… the Russian militarists, upon hearing of the Austrian ultimatum, at once jumped to the conclusion that war was ‘inevitable,’ [and] began secret military preparations and urged ‘general mobilization’ at as early a date as possible…. [I]t is also clear that ‘partial mobilization’ against Austria was a mere diplomatic ‘bluff’… Henceforth the army leaders, recognizing that partial mobilization was folly on account of the technical and political difficulties involved in it, exerted steadily increasing pressure for general mobilization, and the danger was that… the Tsar [would] consent to the final military step which would probably make general war inevitable. —S B Fay, The Origins of the World War (1938) … European affairs were growing increasingly desperate, and one was burdened by the constantly nagging feeling that if we would only take the right line, the course of events might be influenced for good, Hitler held in check, and the war prevented. There was a hope then, and it did matter what line we took; during that last decade this country exercised a leading influence in Europe and still held a position of leadership in the English-speaking world. All that has changed now: the real decisions are made elsewhere. —A L Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement (1961) If you liked this post from Talleyrand, why not share it? © 2022 Talleyrand |