Scroll down to: "Trump’s Vision & NATO’s Future: Streamline The Alliance For Modern War,” to see the New American Way of War, which Trump
kicked into high-gear!
BLUF: Anyone who supports/supported Trump, and/or the war on Russia, might want to call for "three cheers to President Trump,” who did the most of any post-Cold War President (with
stiff competion) to pave the way for the war against Russia, before Biden “closed the deal.”
Any reasonably intelligent military officer (of which there are few, given the “tunnel vision” which goes with their professional “enculturation”), or IR “expert,” historian, political
scientist, journalist, et al., (all having the same disability of tunnel vision, including from “national/tribal loyalty”), knows that “war” seldom begins with the actual crossing of a border with military equipment. But rather, it begins with the type of “Cognitive
Operation” (formerly PsyOps, P.R.) necessary to “condition” the “will” of one’s own population to believe in the “necessity” of a planned war to be launched. In fact, Donald Trump recognized that, as he stated in 2017 (see below): “Our own fight for the West
does not begin on the battlefield -- it begins with our minds, our wills, and our souls.” That’s recognized by military strategists going back at least to Clausewitz.
What is new is the ever-greater sophistication of how to “Manufacture Consent” to go to war, as US self-directed “Cognitive Warfare,” against
its own population, designed to create a binary of the “Friend-Enemy distinction,” as fascist theorist Carl Schmitt called it (as most necessary for any “fascist movement,” as well), and “hostile feelings” and “hostile intent” toward the designated enemy,
with Russia having that “honor” most prominently now. “Conditioning the battlefield” of public opinion, as what Rand Corporation once suggested was necessary, or currently, the Phase Zero Phase of “Shaping” (Going Big by Going Small: The Application of Operational
Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero, by Brian S. Petit). And Trump excelled at that, even while offering what seemed to be counter-suggestions, under Arthur Finkelstein’s “Six-Party Theory” to deceive.
So anyone who supports/supported Trump, and/or the war on Russia, might want to call for "three cheers to President Trump,” who did the
most to pave the way for the war against Russia before Biden “closed the deal."And to his military advisors, like the one below who explains this new military US doctrine, now being played out in Ukraine/Russia.
I have been asserting for years now, from 2016 before Trump was elected, down to the present, that Trump was never about “ending the endless
wars,” as his “non-interventionist conservative” supporters duplicitously claimed (it had to be “duplicitous,” as no one could be that stupid to believe otherwise, could they, when even I could see through his lies?), but was about expanding the wars to those
dratted, “revisionist powers,” Russia and China.
"The reemergence of long-term strategic competition, rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare and competition that span the entire spectrum of conflict require a Joint Force structured
to match this reality." p. 1
The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the
reemergence of long-term, strategic competition
by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model—gaining
veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. P. 2
Quotes:
"As President
Trump prepares to exit the White House, it is important to see his military legacy clearly, because for better or worse, it is the foundation on which his successor will have to build.” . . .
"Targeting China. Trump
presided over a wholesale revision of national defense strategy that shifted the focus of military preparations from counter-terrorism to great-power rivalries. Although Russia is often described as a “near-peer” rival of America’s military, former defense
secretary Patrick Shanahan got it right when he observed that the new strategy is mainly about “China, China, China.” The Middle Kingdom will be the main locus of U.S. military preparations for the foreseeable future, and the need for new weapons is explained
primarily in terms of the challenge posed by Beijing."
"Revitalizing
nuclear deterrence. Trump began his 2016 presidential campaign calling for robust modernization of the nation’s
strategic nuclear forces. All three legs of the Cold War nuclear triad—missiles at sea, missiles on land, and long-range bombers—were wearing out and Trump subscribed to the Reagan philosophy of peace through strength. His administration fully funded a modernization
plan inherited from Obama without exhibiting any of the latter president’s hesitancy about nuclear weapons. He also funded the first major modernization of the nuclear command-and-control system since the Cold War ended.
"Surging military innovation. Trump increased the Pentagon budget 20% over four years, but the growth was not evenly distributed between readiness, force structure and investment. The big gainer was research
and development, which in nominal terms rose 49% between Obama’s last defense request and the Trump 2021 request. This enabled all three military departments to develop next-generation weapons while actively pursuing disruptive technologies such as unmanned
submarines (Boeing) and hypersonic weapons (Lockheed Martin). The military embrace of new technologies such as digital engineering has the potential to keep America’s joint force ahead of rivals like China for many years to come.
"Organizing for multi-domain operations. A key feature of the Trump national defense strategy is recognition that U.S. military forces will need to conduct future operations across five distinct warfighting
domains: air, land, sea, space and cyber. To a greater degree than ever before, the military services are generating doctrine and developing networks that will enable them to cooperate across all five domains for optimal effect. . . . This kind of cooperative
engagement has been discussed for many years, but the funding and motivation to pursue it has grown during the Trump presidency.
"Creating a space force. The warfighting domain where American military dominance was most at risk when Trump took office was space. . . . The Space Force will remain within the Department of the Air Force,
but space now has a powerful advocate in military councils that did not exist before Trump.
"Integrating military & economic policy. One of the most unusual developments during the Trump era has been the integration of Pentagon weapons purchases with other facets of national economic policy. .
. . Because China is viewed as both a military and an economic threat, it was natural to think about defense programs in similar terms.” End Quote
And then there is this, “shaping” the consciousness of Poland to join with us in our war already begun against Russia.
