Demonization, Danger and DiplomacyBy Tom Pickering and George Beebe - October 31, 2022
Last
week, 30 Democratic members of the House signed a letter urging us to
balance military support for Ukraine with sensible diplomacy. They were
pilloried for their sober advice, and many of them quickly disavowed
their call. In less than 24 hours, the letter was withdrawn.
This is a shame.
A
brutal war grinds on in Europe, the continent with the greatest hope of
being whole, free and humanitarian. Arguments abound in this country
about whether to negotiate an end to this war, while preserving our
commitment to the causes of democracy, liberty, rule of law, and the
preservation of human life and happiness. The issues at stake are
profound and demand careful deliberation and strategic thinking.
Diplomacy
must work hand-in-glove with military force if we are to avert tragedy
in Ukraine. Historically, vanishingly few conflicts have ended without a
political settlement, and we should be wary of the assertion that
Ukraine can achieve complete victory over Russia if only the United
States provides sufficient military assistance. The siren song of total
victory has produced decades of unending destruction in such places as
Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan. World War II, one of the few conflicts
that produced unconditional surrender, required nearly 100 million
deaths and the military occupation of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.
And unlike Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, Russia has nuclear weapons.
Finding a delicate balance between our yearning for justice in Ukraine
and the imperative of averting a nuclear confrontation with Russia is
essential.
Many
believe that the time is not ripe for diplomacy. They argue that
Ukraine and Russia now show little willingness to compromise, that
Vladimir Putin will remain stubborn and unrelenting, and that Volodymyr
Zelenskyy would put himself in political danger inside Ukraine if he
were to pursue negotiations. But negotiated outcomes require careful
preparation, including the creation of political space necessary to
support compromises. Often, such preparation must begin long before the
warring parties consider themselves ready for negotiations. Unless we
prepare now, the United States may be unable to facilitate a settlement
when the time comes for real bargaining, and we may discover that the
constituencies for compromise in both Russia and Ukraine have
disappeared altogether.
Others believe that diplomatic contacts
constitute appeasement, and that signaling any openness to compromise
would only fuel Russian aggression. This view reflects a growing
tendency in the United States to demonize enemies, creating genuine
barriers to opening contacts and building the kind of relationships that
can produce settlements at the conference table. Had John F. Kennedy
succumbed to the temptation to demonize Nikita Khrushchev and eschew
talks, the Cuban missile crisis almost certainly would have ended in
conflagration rather than compromise. That compromise did not result in a
new era of Soviet aggression and nuclear blackmail, as many fear might
happen today if Russia is not defeated altogether in Ukraine. Instead,
it led to a new era of détente and arms control during which the Soviet
bloc gradually withered from within.
Still
others insist that diplomacy can only focus on delineating Ukrainian
borders. But this is only one of many issues that must be addressed, and
the inherent difficulties of any compromise over territory mean that it
is most likely to be settled toward the end of any negotiation, not at
its outset. The United States should not strong-arm Ukraine over
sovereign decisions such as the delineation of its borders. But we have
already seen that Ukraine and Russia can, with outside help, find
compromises over securing grain shipments and exchanging prisoners of
war. Other arrangements might be possible to reduce civilian casualties,
build mutual confidence and lay the groundwork for an eventual
cease-fire. Ultimately, both sides must come to believe that a
negotiated settlement is preferable to the costs and dangers of
continued fighting.
We should have no illusions about the immense
difficulties we face in attempting to end the war in Ukraine. Many
delicate balances must be struck in addressing the dangers we face. But
our critical role in providing Ukraine with the weaponry, intelligence
and military advice it needs for self-defense also carries with it great
diplomatic responsibility to the American people and to the world. Only
the United States can provide Ukraine with the assurances it needs that
diplomacy can safeguard, not threaten, its sovereignty and
independence. Only the United States can pair the firmness necessary to
show Putin he cannot win on the battlefield with the flexibility to
convince him that the right concessions can address Russia’s core
security concerns.
Still
others insist that diplomacy can only focus on delineating Ukrainian
borders. But this is only one of many issues that must be addressed, and
the inherent difficulties of any compromise over territory mean that it
is most likely to be settled toward the end of any negotiation, not at
its outset. The United States should not strong-arm Ukraine over
sovereign decisions such as the delineation of its borders. But we have
already seen that Ukraine and Russia can, with outside help, find
compromises over securing grain shipments and exchanging prisoners of
war. Other arrangements might be possible to reduce civilian casualties,
build mutual confidence and lay the groundwork for an eventual
cease-fire. Ultimately, both sides must come to believe that a
negotiated settlement is preferable to the costs and dangers of
continued fighting.
We should have no illusions about the immense
difficulties we face in attempting to end the war in Ukraine. Many
delicate balances must be struck in addressing the dangers we face. But
our critical role in providing Ukraine with the weaponry, intelligence
and military advice it needs for self-defense also carries with it great
diplomatic responsibility to the American people and to the world. Only
the United States can provide Ukraine with the assurances it needs that
diplomacy can safeguard, not threaten, its sovereignty and
independence. Only the United States can pair the firmness necessary to
show Putin he cannot win on the battlefield with the flexibility to
convince him that the right concessions can address Russia’s core
security concerns.
Could a
combination of military stick and diplomatic carrot cause Putin to step
back from the brink in Ukraine today? We cannot know unless we try. No
one can promise success in either diplomacy or war. But operating as if
they were two entirely separate spheres of activity in which war brings
victory and negotiations mean defeat is a formula for disaster.
Ambassador
Thomas R. Pickering served as the U.S. Ambassador and Representative to
the United Nations under President George H.W. Bush. He also was the
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs under President Bill
Clinton.
George Beebe is director of Grand Strategy at the
Quincy Institute. He spent more than two decades in government as an
intelligence analyst, diplomat, and policy adviser, including as
director of the CIA’s Russia analysis.