Russian President Vladimir
Putin meeting Sheikh
Mohammed bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, the ruler of Abu
Dhabi and the president of
the United Arab Emirates,
in St. Petersburg on Oct
11 2022 [photo credit:
kremlin.ru]
As the war in Ukraine
plays out, are you
detecting significant
shifts in how the Gulf
states are responding?
Yes and no. Travelling
through the Gulf over the
last couple of months,
I've been speaking to a
range of policymakers and
academics. And many of
them are increasingly
concerned about this war,
no longer just being a
Ukrainian, European,
Russian issue, but being
one that could potentially
escalate way beyond the
boundaries, dragging in a
greater part of the world
economy and potentially
also seeing an escalation
in the nuclear field, and
then what would be the
ramifications and
consequences of that? So I
think early on, at the
beginning of the war, most
Gulfies were looking at
this war as being
something that is somewhat
geographically far removed
and is a European issue
that they don't
necessarily need to take a
side on. They're now
realising that it's in
their interest to make
sure that it doesn't
escalate further. And
they're questioning what
the European or the
Western or NATO strategy
is on Ukraine, and whether
the current trajectory
that the West is going on,
is actually going to
generate any tangible
strategic objectives. And
whether this could
actually lead to some sort
of resolution of the
problem at hand, or
whether this is just a
protracted Forever War,
that has the potential, at
every corner, to escalate,
and then drag in the
global international
community more than they
are already dragged in at
the moment. So there's a
lot of concern in that
regard.
And do you think
America is looking at
the region through old
optics, that it doesn’t
seem to realize that the
ground has shifted?
Yes and I think the other
issue is that the United
States doesn’t necessarily
realise how limited their
power is, or how limited
their ability is to
actually rein in
countries. The metrics of
power that the United
States chooses, which is
mostly military centric,
is distorting the real
influence that the United
States has in the Middle
East. But also beyond that
and I think Afghanistan,
what happened last year
certainly was another dent
in that reputation and the
Americans, they need a
moment of reckoning to
actually reconsider how
they want to be seen in
the world and whether what
they're standing for in
the world is something
that people want to buy
into and I think that the
Gulf countries
decreasingly want to
actually buy into that
narrative and hence are
diversified towards the
Russians, towards China,
but also other parts of
the world. And the problem
is that most of the
analysis of the Middle
East is done through
Western institutions by
Western analysts who also
take a very Western
centric point of view, and
cannot understand that
these Gulf countries,
they're in a different
part of the world, they're
part of this bufferstan,
buffer zone between East
and West. And if you look
particularly at the
dichotomy of the
bipolarity, between China
and the West, then the
Gulf is very much on the
frontier between these two
spheres of influence, and
they can't really choose,
they shouldn't choose
because it wouldn't be in
their national interest.
Yes, precisely,
America cannot force
them to choose.
The idea that America
doesn't allow these
countries - even the
bigger ones, even Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE -
doesn't allow them to
actually develop their own
national interests and
pursue policies in their
own national interest is
also something that most
Gulfies don't understand.
And what is quite
interesting is that most
Gulfies are aligned on
this. There might be a lot
of disagreement between
Qatar and the UAE, or
Saudi and the UAE. But
when it comes to their
right to pursue their own
national interest, this is
something that most of the
Gulf countries really are
aligned on and that
translates into the
Ukraine war.
In what way?
The credibility of the
project that NATO started
in supporting Ukraine, I
think most Gulf countries
now have come around and
said this is a very
legitimate thing to
support Ukraine and the
Russian aggression is
illegitimate. And that's
true for even Saudi and
the UAE. But that aside,
they're saying ‘what is it
that you're trying to
achieve? And how do we
know that we're on a
de-escalatory off ramp
that will bring this war
to an end? Because we
don't want to escalate the
conflict.’
Qatar has been much
more openly supportive
of Ukraine. Is that
playing to their
advantage? Or is there
danger of blowback?
I think, for Kuwait, and
for the Qataris, their
stand is one which is
based on values, which is
the standing up for
territorial integrity,
sovereignty and
international law.
