

having it both ways. The basic dividing-line, like it or not, is between those who are deeply convinced that Spain cannot repeat the Spanish Republic's experiment with freedom of expression, freedom of political parties, and free elections without producing another civil war and are therefore determined that the experiment shall *not* be repeated, and those, the people clearly that Whitaker feels at home with and listens to in Spain, who are willing to "chance" it because they have somehow talked themselves into believing that the divisions a regime of free expression would bring to light would, this time, be less sharp, less violent, than before. Now there is not, either in Whitaker's book or in the heads of those Spaniards who would be his favorite dinner companions, one shred of evidence to justify any such optimism. Political freedom, American style, is not, in Spain, compatible with order. A proposal to move things in Spain along toward political freedom is, therefore, a proposal for a blood-bath. You must exert pressure in Spain on behalf of the forces of order or on behalf of the forces of disorder. If you don't see that, as the danger is that America's policy-planners will *not* see it, the power that the economic aid program gives you is, as Huneker liked to say, a razor in the hands of a baby. That is, if you like, tragic; but its being tragedy does not make it any the less the facts of life. And your happening to disagree with the forces of order in Spain about freedom does not make them any the less the forces of order, who alone can prevent the new blood-bath.

(c) All that, moreover, is indispensable to clear thinking and sound policy-making about the Franco dictatorship—that is, about Franco himself. We must get it through our heads that it is not "freedom" that Franco stands in the way of in Spain; freedom you are not going to get no matter which "side" you exert pressure for. (In one case you get authoritarianism, in the other a blood-bath, which as you may have learned from *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, isn't freedom either.) What has to be saved from Franco is, paradoxical as that may seem, precisely the Spanish authoritarians; and not of course saved from Franco's authoritarianism but from his misgovernment, his laziness, his indiffer-

ence not to freedom but to corruption. Which is to say (Whitaker is curiously timorous about this), *Franco must go* (be kicked upstairs, be made, e.g., a Prince of the Realm with no responsibilities except huntin' and fishin'). Any talk of liberalizing him, because as a matter of course that involves keeping him, merely fortifies him—by leaving Spain's authoritarian monarchists, who alone can create order in Spain, no alternative but to rally around him.

PEACE OR ATOMIC WAR? By ALBERT SCHWEITZER

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We stand constantly in the presence these days of a mode of argument that runs as follows: Proposition X, or Propositions X and Y, or Propositions X, Y and Z, if valid, would force certain conclusions that are *intolerable*. The propositions in question are, therefore, not valid. And the view of reality that has tended to make them seem plausible, or attractive, or unavoidable, must be a false view of reality. The task, therefore, becomes that of substituting for that false view of reality another view of reality which will yield up propositions whose validity we are entitled to take for granted because it does not lead to the conclusions declared intolerable. Nor do we require any criterion by which to evaluate this other view of reality than just that: we embrace it, *and all the tacit premises and clear implications* that go with it, because it assures us a means of escaping the intolerable.

X, Y and Z are, for this mode of argument, any variant of the following propositions: (1) The Soviet Union and World Communism must be dismantled because otherwise they will spread over the entire surface of the earth. (2) The great issue of our time is that between World Communism and the opposition to

World Communism; thus, that between the Soviet Union and the United States. (3) The issues at stake between World Communism and the opposition to World Communism, between the Soviet Union and the United States, are absolute, uncompromisable, save in the short term and on the level of unwarranted optimism, so that an ultimate showdown is off at the end unavoidable. (4) World Communism and the Soviet Union are not going to change in such fashion as to make that showdown other than unavoidable; and *we* can change in such fashion as to make that showdown other than unavoidable only by ceasing to be all that we have any right to value in ourselves.

And all these propositions are invalid—so, I repeat, runs the mode of argument I have in mind—because their acceptance leads ineluctably to conclusions that are intolerable; wherefore the view of reality that yields them up, that is, the view of the Communists and ourselves that we have entertained up to now, must go by the board. We must move to such-and-such another view of reality, and if someone says of that view of reality that it does not square with the facts, or that it also will lead to a state of affairs that is intolerable, well—and I come now to the major point—well, *we shall just have to take that risk.*

I oversimplify, you say? I exaggerate the weaknesses of the mode of argument in question, you say? No intelligent man would employ any such mode of argument, you say? Well, let's look into the matter a little, so that you can see for yourself that I do not oversimplify (usually the argument is both more brash, and *more* indifferent to patent difficulties than my schematic representation of it would suggest). I do not exaggerate those difficulties (they cannot be exaggerated). The hard task would be to find a man reputed to be intelligent who is not arguing along these lines (by confusing the extremely disagreeable with the intolerable; by abandoning all traditional notions of what is intolerable to civilized man; by telling any lie necessary about reality, historical *and* moral, in order to bring the argument off; and by insisting that *any* resultant risk, however frightening it used to be considered, is worth taking; and, above all, by ignoring all countervailing argument).

