China wary of Russia-type sanctions, but Beijing’s ‘financial nuclear bombs’ are a powerful deterrent
        
 - Economy-crippling
 sanctions imposed by the West on Russia are a ‘textbook warning for 
China’ if it helps its neighbour or follows through with Taiwan threats
- But
 China is so involved in global trade that severing ties seems very 
unlikely, and some Western trade partners may not follow US-led moves to
 punish Beijing
But
 China is so involved in global trade that severing ties seems very 
unlikely, and some Western trade partners may not follow US-led moves to
 punish Beijing
Punishing the world’s second-largest economy with
 destructive financial and economic sanctions – such as expelling China 
from the international Swift payment system and freezing foreign 
reserves – had never been publicly considered an option by Washington. 
But that changed when they were levied against Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.
Now,
 the breadth of those sanctions, and the speed at which they were 
applied, have given Beijing a glimpse of what it could face if it offers
 support to Moscow or tries to forcefully reunify Taiwan with the 
Chinese mainland.
However, Russia is no China, whose 
economy is about 10 times larger and much more closely intertwined with 
the rest of the world.
China remains highly dependent on 
foreign trade and has the world’s largest foreign exchange reserves – 
worth US$3.25 trillion – much of which is stored in the United States 
and Europe.
“The expansive economic sanctions that US-led Western
 countries have imposed on Russia can be seen as a textbook warning for 
China – on how far [the sanctions] can go,” said He Weiwen, former 
economic and commercial counsellor at the Chinese consulates in New York
 and San Francisco.
Some say the economic impact could be much more debilitating for China.
“Once
 sanctioned, China would be hurt far more than Russia,” said a 
Beijing-based European diplomat on condition of anonymity. “China is 
worried and doesn’t have many tools [to counter the impact of 
sanctions].”
On the other hand, China has carved out such
 a strong foothold in the global value chain that analysts say it would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for more than 120 countries 
and regions, including the United States, to sever ties entirely with 
their top trade partner.
The effects of any sanctions are mutual.
 We have assets in the US and Europe, and so do they in ChinaLu Xiang, 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
He, who is now a senior fellow
 with the Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG), a Beijing-based 
think tank, said: “China and the US have a stake in each other, so for 
the US, China is totally different from Russia. The political 
calculations will inevitably be restrained by economic conditions.”
Lu
 Xiang, a senior fellow with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(CASS), also said that if the same sanctions were levied against China, 
they would have unintended consequences for the nation or global bloc 
imposing them.
“The effects of any sanctions are mutual,” Lu said. “We have assets in the US and Europe, and so do they in China.”
Some
 US sanctions will inevitably remain in place, and perhaps more will 
come, but the unfolding of the sanctions will follow its original pace, 
according to Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Renmin
 University and an adviser to the State Council, the country’s cabinet.
“A sharp and sudden escalation is quite unlikely,” Shi said.
Potential triggers: Ukraine, Taiwan and ambiguity
More
 than two months into the Ukraine war, it has become increasingly 
difficult for Beijing to distance itself from the tension. While Chinese
 diplomats have been calling for a peaceful resolution, Beijing’s 
insistence on maintaining a neutral stance has come under fire from the 
US and its allies.
CIA director William Burns called 
China “a silent partner in Putin’s aggression” when speaking to students
 and faculty last month at the Georgia Institute of Technology.
But 
to trigger potential secondary sanctions against China, a generally 
acknowledged red line is the provision of weapons, even though 
Washington has been vague in its wording on this, saying there would be 
“consequences” if Beijing offered “material support to Russia’s 
invasion”.
“The United States is now playing with 
ambiguity,” said another Beijing-based foreign diplomat. “China also 
wants to know, clearly, under what specific circumstances it would be 
sanctioned.”
US intelligence has not found 
evidence of China selling weapons to Russia, according to Ned Price, 
spokesman for the US Department of State.
