We can’t keep treating talk of negotiations to end the Ukraine war as off limits
Broaching the subject of peace negotiations invites accusations of helping Putin – but that’s misguided
Poles and Ukrainians pay tribute to the victims of the Russian invasion. Photograph: Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
The war in Ukraine shows no sign of abating, let alone ending. Unable to make headway on the battlefield, Russia has been bombarding Ukraine’s electrical infrastructure in hopes of freezing Ukrainians into submission as winter looms. The Ukrainians continue to press
their offensive against Russian troops, many ill-trained and poorly
motivated, to gain as much territory as possible before the cold sets
in.
The United States continues to provide economic aid and armaments to Kyiv. Another $275m in weapons and ammunition was pledged on 27 October, taking total US financial, military and humanitarian aid to more than $50bn since January. Additional assistance is certain.
As
the war drags on, the debate back home on how the US should handle it
is likely to get more pointed and accusatory. Indeed, we may have
already reached that point. Today, anyone broaching the subject of peace
negotiations, let alone proposing ideas for a settlement, invites
accusations of furthering Vladimir Putin’s narrative or providing aid
and comfort to the enemy. The Congressional Progressive Caucus learned
this the hard way recently, when its letter to President Biden proposing diplomacy to end the war was immediately vilified.
Facts on the ground make clear that the likelihood of immediate negotiations are virtually nil
That’s
more than lamentable; it’s harmful. It’s during times of war that
serious, unfettered discussion about the stakes, costs and risks of a
particular policy choice is not only appropriate but absolutely
essential. Arbitrarily policing the debate not only does a disservice to
free thought but potentially leads to a situation whereby common-sense
policy options are dismissed. Reasoned debate becomes a casualty.
Facts
on the ground make clear that the likelihood of immediate negotiations
are virtually nil. Ukraine’s forces are making slow but steady progress
and are trying to push Russian troops out of Kherson, so Kyiv has no
reason to sue for peace. Moreover, Ukraine
rightly fears that a ceasefire would leave about a fifth of its
territory in Putin’s hands and give him a respite to regroup his army
and then resume the offensive.
Alleged Russian war crimes in Bucha, Mariupol and elsewhere have made Ukraine all the more determined to win the war. Meanwhile, Putin’s unlawful annexation
of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson last month have further
convinced Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskiy that talks aren’t possible.
Still, although talks may be infeasible now, they may be possible later on.
An abandoned dog stands in front of a part of a destroyed Orthodox monastery in the village of Dolina. Photograph: AFP/Getty Images
War
is inherently unpredictable. The side advancing today could be
retreating tomorrow – or six months later. The course of this war makes
this evident. Early this summer, the Russian army, using its superiority
in artillery, pummeled Ukrainian positions in Luhansk and captured the
towns of Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk;
Ukrainian troops suffered heavy losses. Two months later, Russian
troops were beating a chaotic retreat and the Ukrainian army regained more than 3,000km of land in Kharkiv province within days.
The tide could turn again once as tens of thousands of new Russian recruits (even if many are poorly armed, equipped and trained)
join the fray and enable a Russian counteroffensive. The same Ukrainian
government that now regards talks as pointless may then be open to them
if it helps them avoid losing even more land. This may not happen, but
the possibility that it could means that suggestions for a settlement
should not be demonized.
As the war continues –
for months, perhaps years – the economic costs to the west in arms and
economic aid to Ukraine, already substantial, will increase,
particularly if Russia continues its relentless attacks on Ukrainian
economic assets. Moscow’s slashing of energy exports has already
contributed to an economic crisis in Europe. Germany, the EU’s largest
economy, risks slipping into a recession and has had to mobilize $200bn to help consumers and businesses battered by high energy prices. France and Spain saw their GDPs contract in the July-to-September quarter. Eurozone inflation reached 10.7% in October, a record high. In the Baltic countries, the rate exceeds 22% as fuel and food prices have rocketed.
There is always the possibility that the war could escalate and draw Russia and Nato into a direct confrontation
If
Europe’s economic conditions get even worse and a recession occurs in
the US, it isn’t far-fetched to imagine calls for a settlement becoming
more palpable if it helps reduce the economic burden.
Moreover, there is always the possibility that the war could escalate, potentially drawing Russia and Nato into a direct confrontation. Hence proposals to prevent this denouement through diplomacy should be welcomed.
Many dismiss the risk of escalation and Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling
as empty rhetoric. Perhaps it is. But none of us can know what Putin
would do if Russian conventional forces continued to lose ground or were
facing a complete defeat. Policymakers don’t have the luxury of
planning for the best-case scenario or hoping Putin will respond the way
we expect him too. We should be humbler about our powers of
prognostication: two years ago, who would have foreseen Europe
witnessing its worst war in nearly eight decades?
None
of this means a deal with Putin should be cut behind Ukraine’s back.
Nor should the US necessarily lead the process; simple geography
suggests that Europe should play a larger role on all fronts in
addressing the gravest threat to its security in a generation.
The
notion that offering proposals for ending the war betrays Kyiv and aids
Moscow is absurd. We need constructive discussions about diplomatic
solutions. One day, they will be needed.
Rajan Menon is the director of the grand strategy program at
Defense Priorities, a professor emeritus at the Colin Powell School for
Civic and Global Leadership at the City College of New York, and a
senior research fellow at the Saltzman Institute for War and Peace
Studies at Columbia University. He is the co-author of Conflict in
Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order
Daniel R DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a
foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune and Newsweek, among
other publications