Let us take, for instance, that great and good man, Albert Schweitzer. X, for him, is the proposition that nuclear tests are a necessary part of the general defense against Communism and the Soviet Union. Y is the proposition that the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union may well lead to an atomic war. Z is the proposition that a Summit Conference, were one to be held, would accomplish nothing. Acceptance of these propositions, Schweitzer argues in his new book, *Peace or Atomic War*, leads necessarily to consequences that are—yes, just as we were saying, “intolerable.” “The Summit Conference must not fail; mankind will not again *tolerate* failure” (italics, here and below, are mine). As for the tests, “*We must not* be responsible for the future birth of thousands of children with the most serious mental and physical defects. . . . Only those who have never been present at the birth of a deformed baby, never witnessed the despair of its mother, dare to maintain that the risk in going on with nuclear tests is one which must be taken under existing circumstances.” Taking that risk, in other words, is intolerable. As for atomic war, it would be “the most senseless and lunatic act” that could ever take place, and “at all costs it must be prevented.”

Having thus taken his stand, our philosopher-musician-theologian-man-of-science proceeds to tell any lie about reality, about his opponents, about the choices to be made, that suits his book. Those who favor continuance of the tests are deliberately engaging in “propaganda”; are guilty of “complete disregard” of their harmful effects on future generations and a “lack of compassion”; are conspiring against the “truth.”

If the Rapacki proposal were adopted, the “maintenance of peace would be assured,” and the “beginning of the end of *the spectre that overshadows the Soviet Union* would become an accomplished fact.” The “testing and the use of nuclear weapons carry in themselves *the absolute reasons* for being renounced.” As for “what will become of poor Europe if American atomic weapons no longer defend it,” that is, what will happen if Europe is delivered to the Soviets—well, “perhaps the Soviet Union is *not quite so malicious* as to think only of throwing itself on

Europe . . . and perhaps not quite so unintelligent as to fail to consider whether there would be any advantage in upsetting her stomach with so indigestible a meal." "A Europe standing on its own has *no* reason to despair." To be sure, "East and West are dependent on presupposing a certain reciprocal trust in one another," and "we live in a time when the good faith of peoples is doubted more than ever before"; *but* "We cannot continue in this paralyzing mistrust."

Not even when the mistrust is clearly justified by the facts? Well, "another spirit must enter into the people." And therefore *will* enter into them? It will "if the awareness of its necessity suffices to give us strength to believe in its coming." Will it? Well, "We must presuppose the awareness of this need in all the peoples who have suffered along with us. . . . [We] must re-discover the fact that we—all together—are human beings, and . . . concede to each other what moral capacity we have. . . . Then there will arise the need for a new spirit which can be the beginning of a feeling of mutual trustworthiness. . . ."

Suppose that feeling does not arise? No answer, save that which is between the lines of every page: this is a risk you have to take, because the alternative is "intolerable." Not just very unpleasant, and perhaps less unpleasant than the predictable results of taking the risk? No, indeed.

In a word, the spread of the Communist movement over the entire world, *never once mentioned by Dr. Schweitzer as a possibility*, much less as *the possibility* that haunts the minds of his opponents, is "tolerable" in some sense in which the possibilities he stresses are *not* "tolerable."

These are, I repeat, lies; and Dr. Schweitzer is—not a liar, for to say that would be to say he knows better—a purveyor of falsehoods. But the intellectual crime to which I wish to direct attention is far less the misrepresentation of reality, which I deem to be derivative, than the playing of games with the word "intolerable." And the resultant rejection of the role of the intelligent and courageous man in history—that is, the careful and responsible weighing of the goods and evils among which man is free to choose. For to reject that role is to refuse to be free.

AN HISTORIAN'S APPROACH TO RELIGION.

By ARNOLD TOYNBEE

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Arnold Toynbee's new book offers us (1) a history of man's worshippings, (2) an explanation of the great turning-points in that history, (3) an analysis of man's present politico-religious predicament, (4) a prediction as to how man will extricate himself from that predicament, and (5) a long-run solution to man's religious problem, one aspect of which is a religious "message" of sorts. It would, therefore, be a bargain even at twice its price; and Suburbia, which in books at least has a sharp eye for a bargain, will predictably buy and absorb it in vast quantities.

First, then, as to the history of man's "worshippings," or in Toynbee's own phrase man's "religions" (this term he uses broadly enough to cover everything, e.g., Nationalism and Technology, to which, consciously or unconsciously and with or without religious experience, man has ever subordinated himself). Where I distinguish between "worshippings" and "religion," Toynbee distinguishes between "religions" and "higher religions." Here, though specialists will pick quarrels with him on matters of detail (and will no doubt win most of the resulting arguments), Toynbee the professional historian is in his element. He has a carefully worked-out story to tell, and he brings to the telling of it the vast learning, the profound sense of drama, the sympathetic imaginativeness, and above all the rich gift of phrase that have marked all of his historical writings. Human societies and communities, he declares, have at different times and places worshipped one or another of "no more than three objects . . . namely, Nature, Man himself, and an Absolute Reality that is not either Nature or Man but is in them and at the same time beyond them."