“We’re going to
 continue to watch very closely,” he said during a press conference on 
April 18. “We offered an assessment a couple of weeks ago now that we 
had not seen the provision of weapons, of supplies, and that assessment 
has not changed.”
Accordingly, the Chinese government, 
along with state-owned banks and enterprises that have business 
relations with Russia, have been adopting a very prudent approach since 
the war began, according to Professor Shi with Renmin University.
“Such
 a Western attitude [towards Russian aggression] has probably been fully
 anticipated by China, so to protect Chinese assets, I think so far, 
China has been acting very cautiously,” Shi said.
Legal 
sources told the Post that various state-owned enterprises in China, 
such as banks, oil companies and semiconductor firms, have been seeking 
advice on whether to continue their trade with Russia since the war 
began.
But as long as China does not provide munitions to
 Russia, secondary sanctions on China are a non-existent problem, said 
Wang Huiyao, founder of the CCG think tank and also a State Council 
adviser.
“China is conducting normal trade with Russia, 
and so is the EU,” Wang said. “The key point is that [the US] has no 
reason to impose sanctions [on China] because of the war.
Meanwhile,
 US officials have been increasingly using the measures taken against 
Russia as a warning to China, suggesting that a similar playbook would 
be employed if China were to one day attempt to take Taiwan by force.
One
 US official told the Post that anyone who assumes the US would hold 
back on similarly powerful economic retaliation against Beijing – if it 
one day attacks Taiwan – is misunderstanding just how far and how 
quickly the conversation has changed in Washington since the Ukraine war
 began.
Beijing regards the island as a breakaway 
province that must be reunified with the mainland – by force if 
necessary. And tensions have risen in recent years as Washington shifted
 away from the one-China policy that had been the bedrock of Sino-US 
relations for four decades.
Heightened tensions in Taiwan amid Russian invasion of Ukraine
However, some Chinese government advisers have suggested that Beijing may be in no rush to take Taiwan by force.
“Although
 there are frequent tensions on the Taiwan issue, the basic framework is
 quite stable,” Shi said. “Under the circumstances we can now foresee, 
there will be no substantial Sino-US conflict on the Taiwan issue.
“China
 absolutely does not tolerate Taiwan’s independence and foreign control 
of Taiwan, and the United States understands it very well. So, in terms 
of such a fundamental red line, I think [Beijing and Washington] have a 
clear understanding of each other.”
And as long as China maintains good relations with Asean countries, the US cannot make waves in the South China 
As
 for Xinjiang and the South China Sea, it is not worthwhile for the US 
to impose the same level of sanctions that would jeopardise its own 
economy, said He, the former diplomat.
“For the US, Xinjiang is more 
of a pawn that they use to cause trouble for China while garnering 
international support. And as long as China maintains good relations 
with Asean countries, the US cannot make waves in the South China Sea.”
But as evidenced by the abruptness of the Ukraine war, surprises can pop up overnight, said Lu from the CASS.
“China
 has repeatedly made it clear to the United States that Taiwan is the 
most sensitive and important issue in the relationship between the two 
countries, and the US understands this well,” Lu said. “But will the US 
challenge China on this issue precisely because it understands the 
importance? We must also make various assumptions.”
Even with leverage, China must prepare for the worst
Since
 the war began, the Swift international financial messaging system has 
been widely regarded as the most impactful way to cut off Russia from 
the international financial system – and the US and its Western allies 
indeed moved quickly to exclude selected Russian banks from Swift.
But that expulsion was a compromised version – energy trade has thus far been excluded from the punishment.
“The
 international payments system is just the international supply chains 
in reverse,” said Shahin Vallee, head of the Geo-Economics Programme 
with the German Council on Foreign Relations, in an article in March
“It
 is not possible to cut off Russia from the international payments 
system unless one is prepared to cut it off from global supply chains – 
or, in this case, from energy supplies to Europe.”