Obviously, both Qatar and
Kuwait have experience
being on the receiving end
of international law
breaches and aggression,
Kuwait from Iraq, and
Qatar more recently, being
exposed to this from its
direct neighbours. And so
the Qataris have taken
very much an ideological
stance of saying ‘we have
to be on the side of
Ukraine, because this is
illegitimate, it's
illegal. And if we don't
stand up for it in
Ukraine, we can't stand up
for it elsewhere.' But the
Qataris at the same time
are saying that they're
standing up for
international law,
wherever it is. They're
saying ‘if we stand up for
Ukraine, we also have to
stand up for Palestine.’
And again, a lot of
criticism I've heard
across the Gulf, is
Gulfies saying ‘Why are
you so adamant to protect
the rights of Ukrainians,
but not very interested in
protecting the rights of
Palestinians?’
But beyond that, it's an
energy relationship. And
obviously the Ukraine
crisis has helped and will
help the Qataris to
basically sell more of
their LNG at the expense
of Russia. So while
Russian exports will be
diversified further east,
away from the West, I
think what we see now is
that Qatar in particular,
and their LNG, they will
obviously with the
expansion of the North
Field, see many of these
exports being exported
towards the West, on top
of all these exports that
are already going East.
So, again, here we see a
pivot of Qatar towards the
West in that respect.
There are some risks in
that. But we also
shouldn't forget that
unlike the UAE or unlike
Saudi Arabia, Qatar never
had a very intimate
relationship with Russia.
This was always a very
pragmatic one, it was one
that revolved around
energy. And ideologically
speaking, if you look at
all the crisis in the
region, the Qataris and
the Russians were always
on opposite ends. When it
comes to Libya, they are
on the other side, when it
comes to Syria, Qatar is
on the other side. So
ideologically,
geopolitically speaking,
this is not a sort of
partnership that is very
similar to the one between
the UAE and Russia, for
example. For the UAE,
there is an ideological, a
value-based relationship
between Russia and the
UAE. They look at most of
the crises in the region
from the same sort of
angle and also want to
pursue the same objectives
in the region when it
comes to authoritarianism,
clamping down on civil
society. The narratives
are very similar. And
Qatar, obviously doesn't
have that sort of
alignment with the
Russians.
Joe Biden
is very annoyed with the
Saudis over their oil
production cuts but the
Emiratis are also
significant OPEC
players. The UAE seems
to once again have
dodged the flak. So
do you think that
Mohammed bin Zayed, who
always plays the
advantage, will seize
the opportunity in this
current dispute between
Washington and Riyadh?
Oh, 100%, I think yes
definitely. Over the last
decade, whenever there was
a problem between the US
and the Gulf, it's mostly
a problem between the US
and Saudi Arabia. And then
the other smaller states
have always been ignored.
And the Emiratis have
absolutely benefited from
this. I would call MBZ
very much a Teflon guy.
Nothing ever sticks. And
that's true over Yemen,
true over Libya. The
Emiratis have, time and
again, played a role much
worse than the Saudis by
the way of not being a
partner. They've been
pushing back much longer
than the Saudis against
what were directives
coming from Washington or
the West, and still
they've gotten away with
it.
How have the Emiratis
managed that?
I think much of it has to
do with communication
strategy. The Emiratis are
much better at political
communication. They have
more extensive, more
enduring partnerships and
information networks
across all Western
capitals but Washington in
particular. The Emiratis
have ways to feed in their
policy objectives and feed
in their narratives to
very senior institutions
across Washington, across
the Western world, and
thereby have found ways
below and outside of the
public sphere to actually
communicate. And,
obviously, we've got all
the evidence of lobbying
and PR firms. The Saudis,
on the other hand, don't
have any of these genuine
networks. They used to
have that. I mean, there
were a lot of senior
Saudis like Adel al-Jubair
(Saudi ambassador to
Washington 2007-2015) for
example, who used to be in
key positions, who had
great personal
relationships with people
in Washington, who behind
closed doors could feed
certain narratives of
where the kingdom was
going, why they're doing
what they're doing,
explaining themselves. But
many of these
relationships have been
disrupted or have
basically collapsed since
2015. And definitely since
2018 and the Khashoggi
affair. A lot of the
Saudis with great
relationships in
Washington have been taken
out by MBS, some of them
have fled the country. So
in that regard, Saudi
Arabia doesn't have these
sort of enduring
relationships anymore.
