The IRG and human rights groups have pressed the Houthis to open
vital roads around Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, which have been
closed since 2015 by Houthi forces
To start with the IRG, its reluctance to extend the truce for more
than two months was due to the lack of past achievements. Its main
demand focused on the opening of roads primarily around Taiz and was a
basic element of the original truce which made very little progress
during the six months it lasted. This left the IRG with little to show
for its agreement. Other than the vastly reduced military casualties,
and “the longest period of calm,” Grundberg’s list of achievements of the truce
provided more benefits for the population living under Houthi control
and for the Houthis themselves. That’s not surprising as most of the
country’s 30 million people are under Houthi rule. Grundberg’s list
included “no major military operations and a 60 per cent decrease in
casualties; the reopening of Sana’a airport with 56 commercial roundtrip
flights to date, transporting more than 29 000 passengers …; over 1.4
million metric tonnes of fuel products delivered to Hudaydah ports, more
than three times the amount of fuel products entering in 2021; and
face-to-face meetings of the parties under UN auspices on military
de-escalation and road openings in Taiz and other governorates.”
In addition to the limited political achievements of the truce for
the IRG, its new leadership format, the Presidential Leadership Council
(PLC) formed in April in Riyadh is riven by dissention and ineffective,
not even meeting in person, leading the Saudis to summon its members to
Riyadh in September. Not only have neither its governance nor its
cohesion improved but the Saudis and Emiratis are still delaying their
promised US$ 2 billion financial support to the central bank, essential
to establishing PLC authority. As a result, the overall humanitarian
situation has continued to deteriorate, funded at a mere 49% of the
annual requirement on 20 October. Politically, the PLC started
unravelling with internal fighting between its factions focused in
recent months on control of Shabwa and Abyan governorates, with threats
to Hadhramaut and al Mahra. This internal strife encourages Houthi
intransigence, as it reduces the likelihood of an effective assault on
their forces in Marib and elsewhere.
From the point of view of the two states most deeply involved in the
Yemeni conflict, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the ending of the truce would
only become an urgent problem if Houthi drone and missile cross-border
attacks were to resume. For the Saudis, refraining from airstrikes on
Yemen serves a double purpose: it proves to its citizens that for them,
the war is over. It is also a minor concession to the US when, on other
fronts, the Saudis are not merely ignoring US pressure but actively
acting against US interests, as in the case of recent OPEC + reduced oil
output announcements.
Similarly, while the Saudis have been remarkably passive in the face
of STC [Southern Transitional Council] attacks against the elements they
support in the PLC, a bilateral Saudi-Houthi agreement could well lead
them to leave the Yemeni quagmire and mess to their Emirati allies [or
is it rivals?] This is by no means as far-fetched as it might seem:
recent weeks have witnessed what could be very significant progress for
the Houthis who often claim that the war is between Yemen and Saudi
Arabia: in mid-October, mutual delegations of Saudis and Houthis visited
each other’s countries, purportedly to verify lists of prisoners
due to be released under the 2018 Stockholm Agreement. However, the
size and identity of the delegations indicate that discussions were far
broader. This demonstrates two points: possible long-awaited progress in
the saga of the release of prisoners [see our posting of 23 August]
but, politically, it is the first open and public acknowledgement of
direct Saudi-Houthi negotiations. While no immediate final peace
agreement between the Houthis and the Kingdom should be expected,
something of the sort is clearly on the cards in the foreseeable future.
It is not in their interest for the Houthis to relaunch strikes
against the KSA or UAE, though they have made a point of displaying
their improved weaponry at a number of military parades on recent
historical anniversaries. While, incidentally, the multiplicity of
parades suggests rivalries within the Houthi movement, the most
important factor is that they openly displayed advanced weaponry clearly
identifiable as close, if not identical, to Iranian materiel. They have
also threatened oil companies to desist from exporting oil from Yemen,
something which is clearly related to their demand that salaries of
their personnel should be paid from oil revenues; this has caused
serious concern internationally and for the IRG.
As long as full-scale fighting and cross-border attacks are not
renewed, the negotiating processes can proceed and may eventually lead
to some agreements. Progress on the release of prisoners would be a very
welcome step forward for all sides and might be an incentive for other
concessions. But for the population at large, the worsening
humanitarian situation shows no sign of relief and the lack of funding
for the UN’s humanitarian plan by the Saudis and the Emiratis are the
main cause of this year’s low funding, a mechanism these states are
using to put pressure on Yemeni politicians though, in practice, as in
all similar cases, those who suffer are the citizens, not the
war-mongering elites.