“Our own fight for the West does not begin on the battlefield -- it begins with our minds, our wills, and our souls. Today, the ties that unite our civilization are no less vital
and demand no less defense, than that bare shred of land on which the hope of Poland once totally rested. Our freedom, our civilization and our survival depend on these bonds of history, culture, and memory.”
Trump’s Vision & NATO’s Future: Streamline The Alliance For Modern War
It would be wrong for Europeans to conclude that President Trump wants to withdraw all US forces from Europe. The President simply wants the US military to be NATO’s security guarantor of last resort, not NATO’s "first responder."
![Army photo]()
US Army M1 Abrams tanks train in Bulgaria
President Trump’s harsh words for Germany set the tone for a tense NATO summit
— but America’s allies now know they have no right to assume the US will keep cutting fat
checks to cover
the cost of Europe’s defense. However, it would be wrong for Europeans to conclude that President Trump wants to
withdraw all US forces from Europe. The President simply wants the US military to be NATO’s security guarantor of last resort, not NATO’s “first responder.”
![Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. graphic]()
One reason is the character of the Russian threat. Instead of the massed motor rifle regiments of the Cold War, we’re now seeing
disinformation and infiltration by Russian Special Operations Forces (little green men) on the pretext of
aiding disaffected Russian minorities in countries like Estonia, Latvia, or Moldava. When Moscow thinks the time is ripe, it sends in the second wave: a rapid intervention by Russia’s standing, professional forces — primarily mobile armored formations ranging
in size from 3,000-8,000 soldiers, tightly integrated with precision
rocket artillery,
surface-to-surface missile groups, and
aerospace power. All of these forces are designed to operate under the cover of Western Russia’s formidable integrated air defenses (IADS)
to keep NATO airpower at bay.
NATO’s preferred response is simultaneously too fragile and too sluggish. The first responders would be a spearhead of light forces, followed by a large U.S. military presence planted in Cold War-style garrisons, and ultimately
the mobilization of European reserves. But Russian forces would not only rapidly crush the
light infantry spearhead and
achieve their strategic objectives long before the first European reservist shows up to fight: The Russians would also
destroy US forces in their garrisons with precision strikes.
![Sydney J. Freedberg Jr. graphic from NATO data]()
SOURCE: NATO data (2017)
Extended nuclear deterrence is an even less appealing solution. Tossing
nuclear pebbles at an opponent that will likely respond with nuclear boulders makes no sense. If it did, Great Britain and France would have committed their nuclear forces to NATO’s defense, but they have declined to do so. Unless Moscow takes the unlikely
step of opening an offensive against Eastern Europe with nuclear strikes, any future Russian intervention must be defeated with conventional weapons, not
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMS) from the United States.
A second reason is not as widely understood:
World War II and its sequel, the Cold War, are behind us, not in front of us. The age of mass mobilization-based armies has given way to limited, high-intensity conventional warfare — an era of integrated, “all arms-all effects” warfighting.
This new brand of “come- as-you-are” warfare requires highly trained professionals ready to fight effectively when the hostilities begin. The unified application of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, the whole range of
cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, widely dispersed
joint strike systems, and
mobile, armored maneuver forces across service lines cannot be executed on the fly. To effect change in the way Europeans and Americans think about defense, the President must issue new marching orders to the Department of Defense:
- Turn US bases in Europe into austere Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) designed to receive deploying forces and then project them into training exercises or combat. Stop the expensive practice of building elaborate facilities
for military communities in foreign countries, complete with family housing, schools, and grocery stores, that create jobs for foreign nationals, but do nothing for the U.S. economy.
- Establish permanent bases in the United States from which future forces will deploy and where service members’ families can live. End accompanied tours overseas except for the few specialists needed to sustain forces deploying
through the FOBs.
- Build regionally focused, lean Joint Force Command (JFC) organizations to replace today’s overly large single-service headquarters. These bloated relics of World War II and the Cold War are too slow to deploy and they
obstruct the rapid decision-making required in future warfare. Flatten command with the JFCs and exercise them regularly on short notice.
- Build self-contained
Army formations of 5,000-6,000 soldiers for rapid deployment under joint command. Disband the large 15,000-18,000-man divisions. Extract billions in savings by shedding equipment and organizationsthat are no longer needed.
- Invest in new
airlift and
sea-lift to meet demands that commercial transport cannot. Invest in transportation support systems to off-load military cargo in unimproved locations.
NATO needs these reforms and European military leaders know it. But though these measures would save billions of dollars and dramatically improve the US armed forces’ readiness to fight, America’s senior military leaders
will resist them. This, however, is a problem for President Trump, not NATO.
![Air Force photo]()
Gen. Curtis LeMay
History provides a model for how to fix this. When
General Curtis LeMay took over Strategic Air Command, he discovered that SAC lacked the right operational focus and military capability; there were no detailed war plans, only broad directives. LeMay concluded there were not enough leaders with the elasticity
of mind to meet the Cold War’s new demands for fast-paced exercises and deployments. LeMay found the ‘right people,’ he appointed them to command and staff positions, and SAC became the model of warfighting readiness. LeMay’s approach may be helpful to the
President as he moves the Department of Defense and NATO in a
new strategic direction.
Colonel (ret.)
Douglas Macgregor, US Army, served as the Director of the Joint Operations Center during the Kosovo Air Campaign in 1999. He is a decorated combat veteran, a PhD, and the author of five books. His latest is Margin of Victory, (Naval Institute Press, 2016).
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