India-China ties: The case for a thaw in the Himalayan stand-off
Easing the border tensions will lessen the impact of the new Cold War on Asia
Published by Straits Times on 18 May 2022
Disengagement
and de-escalation of the military stand-off in the high Himalayas could
also reopen possibilities for international cooperation between the two
Asian giants amid the great churn in major power relations following
the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
It
is a little over two years since China surprised India by a massive
military mobilisation in Ladakh and unilaterally changed the territorial
disposition along the disputed frontier. That China's action came in
the middle of India's struggle to cope with the massive breakout of the
Covid-19 pandemic, shocked the government and triggered a massive
anti-China backlash in the political and chattering classes.
As
three decades of military confidence-building all along the so-called
Line of Actual Control broke down in April 2020, India responded by a
counter mobilisation of its army. The military face-off in the Western
Himalayas produced a clash between the two armed forces in mid-June 2020
that saw significant loss of life for the first time on this disputed
border in nearly four decades.
Military
tensions on the Sino-Indian border in Ladakh produced a number of
strategic consequences - intended or unintended. For instance, there has
been a notable decline in high-level political engagement between Delhi
and Beijing, even accounting for the pandemic. Although bilateral trade
continues to grow, India is consciously reducing its long-term economic
exposure to China.
The
conflict has also pushed the foreign policies of the two Asian giants
on divergent paths. India has elevated its strategic cooperation with
the United States, both bilaterally and in mini-lateral formats, such as
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue that brings together Australia,
India, Japan and the US. Meanwhile, China has drawn closer to Russia and
is locked in a deepening confrontation with the US.
The
Sino-Indian conflict in the Himalayas is increasingly intertwined with
the profound shift in great power relations marked by President Vladimir
Putin's war in Ukraine that has united the Western alliance against
Russia.
The
new focus on European security has not diluted the US and Western
strategic commitment to the Indo-Pacific strategy. The Quad has been
elevated to the summit level, with new mechanisms like the Aukus - a
military technological collaboration between Australia, the United
Kingdom and the US.
The
Himalayan border dynamic has had a great impact on India's great power
relations and the conflict among great powers, in turn, continues to
influence Sino-Indian relations. Put simply, a reasonable relationship
between Delhi and Beijing is critical for reducing the impact of the new
Cold War in Asia and its waters.
On
the face of it, the prospects for a reconciliation between India and
China appear bleak; but a careful assessment of the ground situation
suggests there is a narrow path for India and China to move forward.
To be sure, the current approaches between the two sides are indeed very different.
China
argues that the border issues should be set aside and the two sides
should focus on normalising bilateral relations and jointly develop an
Asian approach to stabilising the global political and economic system
shaken to the core by the war in Ukraine. That was the burden of Chinese
Foreign Minister Wang Yi's argument when he visited Delhi last month.
The
Indian response, articulated by the External Affairs Minister
Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, was that the easing of the military tensions
was critical for the normalisation of bilateral relations.
India, which has taken an independent approach to the war in Ukraine, has
not closed the door for global cooperation with China. But Delhi
insists that any political partnership with China cannot be constructed
amid the muscular military coercion by the PLA on the disputed border.
Contrary
to widespread misperception, India's primary concern currently is not
settling the border dispute that dates back to the 1950s. Rather its
immediate priority is to defuse border tensions, and that is to be done
in two phases - disengagement of the troops from face-to-face
confrontation and de-escalation by moving the troops away from the
points of military friction.
On
the positive side, 15 rounds of talks between military commanders of
China and India have led to disengagement at some of the friction points
on the border. Disengagement and de-escalation will open up enormous
space for bilateral diplomacy.
This
is by no means impossible. There are sensible imperatives on both sides
to end the military tensions on the border. Continuing the military
confrontation and moving towards permanent deployment of troops at
heights uninhabitable to human beings is of no military value to India
or China.
For
China, the limited territorial gains it might have won from its
manoeuvre in April 2020 are far outweighed by the political costs in the
relationship with India.
For
India, the military conflict with China has been a needless distraction
from the threats it faces on its western frontiers from the growing
instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, China's challenges
on its eastern borders are only growing.
Rebuilding
military confidence on the border will also allow Beijing and Delhi to
pursue their more natural foreign policy orientation. Chinese military
pressure on the border has seen India move steadily closer to the US. In
fact, the progress in the US-Indian strategic partnership can be
directly correlated to the military conflicts between China and India at
the Doklam plateau in Bhutan in 2017 and in Ladakh in 2020.
China,
which has strongly denounced the Quad as "Asian Nato", can easily
reduce the Indian incentives to support the forum by getting the PLA to
restore the status quo on the border that prevailed in 2020. Peace on
the border with China will encourage India to return to its basic
instincts that emphasise Asian solidarity, strategic autonomy, and the
pursuit of a multipolar world.
C.
Raja Mohan is a visiting research professor at the Institute of South
Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, and a senior fellow at
the Asia Society Policy Institute, Delhi. This article was first
published on the website of the Asian Peace Programme (APP), an
initiative to promote peace in Asia housed in the Asia Research
Institute, NUS.