The U.S. is expanding its goals in Ukraine. That’s dangerous.
Comments
by political and military leaders suggest the goal is no longer to
drive Russia to the negotiating table but to seek a total defeat of
Russian forces. That increases the odds of catastrophe.
May 11, 2022Ukraine
has surprised the world with its ability to hold back Russian
aggression. Yet its success in doing so appears to be prompting Western
leaders to expand their goals for the war in ways that may carry
extraordinary, underappreciated risk. The earlier hope was that a robust
Ukrainian defense would ensure the country’s right to exist as a
sovereign and independent state while minimizing the loss of territory
in the south and east. But now, many political and military leaders are
laying out much loftier goals, backed by an unprecedented infusion of
military aid.
“Ukraine’s victory is a strategic imperative for all of us,” British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss recently proclaimed.
“… We are doubling down. We will keep going further and faster to push
Russia out of the whole of Ukraine.” Rep. Jason Crow (D-Colo.), who
traveled with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) to Kyiv, made a similar point:
“The United States is not interested in stalemates. We are not
interested in going back to the status quo. The United States is in this
to win it.”
Talk
of total victory aligns well with another recently floated objective:
an extended bloodletting of the Russian army. Defense Secretary Lloyd
Austin asserted on April 25 that the United States wants
“to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of
things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” And that fits with Joint
Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark A. Milley’s prediction that the war will
turn into a “protracted conflict … measured in years.”
Yet
crippling Russia’s military or expelling Russia from Ukraine are
significantly more dangerous aims than preventing the further loss of
Ukrainian territory or, through limited offensive operations, gaining
some of it back. Unfortunately, if Russian President Vladimir Putin
begins to think that his back is against the wall, he may lash out by
directly confronting NATO, intensifying the conventional war in the
east, or even using nuclear weapons.
Moreover,
building a Ukrainian army capable of the large-scale counteroffensives
needed to expel Russia or profoundly degrade its military would almost
certainly extend and intensify the war, leading to additional suffering.
The sooner that President Volodymyr Zelensky and the Russians can get
to the peace table to arrange a deal that preserves Ukrainian
sovereignty, the better.
Keep in mind that while Russia’s campaign has been horrific,
it can still get much, much worse. Russia has been fighting with one
hand tied behind its back, largely for domestic political reasons. In
Putin’s Russia, after all, the conflict has not been described as a war
but rather as a “special military operation.” But the worse the battle
goes for Putin, the more he will be tempted to mobilize his society to
fight it as a full-blown war, despite the political risks of calling up
reservists or expanding conscription. Russia has more than three times
the population of Ukraine, giving it a hard-to-surmount advantage in any
war of attrition, despite Ukraine’s skilled and motivated soldiers.
Ukraine should try assiduously to avoid any further mobilization on
Russia’s part, yet the West’s expanding war aims make it more likely.
Even
worse, Putin could turn to unconventional weapons, including low-yield
nuclear weapons, to stave off defeat. Skeptics might argue that Putin is
not suicidal and would never risk nuclear escalation with the West. But
Russia is overwhelmingly likely to begin any nuclear escalation — or,
for that matter, chemical escalation — inside Ukraine, which would put
the onus on the West as to how to respond. With a handful of nuclear
weapons Putin could obliterate significant portions of the Ukrainian
army, especially if conventional battles forced it to mass in a
relatively small area in the east. (To presume that the architect of
Bucha would blanch at using nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which
cannot respond in kind, is wishful thinking.) All the new heavy weapons
flowing to the Ukrainian military would not save it from destruction in
this situation, to say nothing of the casualties among Ukrainian
civilians.
Going
nuclear would be extremely dangerous for Putin. But if he believes that
the West is trying to permanently weaken Russia, will never lift
sanctions or even aims to topple his regime (despite repeated denials
from Western policymakers), he may become willing to roll the dice.
Putin could see escalation as a way to preserve the military as the
basis of both his international clout and domestic security.
More
prosaically, the longer the war continues, the higher the probability
that NATO and Russia will be drawn into direct conflict — through
accident or incident. Russia has every incentive to attack the coming
avalanche of Western military aid to Ukraine. Such attacks could easily
lead to a head-on collision between superpowers: Planes and munitions
might go astray across international borders, for instance, or Moscow
could decide to deliberately target the NATO bases where Ukraine
receives military aid and training. Such a confrontation would carry
obvious nuclear risks.
But
assume there is no nuclear escalation. A nearly inevitable result of
expanded Western war aims will still be a longer, more intense conflict
that grinds up cities and towns and keeps killing civilians. For an
example of the kind of damage that a proxy war without end can cause, we
need only look at Syria.
And
the reality is that neither total victory for Ukraine nor dismemberment
of the Russian army is necessary for Western security. The Russian
military is already beset by terrible logistics, a lack of tactical acumen, cratering morale and unreliable weapons.
The senior officer corps and battalion tactical groups have suffered
brutal attrition, and the coming battles in Ukraine’s east will only
exacerbate these problems. Russia’s ground forces are not in a position
to go on the offensive against NATO anytime soon.
Russia remains a threat to the West, but as the Pentagon explicitly told Congress a month after the war began, it plays second fiddle
to the competition with China. We should not let Putin’s mistake of
invading Ukraine prod us toward making our own error: spending valuable
resources and attention on an escalating proxy war against an adversary
that has already inflicted large wounds on itself.
Fortunately,
there is an alternative, one that is consistent with continued
substantial military support to Ukraine. The West should frame its
infusion of aid as a means to help Kyiv achieve an acceptable
settlement. These military resources can help Ukraine regain portions of
its lost territory in the south and east and better preserve its
economic and institutional relationships with Europe in whatever deal
Kyiv eventually makes to end the war. Policymakers will have to be
flexible as they assess prospective settlements, but President Biden
himself recently broached the key idea, arguing
that “Congress should quickly provide the requested funding to
strengthen Ukraine on the battlefield and at the negotiating table.”
Effectively
shaping a negotiated outcome to the war will also require the West to
put diplomatic pressure on Kyiv to come to that deal sooner rather than
later. This includes demonstrating a willingness to turn off the spigot
of military aid if needed. The present tranche should be given time to
work its effect, but its ultimate purpose should be to hasten the
conclusion of a war that carries awful risks and tragic humanitarian
consequences for all involved.