Ukraine – the situation (September 6, 2022)
No clear signs of Ukraine’s ballyhooed counteroffensive while protests in Europe show waning public support for the war
Summary/Overview
- Russia cut Nord Stream 1, its main natural gas pipeline to Europe, blaming it on sanctions and saying it would be long-lasting. Energy prices surged; European currencies dropped to multi-decade lows.
- Ukraine President’s office “explained” the Kherson offensive – or low visibility thereof – by telling the Wall Street Journal the goal was not quick territorial gains but the “systemic grinding of Putin’s army.”
- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) mission to investigate the safety situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant has arrived. Mission leader Rafael Mariano Grossi has not yet delivered his report on the shelling of the facility and the plant’s overall safety. But ten or so members of his mission remain at the Energodar site and have proved the value of their continued presence by clarifying plant safety after a powerline was cut two days ago.
- Russia claims – and there’s some independent evidence – that just prior to the arrival of the Grossi mission the Ukraine military sent commandos on barges and speed boats across the Dnepr River from the Nikopol side attempting to take over the plant. All that’s known for certain is that there was fighting near the plant in the early morning prior to the IAEA mission’s arrival.
- In the South, there was company-strength fighting along the lines of control since March at and to the north and northeast of the town of Arkhanhelske.
- In the East/Center theater, Russian forces continued their slow grind west out of the city of Donetsk and, further north, into the town and transportation hub of Bakhmut.
South
Ukrainian Presidential Advisor Oleksy Arestovych yesterday told the Wall Street Journal that the goal in the south is the “systemic grinding of Putin’s army” and that “there’s no rush.”
This was underlined and amplified by Ukrainian special operations officer Taras Berezovets, who told Al Jazeera that the Ukrainian offensive will gain speed as Western military equipment arrives in Ukraine and adding that, “Currently the armed forces of Ukraine feel the lack of armored vehicles for our infantry. We feel the lack of our air forces. We need tanks and we need artillery first of all.
“From this perspective, I would say any sort of counteroffensive [to retake Kherson city] would be possible after receiving all of these armaments. It will take several months at least.”
While the Ukrainian General Staff (UGS) has been quiet following its August 29 reports on breaking through Russian defenses at several points in the Kherson region, it is now clear that no such break-outs occurred. And this, of course, is clear to NATO observers who frequently follow the action (or lack thereof) in real-time.
The lines of control established in March running about halfway between the cities of Kherson and Mykolaiv in the south, some 60 kilometers north-northeast from Kherson City around a Ukrainian bridgehead across the Inhulets River and about 100 to 110 kilometers northeast of Kherson City from Arkhanhelske to the Dnepr River have remained largely unchanged.
To the east of Arkhanhelske, Russian forces have been probing north toward the village of Potomkyne; a bit further west the Ukrainians claim to have moved into the village of Olhyne. But on our map that marks the line of control as established in March and both of those villages were in Ukrainian-held territory.
Somewhat more telling action may be happening at the Inhulets bridgehead where the Ukrainians have tried to push in a southeasterly direction. But after a few kilometers’ move into Sukhy Stavok, they were stopped on August 31 and have not moved any further.
As we noted near the end of July when the Ukrainian offensive was first announced on July 23, it would be an obvious Ukrainian move to push east and southeast out of the bridgehead while simultaneously moving south from the Kryvyi Rih area and trapping Russian forces west of the Dnepr. If we saw that, then surely the Russians did as well and now the obvious has become a standoff.
Ukrainian special operations officer Berezovets is right: the Ukrainian army does not have enough tanks and artillery to mount a fast-moving counteroffensive. Most importantly, they do not have any significant air support.
The UGS reported 21 sorties yesterday, including drones. By any measure, that certainly does not support decisive offensive actions. Much of it is probably for artillery guidance and some quick hits on an ammo dump here or there.
Ukrainian Air Force aircraft fly during drills over an unidentified location in Ukraine in this screen grab from an undated handout video. Image: NBC News / ScreengrabThere’s action on the main road connecting Kherson City with Mykolaiv, but no visible progress by either side and not much conviction in the moves.
So much as in the East and Center, the war has settled into a grind. But a war of attrition is not the war a smaller country wants to fight against a much larger invading army.
Assessment
What’s noteworthy is that the Russian grind westward out of Donetsk is progressing a kilometer here, two kilometers there and over time even such slow advances pose the threat of a breakout of Russian forces into the western parts of the Donetsk Oblast. If nothing else, that’s enough to prevent the Ukrainians from shifting additional forces South.
To the north, the Donetsk region action is supported by continuing pressure, spearheaded by Wagner Group paramilitary units, on the transport hub of Bakhmut that controls the mouth of the Donbas salient. South of the city of Donetsk, Russian forces are continuing to probe north toward Vuhledar and beyond Velyka Novosilka.
Along all front lines, Russian artillery is firing up to 40,000 rounds daily compared to about 6,000 to maximally 8,000 by the Ukrainians. Against 20 Ukrainian air force sorties, the Russians never fly less than 100 per day and are clearly holding air power in reserve.
Those are key “grind ratios.” As noted above, a slow grind is hard to construe as a winning Ukrainian strategy.
This is underlined by the broader strategic constellation. Russia is making big money on energy without even trying. Europe is in an energy crisis that will only deepen as winter nears.
Popular support for Ukraine in Western and Eastern Europe is waning. Perhaps this became most strikingly obvious when German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock said in Prague recently, “I don’t care what my German voters think. I will support Ukraine.” (Bit of a strange comment for someone fighting for freedom and democracy).
Meanwhile, 70,000 demonstrated in Prague and called for “warmth” and peace. In Leipzig, Germany, the rally cry of thousands was “No weapons, diplomacy!!”
Demonstrators in Prague demand a new gas deal with Russia and an end to sanctions over the war in Ukraine. Image: TwitterFor now, Ukraine can still count at least on American support. But this is threatening to become an American war, at least an American-financed one. Does Ukraine want to bet that that continues? That’s the main risk of a slow grind strategy.
And in conclusion another matter of “diplomatic” concern. As an American military analyst writes:
“Geolocated video from 2 days ago showed Russian artillery firing MLRS rockets from the area of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). It is worth noting that that was not the original issue, the issue was rounds headed into the plant; it was accepted that Russian forces were firing from the general vicinity of the plant.
This seems to wind back to my suspicion that when the HIMARS arrived in southern Ukraine, with their much-improved accuracy, someone got a bit cocky and returned fire, comfortable with the idea that the rounds would not hit the reactor. (The first report that I recall of worries of rounds being fired at the plant, except in early March when the Russians fought their way in, came after HIMARS arrived in country.)”
The IAEA’s Grossi might be able to supply an answer. But most likely he won’t.
Follow Uwe Parpart on Twitter at @uwe_parpart