They are unable to
communicate well, and
beyond that the Emiratis
have been very good at
letting the Saudis take
the flak first, which,
obviously, whoever is
being targeted first by
criticism is the guy with
whom the criticism will
stick. So on the OPEC
decision, it was the
Saudis who took the flak,
and the Emiratis didn't
say anything until a
couple of days later, when
they were saying we're
staying with Saudi Arabia.
But at that point, nobody
really cared because this
war of narratives had
already escalated, and the
Saudis were really in the
line of fire. The
Emiratis are using their
networks a lot more
subtly, (even though) they
don't necessarily have a
lot of plausible
deniability in what
they're doing. You know,
if you look at sanctions
evasion, in particular, I
think this is a key thing
to remember that the
Emiratis are offering the
Russians ways to bypass
sanctions. And they've
been doing that
proactively. That's not a
passive thing. It has been
encouraged by MBZ’s
brother. And this is
something that's been
happening for a long time,
and that the Emiratis have
got away with. So it's all
about how you design
statecraft and how you
communicate. I think the
Emiratis are much better
at this.
Finally, a question
about the World Cup.
The Qataris have spent a
huge amount of money on
it, they are receiving a
lot of criticism on the
migrant worker and human
rights front. Is Qatar
getting the return it
hoped for?
I think the jury's still
out, we'll have to see at
the end of the World Cup
what the impact is going
to be. Let's put it this
way. The 200 billion
pounds that was spent over
the last 12 years or so
have to be seen and
understood within the
wider agenda of the 2030
development plan. They've
used the World Cup as an
excuse, with clear
deadlines to actually
deliver infrastructure
projects that were
necessary. And I think
most Qataris will see it
as national development
rather than a development
for the World Cup. But the
question is really this:
Qatar wanted to be seen as
a more positive player in
the world, getting its
name out, being put on the
map. That certainly
happened. But I think not
necessarily in a positive
light. Let’s put it this
way: in the wider world, I
think it's a very positive
development. Qatar has
been very positively
received in South America
and Africa and Asia. And
also in North America, the
United States in
particular, there has not
been that criticism.
I think Europe is kind of
the outsider here, which
is obviously a huge issue
because Qatar has a very
important relationship
with Europe. Living in
Europe, we think that the
entire coverage of Qatar
is negative globally. It
isn't. It is very much a
UK, French, German,
Scandinavian kind of
issue. And the activism
has led to very good
reforms and very important
reforms in Qatar that were
absolutely necessary. I
think it was important
that pressure was put upon
Qatar because they
responded in the end, and
started some of these
reforms. But this advocacy
has now turned into some
sort of activism to
basically say anything
Qatar is toxic. And I
think that is something
that is probably there to
stay. So in terms of image
building, I'm not sure
where this is going to go
and what way and how Qatar
will be perceived. But I
would say this, that in
terms of development for
the country, I think it's
been very, very positive.
Because even the changes
in the Kafala system,
changes in the law in the
country have been
necessary and very
important developments.
And as such wouldn't have
been possible without the
pressure and without the
World Cup. I think Qatar
has become a better
country because of the
World Cup and because of
that activism and because
of all the negative
coverage, but obviously,
and that's the other
question is to what extent
will coverage change about
Qatar once the World Cup
is over?
And the negative
coverage, the criticisms
how do you think the
Qataris are handling
that?
I think for the Qataris
it’s been very, very
exhausting to actually
constantly try to fight
that game of saying we're
doing something but yeah,
is it enough? And
whatever, even when it is
enough, you're still going
to get criticized. The
Qataris weren't up for it,
I think they didn't
understand how much
scrutiny they would be put
under and what it means to
actually be put on the
map, and what the negative
ramifications of being in
the limelight actually
are. But I'd say take a
more global look: I think
for Qatar, this has been
and will be very positive.
Looking at Africa, the
Middle East, most Middle
Easterners are absolutely
excited for this World
Cup. You know, we will
have to take a global view
on this and see after the
World Cup how the
narratives and how the
coverage will change.