As US-China tensions escalate, another Taiwan Strait crisis becomes more likely. Washington believes that its regional role is contingent on maintaining Taiwan’s de facto independence, but efforts to preserve this could actually pose greater threats to the US role in Asia. Asian audiences blame both China and the United States for stoking tensions, as recently evidenced by the regional reaction to the visit to Taiwan by US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi. There is no obvious regional appetite to incur substantial risks of war to prevent China’s annexation of Taiwan, and regional states are — so far — unwilling to clearly signal how they would react in a Taiwan Strait crisis. Moreover, such a crisis could result in a nuclear exchange, killing millions, with flow-on consequences including environmental disaster and famine. If this occurs, “those left behind after Asia’s atomic mushroom clouds have settled will wish that we had fought with every fiber of our being to prevent it.”1
Three fundamental operating beliefs — almost unquestioned in Washington but not widely accepted in Asia — underpin the present US attitude towards Taiwan: 1) China is the only revisionist actor; 2) Asian states will enthusiastically support a US-led defense of Taiwan; and, 3) everything will be at stake in the next Taiwan crisis. If just one of these beliefs is mistaken, Washington’s thinking about another Taiwan Strait crisis is unsound. Below, we interrogate each assumption and set out competing interpretations to better imagine how a future Taiwan crisis might unfold.
WHAT IS THE STATUS QUO AND WHO IS REVISIONIST?
Washington and Beijing are both convinced that their own conduct is designed to maintain the status quo and the other party is revisionist. This has led to a spiral of insecurity and a breakdown of the vital US-China bargain of the 1970s-80s.
Seen from Washington, China is unquestionably revisionist and determined to take Taiwan by force. Thus, recent US initiatives to bolster Taiwan’s international standing, improve its defense posture, and preserve its existing diplomatic relationships are efforts to fortify the status quo of Taiwan’s de facto independence.
But Beijing understands the status quo differently: not as a static situation, but a trend line. Using the Three Communiqués, it argues that the US has previously recognized China’s position that Taiwan is an internal matter, eventually to be resolved through unification. Thus, Washington’s current policies are seen as reneging on the foundational understandings of US-China normalization.
Neither side can easily empathize with the other’s perspective. The result is a spiral of insecurity: both sides claim to be playing “co-operate,” while proceeding on worst-case assumptions of the other (and thus playing “defect”). Seen in this light, Taiwan has become symbolic of the ultimate contest for dominance in Asia: the debate over whether the US should defend Taiwan is now a debate over how this must be done.
What has fundamentally broken down is not mutual deterrence; it is the negotiated understandings about Sino-American relations — and Taiwan — that underpinned US-China normalization in the 1970s. Every other regional state built upon the 1972 One China formula when normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).2 Now, Washington and Beijing each believes the other has walked away from this consensus. Unless a new bargain is negotiated, the risks of conflict — including nuclear war — will escalate.3 Diplomacy is not an optional extra in the Taiwan Strait. A negotiated compromise has underpinned 50 years of peace, and now a new, mutually acceptable status quo — including understandings about the future of Taiwan — is required.
The disposition of regional states, including allies, is critical in determining whether US goals are realistic. Many regional discussions about a Taiwan contingency — especially in Washington, Tokyo and Canberra — are not yet sufficiently serious. This is dangerous. It confuses cosplay with strategy. In particular, Washington often conveniently assumes that allies in Asia — especially Japan and Australia — would dutifully fall in line to defend Taiwan. But neither Tokyo nor Canberra has ever issued a “blank check” on Taiwan.
Japan’s disposition is especially important, because it is doubtful that the US could defend Taiwan without the use of bases in Japan. Thus, we would also expect the reactions of other US allies in a Taiwan crisis to be contingent upon Tokyo’s response. But Japan’s willingness to support the defense of Taiwan has varied over the years. In the 1950s, Tokyo worried that US military action near Taiwan would trap Japan into a war against its wishes. In 1960, Tokyo gave the US a secret commitment that bases in Japan could be used for the defense of South Korea, but it has never explicitly and publicly confirmed that this would apply to Taiwan.
