UAE president Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan being greeted by the Sultan of Oman Haitham bin Tariq Al Said
Also disconcerting, most of the mainstream media reporting seemed
exclusively focused on the prospects of greater bilateral UAE-Omani
trade ties and infrastructure opportunities. While many of the
headlines were undoubtedly noteworthy, especially for neighbouring
states — including an announced new high-tech joint venture capital fund and a $3 billion cross-border railway project
— most were not really new developments. In fact, the joint fund was
already up and running, while the railway deal is believed to be quite
far advanced. Contrastingly, the UAE’s existing and planned linkages
elsewhere in the Arab world are considered far more significant, especially in Egypt, and therefore deserving of much greater need of attention.
In the past few days, however, further emerging details of MbZ’s trip
are seen as having added important extra context. According to some
sources, for example, the UAE delegation was particularly interested in
discussing future Gulf-Israel ties. This is significant, as the UAE and
Bahrain are currently the only two Gulf monarchies that have officially
normalized ties with Jerusalem — both having participated in the
September 2020 US-led ‘Abraham Accords’. With MbZ therefore still out on a limb (especially given suggestions that a substantial number of Emiratis actually oppose Israeli normalization),
getting Oman on board is evidently one of Abu Dhabi’s key foreign
policy priorities. After all, unlike Saudi Arabia, which has claimed it
will never fully normalize relations until there is a two-state solution, the official Omani news agency has already openly approved of the Abraham Accords.
Moreover, in parallel to MbZ’s formal entourage, it is now understood
that a parallel, national security-focused delegation was also in
town. Led by senior UAE intelligence officials, including Abu Dhabi’s de facto roving intelligence chief Ali al-Shamsi, it reportedly met with Houthi representatives,
aiming to sustain a UN-brokered truce in Yemen and safeguard Yemeni
energy exports. From the UAE’s perspective, the seven and a half year
war has not only turned into an inescapable quagmire, requiring them to partner with all manner of unsavory elements
on the ground but it has also turned around to bite them back, most
fiercely in the form of the Houthi-linked missile and drone attacks on
UAE territory in January and February 2022 — known in Sanaa as ‘Operation Hurricane Yemen’.
In this respect, Oman’s perceived interlocutory role (and neutral
location) is seen as vital. After all, an earlier March 2022 meeting in
Muscat between the Houthis and the UAE’s national security advisor,
Tahnoun bin Zayed Al-Nahyan, was credited with preventing further
airborne attacks (for more on Tahnoun see our newsletter of 6 June.) Certainly, even if the recent summit leads to naught — with the Yemen truce having already reportedly unraveled,
and with the price of peace having apparently been raised, if the UAE
can afford it — there seems little doubt that Abu Dhabi views ongoing
Omani mediation and facilitation as central to any future solution.