in arms trade with Russia (Chas Freeman)
> Salon mailing list
> Salon@listserve.com
> https://mlm2.listserve.net/mailman/listinfo/salon
> https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2022-03-30/asian-giants-tread-a-fine-line-on-putin-s-war?utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&utm_term=220330&utm_campaign=bop
> 
> 
> Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov is making two very telling trips this week.
> 
> 
> In China today ostensibly for a meeting of countries bordering Afghanistan, Lavrov took the chance to discuss the war in Ukraine with his local counterpart.
> 
> 
> But Beijing is being very low key about the visit. That’s as it faces international criticism for its stance of not condemning Russia for the war as well as threats of economic penalties should it help Russia skirt international sanctions.
> 
> 
> Key reading:
> 
> 
> * China Moves to Comply With Sanctions, Easing Some U.S. Concerns
> 
> * Russian Foreign Minister Lands in China on First Visit Since War
> 
> * India’s Dependence on Russian Weapons Tethers Modi to Putin
> 
> * Russia Offers SWIFT Alternative to India for Ruble Payments
> 
> * China Envoy Says Xi-Putin Friendship Actually Does Have a Limit
> 
> 
> China’s Foreign Ministry, in its daily briefing today, limited itself to a few generic comments on overall ties with Russia. Chinese companies have, to all accounts, been trying to work out how to comply with sanctions even as Beijing hasn’t officially joined the economic squeeze on Moscow.
> 
> 
> The fear is that China and Russia, with much in common (although Beijing views Moscow as the junior partner), act ever more as a bloc.
> 
> 
> But while China avoids public criticism of Vladimir Putin for his war and is averse to mechanisms that damage its own economic progress, President Xi Jinping is probably loathe to put himself in the middle of Putin’s political fights with the U.S. and Europe.
> 
> 
> Tomorrow Lavrov heads to India, a country that has similarly failed to condemn Russia for the invasion and which continues to trade with it, especially in oil and weapons. New Delhi is in fact considering a proposal from Moscow to use a system developed by the Russian central bank for bilateral payments, bypassing SWIFT — the Belgium-based cross-border payment system operator — from which it has largely been cut off.
> 
> 
> 
> The criticism of India for its stance on Russia has been far more muted. India is a member of the Quad alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia that seeks to limit China’s military and strategic clout. It is also a democracy, as opposed to authoritarian China.
> 
> 
> The question is how long the relative leeway for Delhi can go on, though, if India continues its business-as-usual approach to Russia. — Rosalind Mathieson
> 
> 
> 
> Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on Dec. 6. Photographer: T. Narayan/Bloomberghttps://thehill.com/policy/international/600107-envoy-says-us-seeks-to-ensure-putin-suffers-strategic-failure
> 
> But what about Ukraine and the Ukrainians?
> Abu Dhabi: staking a bold claim
> 
> Summary: the UAE is brusque with Washington, strategic with Moscow and keenly reinforcing relations with China and the wider East as America’s erstwhile ally seeks to play the advantage while the war in Ukraine rages.
> 
> Suhail al-Mazrouei has been the UAE’s minister of energy since 2013  and previously served as CEO of  state-owned ADNOC. He knows the  pricing peaks and valleys and the political terrain both rough and smooth of the hydrocarbons sector. And he also knows how to handle himself with Western media. So when CNBC’s Hadley Gamble asked him in her 28 March interview  about the call from America and Europe to replace Russian oil and gas he was succinct in his reply:
> 
> Who can replace Russia today? I can’t think of a country that can in a year, two, three, four, even ten years replace 10 million barrels (per day). It’s not realistic.  This talk is only going to push the prices higher.
> 
>  Though he expressed sympathy for those suffering in the war in Ukraine he was careful to stress that Russia’s role in OPEC+ remains a central and valuable one: “Russia will always be part of the group.  We will respect them.”
> 
> None of this is welcome news in Washington as it attempts to pressure the Saudis and the Emiratis to release more oil into the market and bring prices down.  Indeed the war has put further strains on relations between the US and the UAE. As David Gardner writing in the FT noted, in addition to the Gulf oil producers refusal to meet President Biden’s request to open the taps, there is deep annoyance that neither Saudi Arabia or the UAE are paying attention to the sanctions:
> 
> Washington and European capitals are also irritated at their Gulf allies’ non-committal reaction to Putin’s vicious attack on Ukraine. The Saudis and Emiratis are ignoring the wall of sanctions the US and its partners are building around Russia.
> 
> Gardner also drew attention to how swiftly al-Mazrouei swatted down the claim by the UAE’s Washington ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba on 9 March that Abu Dhabi favoured production increases and would encourage OPEC+ to consider them. “Within hours,” Gardner writes “the Emirati energy minister announced they were sticking with the Opec+ deal agreed with Moscow. Otaiba’s remarks brought benchmark crude prices sharply down and Abu Dhabi’s rebuttal sent them rocketing north again.”
> 
> 
> 
> US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met UAE de facto leader Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan yesterday on a visit to Morocco [photo credit: @humeyra_pamuk]
> 
> Al-Mazrouei insists that the UAE’s concern is for all sides and in the best interests of the consuming nations and consumers. The UAE wants “to incentivize talks to end the war.” However his suggestion that sending weapons to Ukraine should be halted rather tips the scale on behalf of the Russians. And though he said he was giving his personal view it is surely one that reflects government thinking. He told Gamble:
> 
> (Talking) is better as an action than pouring weapons to the Ukrainians and they are going to die. If we want them to die we should encourage them to go and kill each other…. Giving more weapons is pouring fuel on the fire…. I think we need to end this.  As a father I care about the families who are displaced. The war is ugly. We have seen it in Iraq, in Syria. We have seen it in Afghanistan. War is ugly.