In 1969, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato noted that if the US-Taiwan alliance was activated by “armed attack from the outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East,” and Japan would “deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfilment by the United States of its defense obligations.”4 But the US-Taiwan alliance was abrogated in 1979, and Washington has no such defense obligation today. And Sato’s 1969 statement was preceded by a concerted effort to build “defense-mindedness” in a skeptical and reluctant Japanese electorate. Today, although Japan is thinking harder about its choices during a Taiwan crisis, Adam Liff notes that Tokyo’s “response to a hypothetical cross-strait conflict remains a big unknown. Nor should an unconditional commitment be expected.”5
In Australia, the previous government regularly rattled the saber when speaking about China. After Canberra’s call for an international inquiry into the origins of Covid-19 prompted economic retaliation and a diplomatic deep-freeze by China, Australian leaders came to believe that principled foreign policy would necessarily anger Beijing. In 2021, then Defense Minister Peter Dutton claimed it was “inconceivable that we wouldn’t support the US” in any conflict over Taiwan. He tried to claim that this “wasn’t a pre-commitment,” but was rather “a statement of reality.”6
The previous government’s decision to join the AUKUS technology-sharing agreement (involving Australia, the UK and the US) led some to claim that “if there’s a war, [Australia] will have to fight alongside [the] US.”7 But the public consensus on such a possibility is unclear: a bare majority (51 percent) of Australians polled would support a decision to assist the US to defend Taiwan, but there is little discussion in Australia about what risks such a crisis could present.8
The new Labor Government probably analyses Taiwan from a different perspective. In late 2021, Penny Wong, now Australia’s foreign minister, refuted Dutton’s claim that Australia’s non-involvement was “inconceivable.” Instead, she endorsed strategic ambiguity and warned that “a kinetic conflict over Taiwan, with the potential for escalation, would be catastrophic for humanity.”9 When Beijing responded to Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei by holding military exercises, Wong called on “all parties” — not just China — to de-escalate.10
South Korea, with greater concerns about North Korea and interdependence with China, is even more cautious. The rest of East Asia contains no US allies or partners that believe they have any obligations to support a campaign in the Taiwan Strait. In Southeast Asia, relative geographical distance and high interdependence with China will prompt leaders to worry most about the broader implications for regional stability and economic lifelines. As evidenced by the disjointed responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) do not hold a consensus position on how to react to such situations. When a Taiwan contingency is raised, regional officials are taciturn. They are reluctant to send premature signals to either Beijing or Washington. Many states are also concerned about their domestic constituencies, some of whom are supportive of China’s claims and/or critical of US hegemony. If a Taiwan Strait crisis is triggered by China, some smaller countries may be extremely concerned about the need to condemn a flagrant invasion. Yet every Southeast Asian state has adhered to a One China policy for at least three decades, and any decision to provide active support for a US military campaign will need to be balanced against a myriad of domestic risks and economic costs.
In
short, those looking for a strong or united response from the rest of
the region are likely to be disappointed. There will be uncertainty and
caution even in the case of US allies, and much more so among the
non-allied countries closer to China.
The stakes of a conflict over Taiwan will vary according to its duration and intensity. If China were to quickly succeed in invading or subjugating Taiwan through a blockade, with the US unable or unwilling to defend the island, then Beijing’s ability to project force would improve. From Taiwan’s east coast, PLA Navy submarines — including nuclear-armed ones — could evade detection, and military forces operating in the South China Sea would be more vulnerable to detection and pre-emptive attack by China.11
A rapid Chinese victory would also be the realization of the Chinese Communist Party’s most long-standing national objective. Unification would complete the process of national rejuvenation and place China on new footing to project itself internationally. The corollary will be a diminishment of US global standing and — most importantly — a huge blow to US self-confidence about its role in the region.
East Asian states must, and do, think squarely about a possible Chinese victory, however undesired it might be, because they are unable to withdraw to the other side of the Pacific Ocean if it occurs. This sober fact is a reminder that the oft-repeated regional rhetoric emphasizing the imperative of “maintaining regional stability” is sincere.
If the US rapidly defeats a Chinese attack or blockade of Taiwan, then American and regional perceptions of the aftermath might be radically different. Regional minds may worry that the resulting victory would be short-lived. We would end up with a China that is even more dissatisfied, angry and anti-status quo. Beijing would redouble its efforts to build the military capabilities necessary for a successful annexation in the future, and in all likelihood would attempt to aggressively damage US interests elsewhere in Asia. The region would be left with the problem of how to persuade Washington into even higher levels of deterrence.
The third scenario is one of extended conflict. The duration of a Taiwan contingency would depend on the ability of China and the US to keep the conflict contained. If the US is able to resupply Taiwanese forces, if the conflict expands within Northeast Asia (e.g. by North Korea becoming involved), or if China attacks US interests outside the Asian region, then the likelihood of a prolonged stalemate or wider conflict increases.
Beijing and Washington would be focused on how to win the war while coping with increased risks and costs. Regional states would be focused on how to cope with the implications of a prolonged conflict, including effects on trade, communications, financial-market turmoil and the disruption of essential supplies. This slow-burn, high-impact confrontation would likely bleed every Asian country dry, regardless of the side they choose. A sustained state of hostilities between China and the US would also make co-operation on other issues — including existential risks such as climate change — practically impossible.
But one indisputable fact should always be front of mind: The worst possible outcome would be nuclear escalation. Given that Beijing has stressed unification with Taiwan as a nation-defining goal since 1949, Beijing’s willingness to risk nuclear escalation is very likely greater than Washington’s.