Likewise,
 China’s biggest strength lies in its deep participation in the global 
supply chain, which also raises additional concerns for the US. If the 
actions taken against Russia were to be similarly applied to China, the 
US’ allies may be less likely to follow suit.
“The US knows well that
 Europe would be more reluctant to impose sanctions on China, because 
China-EU economic and trade relations are too close,” said the second 
foreign diplomat in Beijing.
Still, Beijing has to do 
everything in its power to ensure that China is not excluded from Swift,
 according to former Chinese government officials. There is still a long
 way to go for the Chinese yuan to reach the same level as the US dollar
 or euro, in terms of international standing.
And China’s own yuan 
payment system – the Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) still 
relies on Swift for cross-border messaging.
“It is 
necessary to speed up the construction and external connection of the 
cross-border yuan clearing system CIPS … [But] the primary choice is to 
continue to strengthen cooperation with Swift,” said Wang Yongli, a 
former vice-president with the Bank of China and a former board member 
for Swift, in an article in March.
Meanwhile, a far 
stronger action taken by the US and its allies – freezing the Russian 
central bank’s assets held overseas – has not gone unnoticed by Beijing,
 as China has the world’s largest foreign currency reserve assets, most 
of which are in US dollars.
The huge foreign exchange reserves 
are hard-won, and they are China’s ‘financial nuclear bombs’ with a 
powerful deterrent effectWang Yongli, former Swift board member
The
 total value has been maintained at around US$3.2 trillion since 2020, 
more than double that of the second biggest holder, Japan.
There has 
been talk inside China of slashing its huge holding of reserves, but 
experts say this is not feasible, as a sudden change in the volume could
 have catastrophic consequences in global markets.
“The 
huge foreign exchange reserves are hard-won, and they are China’s 
‘financial nuclear bombs’ with a powerful deterrent effect. It must be 
used properly rather than arbitrarily, and cannot be easily slashed,” 
Wang Yongli said.
“Of course, this does not rule out China increasing
 its purchase of gold or other strategic materials, or adjusting the 
currency and country composition of foreign exchange reserves, to 
further reduce its US dollar reserves, but we avoid this as much as 
possible to use it as a means of confrontation with the US.”
Indeed,
 China has been stepping up efforts to diversify its foreign exchange 
reserve assets in the past two decades, according to data from the State
 Administration Of Foreign Exchange.
In 1995, the proportion of 
China’s US dollar reserve assets reached 79 per cent – much higher than 
the international average of 59 per cent. But China’s share fell below 
60 per cent between 2014 and 2016, below the international average of 
over 65 per cent.
One countermeasure China can take is to expand its 
economic and financial opening up to the outside world, and encourage 
foreign investors to hold more Chinese assets, according to Chinese 
government advisers.
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Meanwhile, foreign multinational corporations are already prepared for a scenario in which China is sanctioned.
For
 instance, some may accelerate the implementation of an “In China, for 
China” strategy where goods are specifically produced for local 
consumption, according to the European diplomat who said China will hurt
 more than Russia if sanctioned.
Dan Wang, a technology analyst at 
Gavekal Dragonomics, said China is doing its best to mitigate any 
collateral damage from the Western sanctions against Russia, given 
China’s dependence on foreign markets as well as critical technologies 
such as chips, seeds and aviation.
“Efforts to increase 
self-sufficiency are under way, but China is unlikely to free itself 
within the present decade,” Dan Wang said.
“But once China decides it no longer needs Western technologies, it may no longer feel such restraint.”
Qin
 Gang, China’s ambassador to the US, published an opinion piece in The 
National Interest on April 18, saying: “A worse Russia-US relationship 
does not mean a better China-US relationship. And likewise, a worse 
China-Russia relationship does not mean a better US-Russia relationship,
 either.
“More importantly, if the China-US relationship is messed up, that does not augur well for Russia-US relations or the world.”