> 
> One war the minister did not mention has just passed its seven year mark: Yemen, where the UAE remains deeply engaged despite its claim to have withdrawn forces in 2019. The Emiratis remain in control of the strategic island of Socotra and just recently their proxy force, the Giants Brigade, engaged with the Houthis in the battle for the key governorate of Marib.
> 
> Yemen like many other MENA countries is facing further food insecurity as a result of the war in Ukraine with grains and other commodities prices soaring. Al-Mazrouei used food insecurity as another reason for seeking an end to the fighting. And he spoke about the threat of a worldwide recession driven by rampantly high energy prices. “We don’t want prices to go higher,” he told Gamble.
> 
> He revealed that the US energy secretary Jennifer Granholm had not reached out to him but he would always be there to listen: “there are things we can agree and things that we could disagree and we are not going to be told what to do. We know what is sensible for us.” And though he insists the US remains a good friend and partner, China is a valued partner with whom the UAE has a flourishing relationship. And he made it clear that in the energy field Abu Dhabi’s ambitions include the wider East with Indonesia being singled out.
> 
> Staking out the territory while delivering a backhanded slap to Washington the energy minister insisted “we have a right to be friends with everyone, we are not going to follow what one country wants.”
> 
> There is, of course, the old cliché about wanting to be friends with all and winding up friends with none. Like the Saudis and the Egyptians, the Emiratis are taking a calculated gamble that their tacit – and not so tacit – support for Russia will not come back to bite.
> 
> 
> Members can leave comments about this newsletter on the Today's Newsletter page of the Arab Digest website
> follow us on Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook
> 
> Copyright © 2022 Arab Digest, All rights reserved.
> You are receiving this email as you are subscribed to the Arab Digest.
> Our mailing address is:
> Arab Digest
> 3rd Floor
> 207 Regent Street
> London, W1B 3HH
> United Kingdom
> 
> 
> 
>  To unsubscribe email editor@arabdigest.orghttp://click1.crm.foreignpolicy.com/ViewMessage.do;jsessionid=F28E8BDD34A71EB913E62E5A3BBDDA47
> 
> Biden’s New Defense Budget
> 
> The United States is set to spend more than $773 billion on defense next year, the highest level this century, as concerns over China’s rise and Russian aggression in Europe drive priorities in Washington.
> 
> As FP’s Jack Detsch reported on Monday, the spending is part of the Biden administration’s long term focus on China, even as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine grabs the headlines.
> 
> There are also more mundane considerations. “The big takeaway is inflation, inflation, inflation.” Todd Harrison, a defense budget expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told Foreign Policy. “And so at first glance it would appear to be significantly higher but when you start factoring in the higher cost of everything, it’s actually pretty flat.”
> 
> Harrison pointed out the possibility that defense planners, who usually write the document in November, failed to account for how high inflation would become, raising the possibility that the final figure may end up lower than the previous year’s request in real terms.
> 
> Unlike Biden’s other spending priorities that have run aground over the course of his presidency, Congress is likely to step in and approve the new spending—and perhaps give him even more than he asked for. That happened in last year’s budget, when Biden requested $715 billion for the Department of Defense and ended up being handed $756 billion by Congress.
> 
> That bipartisan enthusiasm is another reason why the U.S. defense budget keeps going up. “There’s a sense of you can never go wrong pushing for more,” William Hartung, a defense industry and budget expert at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft said. “Sometimes defense spending is put forward as a kind of insurance policy, and therefore what’s wrong with more insurance. But too much insurance can bankrupt you, it could be a bad deal.”
> 
> Hartung suggests a combination of cutting the Pentagon bureaucracy—including its large contractor workforce, abandoning high cost programs like the F-35 and new intercontinental ballistic missile, as well as reducing the size of the 1.4 million strong U.S. armed forces as ways to rein in the current budget.
> 
> That’s easier said than done, Hartung concedes, with such moves needing to come from a different strategy “where you’re not going to go anywhere, fight any battle on the globe,” and then surmount a Congress eager to protect pet programs.
> 
> The international picture. Regardless of where the final figure lands, the United States will still be spending comfortably more than any other nation spends on its defense, and three times more than China, its closest competitor.
> 
> Proponents of higher spending often point to the fact that, relative to the size of the U.S. economy, U.S. defense spending is small, at about 3 percent of GDP. (That rationale is not solely a Washington phenomenon; Beijing uses the same explanation when defending its defense spending increases).
> 
> Part of what rankles progressives about the defense budget is how much it consumes of the federal budget, where it represents about one-sixth of total spending. That complaint is compounded by the fact that the United States is much stingier than other developed nations when it comes to overall government spending—devoting the equivalent of just 38 percent of U.S. GDP in 2019, the lowest in the G-7 (France, the G-7’s highest, spent the equivalent of 55 percent of its GDP in 2019).
> 
> A Ukraine effect? Despite the upward trend, the march toward a trillion-dollar defense budget isn’t yet an inevitability, with events in Ukraine—where Russia’s well-resourced military has so far failed to defeat a highly motivated, albeit far less expensively assembled, Ukrainian force—proving that money is not everything when war breaks out.
> 
> There are also changing winds in Europe to consider, where calls for an EU-wide defense strategy, as well as a historic increase in German defense spending, may make the U.S. position as the continent’s security guarantor—and all the costs that come with sustaining that commitment—a thing of the past.The Financial Times, March 29, 2022