But the possibility of nuclear conflict is too often discounted by the assumption is that a firebreak can be established, and the conflict kept “conventional.” This might be true for flashpoints such as the South China Sea. But in another Taiwan Strait crisis, the use of nuclear weapons will be horrifyingly possible. It could be prompted by “use it or lose it” concerns, “escalate to de-escalate” efforts, failures of command and control, or attempts to destroy large masses of military forces with tactical nuclear weapons.12
In the Cold War, crises forced decision-makers to rethink — and sometimes reorder — their national interests and priorities. US leaders, in particular, often entered crises believing that their national reputation was at stake, but they usually — eventually — changed their minds. When nuclear-escalation risks are considered, it becomes clear that rather than viewing a Taiwan crisis as a test of Washington’s reputation as a loyal ally, it may be the ultimate test of the US as a responsible global power.13
The
region will not applaud a demonstration of US “resolve” or “loyalty” if
this creates a high risk of nuclear war, or an even more dangerous
future. Rather, the region will rather praise restraint and prudent
policies that reduce the risk of Armageddon, and heighten the chances
for a new negotiated bargain between the US and China that includes a
peaceful future for Taiwan and the region. Proof of US loyalty, or
resolve, will be of little use to the few who survive any nuclear
exchange. They will be far more concerned about the dwindling supply of
canned beans in their nuclear fallout bunkers.
We have no desire to see Taiwan forcibly annexed by China. Nor are we recommending that Taiwan be pre-emptively abandoned. But before policy recommendations can be made, the full range of possibilities, costs and risks must be faced squarely.
Thinking through the costs and risks of defending Taiwan, and how acceptable or palatable the worst-case scenario would be, pushes us toward the recognition that the actual stakes of the next Taiwan crisis could be both more — and less — severe than usually imagined.
Some claim that Washington’s regional role will be fatally wounded by any retreat or defeat. But this thinking encourages US leaders to misunderstand the importance of their interests at stake. Compared to the Chinese and Taiwanese, Americans cannot attach a similar degree of national purpose to the status of Taiwan, and Washington will need to balance its interests there against other, critical concerns like avoiding the significant risks of nuclear war.
The future of Taiwan is a most serious conundrum, not least for the Taiwanese people. But regional perceptions and debates clearly reflect that this is not the only impossible challenge that will be faced should another Taiwan Strait crisis break out.
1 Brendan Taylor, “The Equation: What would a Taiwan war look like?” Australian Foreign Affairs, Issue 14, February 2022, p.47.
2 See Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3 On the centrality of negotiated bargains for regional order, see Barry Buzan and Evelyn Goh, Rethinking Sino-Japanese Alienation: History Problems and Historical Opportunities (Oxford University Press, 2020).
4 Eisaku Sato, “Address to National Press Club,” Nov. 21, 1969; US Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 91st Congress, pp.1428–1430; See Iain D. Henry, Reliability and Alliance Interdependence: The United States and Its Allies in Asia, 1949-1969 (Cornell University Press, 2022), Chapter 6.
5 Adam P. Liff, “Has Japan’s policy toward the Taiwan Strait changed? Monkey Cage blog, The Washington Post, Aug. 18, 2021, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/08/18/has-japans-policy-toward-taiwan-strait-changed
6 Daniel Hurst, “Peter Dutton attacks Penny Wong on China declaring he aims to deter ‘aggression’ on Taiwan,” The Guardian, Nov. 23, 2021, www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/nov/23/peter-dutton-attacks-penny-wong-on-china-declaring-he-aims-to-deter-aggression-on- taiwan
7 Tweet, from @AaronFriedberg, Sept. 17, 2021, twitter.com/AaronFriedberg/status/1438652705778642947
8 Natasha Kassam, Lowy Institute Poll 2022, Lowy Institute, Sydney, 2022.
9 Penny Wong, “Expanding Australia’s Power and Influence,” speech to the National Security College, Canberra, Nov. 21, 2021, www.pennywong.com.au/media-hub/speeches/expanding-australia-s-power-and-influence-speech-to-the-national-security-college-australian-national-university-canberra-23-11-2021/
10 Andrew Tillet, “Wong urges US, China to de-escalate tensions over Pelosi’s Taiwan trip,” The Australian Financial Review, Aug. 3, 2022, www.afr.com/politics/federal/wong-urges-us-china-to-de-escalate-tensions-over-pelosi-s-taiwan-trip-20220803-p5b6ug
11 Brendan Rittenhouse Green and Caitlin Talmadge, “The Consequences of Conquest: Why Indo-Pacific Power Hinges on Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2022, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-06-16/consequences-conquest-taiwan-indo-pacific
12 See Avery Goldstein, “First Things First: The Pressing Danger of Crisis Instability in US-China Relations,” International Security, Vol.37 No. 4, Spring 2013, pp.49-89.
13 On how US allies do not necessarily view its loyalty or reliability in ways that we expect, see Henry, Reliability and Alliance Interdependence, and Iain D. Henry, “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence,” International Security, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Spring 2020), pp. 45-83.