The Case for Keeping U.S. Troops in SyriaBy James Jeffrey - November 10, 2022
In
his October 10 article, “An Exit Strategy for Syria,” Christopher
Alkhoury argues that the United States has achieved its main objective
in Syria—eliminating an Islamic State (also known as ISIS) safe
haven—and should therefore focus on negotiating a swift withdrawal from
the country that both preserves U.S. access to Syrian airspace and
protects the Syrian partners who fought alongside U.S. troops. At first
blush, this argument seems sensible—after all, who wants another endless
war? But Alkhoury quickly rebuts his own argument by citing the
destabilizing effects of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, an event
that sent shock waves through the international system even though the
U.S.-led campaign was failing and Washington had few strategic interests
there. In Syria, by contrast, the U.S. approach is succeeding, if
modestly, and U.S. strategic interests abound. An Afghanistan-style
withdrawal from Syria would generate an even more destabilizing shock,
one that would make the chaos that accompanied U.S. President Donald
Trump’s brief call to pull U.S. troops out of Syria in 2019 look mild by
comparison.
But the problems with Alkhoury’s proposal run far
deeper than the Afghan analogy. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has not
won the war in Syria, as Alkhoury asserted. Nor did the Trump
administration freeze Syrian humanitarian funding, as Alkhoury’s piece
claimed when it was originally published (it halted and then partially
reinstituted a smaller stabilization program). More important than these
errors of judgement and fact is the reality that withdrawing from Syria
would endanger regional interests of the United States and of the
international community. That is why the Trump administration rejected
an approach similar to Alkhoury’s in 2018, a decision that subsequent
events have vindicated.
The core result of Alkhoury’s proposal,
although he wisely tries to play it down, would be to give the Russians
greater diplomatic and military bandwidth to increase their pressure on
Turkey and Israel to withdraw from Syria as well. That would eventually
leave all of Syria under the control of Assad, who instigated the war,
and hand Russia and Iran a strategic victory. The United States would be
transforming a relatively effective in-country operation that has just
900 soldiers—none of whom have been killed in almost four years—into an
offshore effort against ISIS, presumably in coordination with the tyrant
responsible for 650,000 deaths and the displacement of half his
country’s population.
Assad’s
efforts against ISIS are feckless. Moreover, military leaders at U.S.
Central Command have publicly stressed the need for a U.S. footprint in
Syria, not out-of-country bases, to suppress ISIS. Yes, Alkhoury is
correct that Iranian-backed militias attack U.S. positions in Syria—just
as they do in Iraq and elsewhere in the region. But retreat encourages,
rather than deters, Tehran.
In
2018, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo rejected a similar proposal
to partially withdraw U.S. forces from Syria and focus only on fighting
ISIS. He concluded that such an approach would not help resolve the
underlying civil war on the basis of the political compromise his
predecessor, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, had hammered out in UN
Security Council Resolution 2254, which called for a cease-fire and a
Syrian-led political transition, including negotiations with the
opposition for a new constitution. Nor would a U.S. withdrawal address
the plight of 12 million displaced Syrians and refugees who in the
absence of a political settlement would reasonably fear retribution from
Assad. Furthermore, a U.S. withdrawal would not address Iran’s
increasing influence within Syrian institutions and its stationing of
missile systems in Syria that threaten Israel. The fight against ISIS,
Turkey’s various security concerns, and the fate of U.S. Kurdish
partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), would also remain pressing
challenges for the United States and its partners.
Consequently,
the Trump administration built on Kerry’s efforts by coordinating U.S.,
Turkish, and Israeli military operations to freeze the conflict and
deny Assad victory. (Half of Syria’s population and 30 percent of its
territory, including much of its arable land and most of its hydrocarbon
resources, are still beyond his control.) The United States also
attempted to negotiate a comprehensive solution with Russia in 2019 on
the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 2254. And although Moscow
showed little interest in the negotiations, the freeze still worked.
With the exception of minor gains in early 2020, Assad’s forces have won
no additional territory, and the fighting has been minimal. After an
initial hesitation, the Biden administration adopted a similar approach
to the conflict in Syria.
The decision to stay in 2018 was risky;
U.S. soldiers were in danger, Turkey was adamantly opposed to U.S.
cooperation with the SDF, and new Assad offensives loomed. But despite
the Turkish incursion into SDF areas in 2019—which prompted Trump’s
brief call to withdraw—and an Assad-Russian offensive in 2020 against
Turkish and opposition forces in northwestern Syria, the containment
objective has held.
The relative success of this strategy has
only become more evident in the past four years, as the cease-fires have
held and several attempts by Arab states to reduce Assad’s isolation
have garnered no real response from Damascus. More importantly, in an
era of increasing geostrategic competition, including with Russia and
Iran, the United States must avoid giving away unnecessary strategic
victories. The Syrian freeze might not be pretty, but it is likely what
limited victory will look like going forward in Syria and perhaps
elsewhere.
JAMES
JEFFREY is Slater Fellow and Chair of the Middle East Program at the
Wilson Center. He served as a Foreign Service Officer in seven U.S.
administrations, most recently as Special Representative for Syria
Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.